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 Abstract 
Rural off-farm labor markets and land rental markets in China face many 
institutional obstacles and remain largely underdeveloped. The current land tenure 
system is the most crucial hindrance. This study uses data collected from 479 
randomly selected farm households in Henan province to explore the impact of 
land tenure arrangements on off-farm labor markets and land rental market 
development and the combined effects of land institutions and factor market 
development on agricultural production.  
Based on the notion of tenure security and transferability as the main ways 
through which land tenure affects behavior, this study uses four variables to 
measure land tenure arrangements. Two variables have been chosen to represent 
tenure security: the number of reallocations that have taken place in a village 
since the HRS was established and household expectations of land reallocation in 
the next few years. The share of households with certificates in a village and land 
transfer rights possessed by a household are used to indicate household land 
transferability. 
The determinants of off-farm employment participation, off-farm employment 
labor allocation, as well as its duration were analyzed using probit, poisson and 
tobit models. Factors affecting land rental market participation and the transaction 
amount were analyzed using Cragg‟s double-hurdle model with the assumption 
that the decision to participate in land rental markets precedes the decision on its 
transaction amount. Simple Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression was used to 
investigate the impact of land tenure, off-farm employment and land rental 
participation on land and labor productivity. Finally, a one-step Stochastic 
Frontier Production model was employed to examine the determinants of 
technical efficiency. 
The empirical analyses indicate that land tenure security and land transferability 
provide incentive for household off-farm labor market and land rental market 
participation, while migration could facilitate land rental market development by 
increasing land rental supply, and finally, the development of land rental markets 
improves the efficiency of land allocation, agricultural productivity, as well as 
technical efficiency.  
Based on the empirical results, a number of policy options can be formulated as 
follows. Firstly, further reform the land tenure and Hukou systems. Secondly, 
build local institutions that facilitate land transfer and off-farm employment. 
Thirdly, promote rural industry. Finally, invest in infrastructure construction and 
social services. These policy measurements are likely to facilitate land rental 
market development and stimulate off-farm employment, thereby increasing 
agricultural productivity and rural household incomes and reducing rural-urban 
income inequality. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Background 
Economic reform in China since 1978 has led to two important results: rapid 
economic growth and tremendous structural change. From 1979 to 2011, China‟s 
real gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of nearly ten 
percent (Morrison, 2012). The proportion of the labor force employed in the 
agriculture sector decreased from 69 percent in 1980 to 36 percent in 2011 (NBS, 
2012). China‟s economic reforms started with agriculture. During the period 
1979-1984, agriculture was the driving force of economic growth, showing an 
average annual growth of 7 percent. Despite this, the relative importance of 
agriculture in the Chinese economy has decreased, in 2011 agriculture still 
contributed ten percent to overall GDP and the rural population stood at 49 
percent of the total (NBS, 2012).  
While improved technology created the preconditions for rural growth, 
institutional changes, especially the emergence of the Household Responsibility 
System (HRS) that closely linked farm household income to their own 
performance, were the key factors that induced rapid growth in agricultural 
productivity (Fan, 1991; Lin, 1992; McMillan et al., 1989). With economic 
development, rising agricultural productivity decreased the demand for labor in 
agriculture, providing strong incentive for rural labor to shift to off-farm 
employment (Feng, 2008). The growth of rural Township and Village Enterprises 
(TVEs) in the 1980s and private enterprise in the 1990s were the main factors in 
absorbing a huge amount of surplus rural labor (Shi, 2007).  
Rapid growth in agricultural productivity and rural industry has been an important 
engine for China‟s economic growth and a key reason for rapid poverty reduction 
in China. In 1981, China was the sixth-poorest country in the world, with a 
poverty headcount of 84 percent. Growth in the primary sector, mainly in 
agriculture, was four times more effective in reducing poverty than growth in the 
secondary and tertiary sectors (Ravallion and Chen, 2007); this helped reduce the 
poverty headcount to 16 percent by 2005, well below the developing world 
average of 26 percent (Ravallion, 2009). 
The growth of TVEs, however, was not sufficient to fully employ the labor 
surplus from agriculture. The slower growth of TVEs in the second half of the 
1990s and the increasing demand for labor in coastal regions, which experienced 
industrial growth, triggered the migration of rural labor to private enterprises in 
these regions. As they responded to employment prospects and income 
differences (Lin et al., 2004), migrants contributed to rising rural incomes and 
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well-being and the success of coastal export industries (Liu et al., 1998; Zhai and 
Wang, 2002). The magnitudes are immense, there were more than 279 million 
rural laborers that worked off-farm in 2008 (Huang et al., 2010). At the household 
level, the difficulty of getting a residence permit in cities and the implied high risk 
of moving out of agriculture and abandoning land leads to temporary migration 
and part-time farming. 
Chinese agriculture is characterized by scarcity of land, abundant labor and 
small-scale production using little mechanization (OECD, 2005a). There are 
currently 200 million farm households, cultivating an average of 0.5 hectares of 
land each (NBS, 2012). Future increases in agricultural productivity and rural 
incomes and a slowing or reversal of the trend in the rural-urban income gap are 
likely to depend on further structural change of the economy and within the 
agricultural sector itself. This means a smooth movement of labor out of the 
agricultural sector and for farmers remaining in the agricultural sector, an increase 
in farm size to achieve economies of scale. However, institutional factors still 
pose enormous challenges to labor and land resource mobility. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
China is a large developing country with its economy in transition. Over the past 
decades, marketization, urbanization, and modernization are taking place at a 
dizzying pace (HART, 2012). However, economic growth has not benefited the 
country equally. There are large disparities between rural and urban areas leading 
to some major issues in contemporary China. The development of the agricultural 
sector is far behind the development of the second and tertiary industries. Wage 
differences result in a massive movement of labor away from the agricultural sector 
to seek higher incomes. However, lack of basic social security arrangements makes 
it hard to settle in cities, the large floating population becomes a potential threat to 
social stability. There are also land issues related to labor mobility and urbanization. 
Today, these issues are major concerns of both government and academia. 
China had a huge urban-rural divide before the economic reform due to many 
policy biases in favor of urban citizens in the central planning era. In 1978, China‟s 
per capita income of urban residents was about 2.56 times of that of rural residents 
(NBS, 2012). In the early years of the economic reform, overall urban-rural 
inequality declined following the institution of the HRS. In more recent years 
however, the urban-rural divide has widened (ZHONG, 2011). In 1985, the per 
capita income ratio between urban and rural households had decreased to 1.86, 
however in the 2000s, income growth for urban households was far more dramatic 
than that for rural households. By 2011, the per capita urban-rural income ratio 
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escalated to 3.13 (NBS, 2012) which is extremely high by international standards 
(WORLD BANK, 1997). Moreover, the consumption gap between the urban and rural 
populations is also wide. In 2011, per capita consumption of an urban resident was 
2.9 times of that of a rural resident (NBS, 2012). 
In addition to income and consumption disparity, rural-urban inequality is also 
reflected in the quantity and quality of infrastructure and public services (ZHONG, 
2011). The cost of infrastructure and public service provision is significantly 
higher in the countryside than in cities because of the former‟s lower population 
density and its inability to realize economies of scale in service provision. Urban 
residents are also better covered by social safety nets, while the rural Hukou 
population, including rural migrant workers in cities, has to mainly rely on their 
own devices (for example, rural land) or on rural collective enterprises of various 
levels of profitability for social protection (ZHONG, 2011). 
There are a large number of rural migrants, the total number of rural to urban 
migrants reached 139 million in 2011, about 30 percent of the total rural labor force 
(NBS, 2012). Restrictions on migrants‟ ability to achieve residency at the 
destination imply that virtually all migration is temporary (FLEISHER AND YANG, 
2003). Consequently, migrants in cities are treated differently than their urban 
registered counterparts. They often obtain lower-end jobs and are not entitled to 
social welfare and social services which are available to urban Hukou people. As 
such, migrants and their families have no access to unemployment, health care, or 
pension support in cities and their children only have limited access to urban public 
schools (MENG, 2012). 
There are many explanations for China‟s widening urban-rural disparity. Income 
differences between urban and rural population is not unique to China as labor 
productivity in manufacturing and services is generally higher than that in 
agriculture (SICULAR ET AL., 2005). Regional economic development theories 
suggest that under perfect market conditions, productivity gaps across localities 
will propel migration and help narrow the income gap over time. However, the 
productivity gap only explains a minor proportion of China‟s urban-rural inequality 
(SICULAR ET AL., 2005). Most researchers believe that a set of discriminating 
institutional arrangements is the core reason for the large rural-urban disparity 
(MENG AND ZHANG, 2001; WHALLEY AND ZHANG, 2007; LU AND SONG, 2006). 
According to AU AND HENDERSON (2003), China‟s urbanization lags far behind its 
industrialization and national economic development. The Hukou system, though 
much less restrictive than before, still limits labor mobility and population 
redistribution across regions and between urban and rural areas. At the same time, 
destination governments are under great financial pressure to provide social 
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security for an increasingly enlarged body of laid-off workers, State-Owned 
Enterprise retirees and urban poor with Hukou designation. Provision of social 
security, housing and children‟s education for migrants is still not the top priority 
on local government agendas. 
Lack of social security, housing and children‟s education arrangements makes it 
impossible for rural migrants to cut the linkage to their lands. Once the migrants 
lose their jobs in cities, rural lands become their last resort for employment and 
income (TAO AND XU, 2007). On the other hand, land tenure arrangements 
characterized by small farm size and frequent reallocation due to the egalitarian 
distribution principle, make it risky to migrate for a long time because the migrants 
may lose their land in the next session of land reallocation. 
Despite the importance of land to the livelihood of the rural population, land is 
frequently grabbed by urban governments to fuel urban economic growth because 
it is the most important financing vehicle for China‟s large scale urban 
development (TAO AND XU, 2007; DEININGER AND JIN, 2009; ZHONG, 2011). In the 
process of accelerated urbanization and industrialization, land requisition in which 
local governments purchase agricultural land from farmers and turn it to industrial 
and commercial uses become more and more frequent. However, since land use 
change from rural to urban in China can only be carried out through government 
requisition (monopolized purchase) under the current legal framework, insufficient 
compensation to farmers in land requisition has led to millions of farmers losing 
land, resulting in bitter complaints and even social unrest (DEININGER AND JIN, 
2009). Therefore, in recent years, disputes related to land requisition have become 
a contributing factor to the uneasy urban-rural relationship and social instability 
(XIE AND SHAN, 2011). 
To solve the problems of administrative land reallocation and land grabbing, many 
scholars argues that more clear recognition of land-use rights and resource 
reallocation through a market system is the way out (YANG, 2003; TAO AND XU, 
2007; DEININGER AND JIN, 2009). However, land rental transactions were seldom 
evident in the 1990s, as leasing activity reportedly occurred on a mere three to 
four percent of the arable land (TURNER ET AL., 2001). After the implementation of 
encouragement policies for land transfer (e.g. Rural Land Contract Law), land 
rental activity started to expand. According to farm survey results, 18.1 percent of 
households rented land and 12.6 percent of households rented out land from such 
markets in 2005 (TU AND HEERINK, 2006). Nevertheless, DEININGER AND JIN (2007) 
find that contracts remain informal and unwritten, and are frequently made with 
relatives. Therefore, the land rental market in China is underdeveloped. 
Problems related to income, land, infrastructure and public services are 
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interconnected with one another and part of China‟s unique institutional framework, 
a vicious cycle can form if things go wrong in one aspect (ZHONG, 2011). Loss of 
land can depress rural economic development (both in agriculture and rural 
industries) and hence household incomes. Low levels of economic development 
also lead to funding shortages in infrastructure and public services when transfer 
payment is limited. While poor infrastructure further retards economic 
development, public service deficiencies cause the deterioration of human capital 
(e.g. low education levels, poor health), which will eventually compromise labor 
productivity and economic efficiency in the long term. 
Although migration helps uplift the living standard of many rural households both 
in cities and back home (FAN, 2008), labor mobility is restricted by both Hukou and 
land institutions (MULLAN, GROSJEAN AND KONTOLEON, 2011). Therefore, a better 
understanding of how these institutional factors affect the shifting of labor out of 
agriculture, to bring about rural structural transformation and productivity growth, 
will be important in light of a number of recent concerns. These include rising 
rural-urban inequality, the challenges posed by a gradual exhaustion of the pool of 
cheap labor in the country‟s interior, an aging rural population, and a need for 
continued agricultural productivity growth to overcome land and water scarcity 
(DEININGER ET AL., 2012). Hence, this study analyzes how one of these institutions, 
the land tenure arrangement, affects market-based land and labor transfer and 
agricultural productivity. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The major focus of this research is to explore the impact of land tenure 
arrangements on the development of labor and land rental markets and the 
combined effects of land institutions and factor markets development on 
agricultural production. Specifically, this study intends to address the following 
objectives: 
To investigate the impacts of land tenure arrangements on the off-farm labor 
market development. 
To examine the impact of land tenure arrangements and off-farm employment on 
the development of land rental markets. 
To analyze the combined effects of land tenure arrangements and factor markets 
development on agriculture productivity and technical efficiency. 
To provide useful information to policy makers on how to improve land and labor 
policy. 
 INTRODUCTION      6 
1.4 Organization of the Study 
The short introduction presented in this chapter is followed by an overview of the 
agriculture reform and related policies in chapter two. This chapter focuses on the 
major reforms in agriculture and its achievements, land tenure arrangements and 
related policies as well as labor mobility policies. General land problems and labor 
mobility situations in China will also be addressed in this chapter. 
Chapter three consists of definitions of key concepts used in the research followed 
by the theoretical review of the major structural change, labor mobility and land 
property theories developed over the years. The theories considered of which this 
study based on are explained in detail along with the main conceptual framework of 
the study. 
Chapter four presents a brief overview of the study area followed by the survey 
design including methods of data collection and the general approach for analyzing 
the collected data. It also describes some selected socioeconomic characteristics 
and important variables for econometric analysis. 
Chapters five, six and seven form the core of this study, presenting the main results. 
These chapters stand as “independent” chapters each consisting of an introduction, 
analytical framework, empirical results and discussion, and a chapter summary. 
Chapter five specifically deals with the determinants of the household off-farm 
employment decision, including migration and local off-farm work. Chapter six 
analyses the determinants of land rental market participation and its intensity, the 
impact of land tenure arrangements and labor market development are specific 
concerns. Chapter seven dwells on agricultural productivity and technical 
efficiency analysis.  
Finally, chapter eight summarizes the problem statement and major findings, 
followed by conclusions and potential policy implications. Additionally, the 
limitations of this study are highlighted.
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2 OVERVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL, LAND, AND 
LABOR POLICY IN CHINA                          
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the agricultural reform in China, 
which is one of the main driving factors of Chinese agricultural growth (FAN, 1991; 
CHEN ET AL., 1997; 1997; LIN, 1992; ZHONG ET AL., 1999). Additionally, follows a 
brief history of land tenure system and labor policy before and after reform with 
particular focus on current policy issues are presented in the last two sections. 
2.1 Agricultural Reforms and Related Policies 
Agricultural reforms have played an important role in China‟s economic 
resurgence over the past three decades (ROZELLE AND SWINNEN, 2004). 
Re-establishing household agricultural production was the spark that ignited the 
process of establishing markets and relinquishing direct government control over 
the economy (LOHMAR ET AL., 2009). The impact was dramatic, productivity and 
incomes in the country soared (LIN, 1992; MCMILLAN ET AL., 1989). The reforms 
lifted hundreds of millions of rural households out of dire poverty (WORLD BANK, 
2000). Hence, reviewing a comprehensive range of issues related to the agricultural 
reform will help to understand the clear picture of the associated problems and 
possible entry points for improvement. 
At the establishment of the People‟s Republic in 1949, China was still an 
agricultural economy in an industrializing and urbanizing world (LOHMAR ET AL., 
2009). In the 1950s, the government started to spur industrialisation by adapting 
Soviet-style collective agriculture. Consequently, collective farming under the 
Commune system was introduced in 1958 (CHOW, 2004). Hundreds of millions of 
farmers were organized into a hierarchy of about 24,000 “People‟s Communes”1 
(LOHMAR ET AL., 2009). Communes were divided in turn into production brigades 
and production teams. Agricultural operations were organized in the production 
team. Each team consisted of about 20-30 neighboring households (LIN, 1992). 
Except for limited cash crop production on small plots of land near individual 
households in some areas, all agricultural production decisions were made by local 
leaders in accordance with a production plan established by higher level leaders 
(LOHMAR ET AL., 2009). Local leaders were obligated to deliver their quota of 
agricultural production to local stations run by state-owned marketing bureaus. 
Marketing bureaus made planned transfers of products from surplus to deficit areas 
at prices determined by the central government (SICULAR, 1988; LOHMAR ET AL., 
                                                             
1
People‟s Communes were a type of large rural organization introduced in China in 1958. Communes began as amalgamations of 
collective farms; later, they become multipurpose organizations for the direction of local government and the management of all 
economic and social activity (Yang, 1996; Chow, 2004; Lohmar et al., 2009). 
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2009). Agricultural prices were set low and industrial prices high to extract 
resources from agriculture to invest in urban and industrial development (LOHMAR 
ET AL., 2009; SHEA, 2010). Such a system existed for nearly 30 years, until the late 
1970s, when the economic reforms started. 
2.1.1 Agricultural Production System Reform 
China‟s agricultural reform was started spontaneously by poor farmers in Anhui in 
1978. To link production team members‟ income with their work performance, 
farmers introduced a contract system between the production team and individual 
members or households. Among various forms of contract systems, the boldest 
reform was a full contract system, under which households became completely 
responsible for inputs and output as well as their tax and sales obligations (WU, 
1997). Land and other separable production means, such as farm tools and draft 
animals, were equally distributed among the households within a village. The 
village‟s elected committee, representing the village community, was responsible 
for the maintenance and use of indivisible fixed capital and infrastructure. At the 
early stage, the state still had production plans, but the plans were now 
implemented through the contract system (HUANG, 2012). 
The full contract system was later officially named the Household Responsibility 
System (HRS) and adopted in 1980 as one of the contract systems to replace the 
collective farming system. However, because of its immediate positive effect on 
output and hence on household income, and more importantly, because it was de 
facto privatization, the HRS soon was adopted throughout the country (WU, 1997). 
In China today there are more than 200 million farms, the legacy of an HRS policy 
that gave the primary responsibilities for farming to the individual households 
(ROZELLE AND SWINNEN, 2004). 
At the beginning, in lieu of rent, farm households were obligated to deliver a fixed 
quota of their production of “strategic crops”2 to the State and the farm households 
were paid a predetermined price (LOHMAR ET AL., 2009). Whereas, households 
could make their own production decisions and could consume or sell their 
products after they fulfilled the quota. Most importantly, farmers could produce 
cash crops and livestock products and sell their surpluses in rural markets. Later the 
government initiated the rural tax and fee reform in 2000. By 2006, agricultural tax 
had been eliminated in China (WANG, 2011). 
                                                             
2 Strategic crops included grains, oilseeds and cotton, but farmers were primarily obligated to deliver grain quotas, as well as 
quotas for cotton and oilseeds in some areas (Sicular, 1988; Lohmaret al., 2009). 
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2.1.2 Price and Market System Reform 
While the institutional transformation from collective to household-based farm 
production and management systems was essentially completed by 1984, the 
process of price and marketing system reform had just started. In 1979, the Chinese 
government gave incentive to farmers to sell their products to the state by lifting 
state procurement prices for 18 major farm products (WU, 1997). Later, a 
marketing system was implemented, while the Government still maintained pricing 
and marketing controls over strategic products. With the gradual reform in the 
united procurement and marketing system, initial restrictions on marketing 
activities were eventually relaxed and interregional markets developed throughout 
the reform period (LOHMAR ET AL., 2009). 
More liberal policies were intermittently reversed when they were blamed for 
bursts of inflation and perceived grain shortages (LOHMAR ET AL., 2009). 
Following those criticisms, government introduced a set of adjustment policies, 
starting in 1989 (OECD, 1995). Apart from constraints put on the development of 
rural industry, the government implemented further reform in the grain sector 
(BRÜMMER ET AL., 2002). In the 1990s, government resumed administrative 
controls over grain production and marketing through a newly introduced 
“governor responsibility system” (WU, 1997). Under this system, the provincial 
level governments were charged with full responsibility for their province‟s grain 
economy, including financial responsibility for grain procurement, ensuring that 
land stayed in grain production, encouraging investment to increase yields, 
maintaining stocks, balancing supply and demand and stabilizing the market (WU, 
1997; DI, 1999). 
The introduction of the “governor responsibility system” has finally terminated the 
centralized control of grain production, which facilitates grain production suited to 
local conditions. In 2001, market-oriented reform of grain purchasing and 
marketing was carried out across the nation. In the same year, the cotton market 
was fully opened. Up to this point, the agricultural products market system is 
basically set up (RCRE, 2012). 
The market system in other agriculture-related sectors also developed, by the end of 
the 1990s, the expansion of traders, greater marketing freedoms for private traders, 
and investment into transportation and communication infrastructure led to the 
integration of domestic markets (LOHMAR ET AL., 2009). As marketing shifted, 
peasants were able to switch to higher value-added activities such as industrial 
production and service provision (HUANG, 2012). Township and village 
enterprises played a vital role in this process. They raised rural income, absorbed 
rural surplus labor, and contributed to a decline in the rural urban income gap in 
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the 1980s (NAUGHTON, 2007). This process broke the monopoly of state-owned 
enterprises in both product and factor markets (HUANG, 2012).  
2.1.3 Agricultural Trade Reform 
Agricultural trade was long dominated by state-owned trading enterprises, 
monopolies for strategic products that imported and exported at the behest of state 
planners (LOHMAR ET AL., 2009). To complement reforms of domestic production 
and marketing, China also liberalized trade policies to become more integrated 
with the world economy. 
A number of institutional reforms were introduced in the administration of foreign 
trade (CHOW, 2004). Since the late 1980s, foreign-trade reform has aimed at fully 
implementing the trade contract responsibility system and introducing a more 
market-oriented trade regime in the economy (HUANG, 2002). Throughout the 
1990s, China lowered tariffs and other trade barriers to many agricultural products. 
By the end of the 1990s, China had rescinded state-trading companies‟ monopolies 
on the import and export of some strategic products, such as soybeans and cotton 
(LOHMAR ET AL., 2009). However, after nearly 20 years of reform, China‟s foreign 
trade regime continue to have major inefficiencies, and international trade in 
agricultural products still remained largely monopolized (HUANG, 2002). 
The situation changed in December 2001 when China became a member of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). The government undertook another big dose of 
liberalization in line with its WTO commitments, which lowered tariffs further, 
ended the remaining state monopolies on imports and exports of agricultural 
products and locked in an open trade regime along with the reformed economic 
policies (LOHMAR ET AL.,2002; ERIXON, MESSERLIN AND SALLY, 2008). The 
simple average bound tariff for agricultural products was reduced from 17.9 
percent in 2001 to 15.2 percent in 2008 (NI, 2009). China also implemented tariff 
quotas on wheat, corn, rice and cotton as a replacement for the former planned 
management of foreign trade, and expanded the share of quotas distributed to 
non-state trading enterprises (CARTER, ZHONG AND ZHU, 2009) and committed to 
ensuring that no single agricultural product benefited from export subsidies (TIAN, 
2009). After over a decade of effort, China is now considered one of the most 
liberalized global economies in general, and in terms of agriculture in particular 
(HUANG ET AL., 2011).  
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2.2 Economic Impact of Agricultural Reforms 
2.2.1 Agricultural Production 
China‟s agricultural sector is a key to the country‟s astounding growth (SHANEAND 
GALE, 2004). The reversal of collectivization of agriculture and marketing reforms 
were followed immediately by record-breaking harvests for grain and other major 
farm products (WU, 1997). After reforms, grain production jumped from 305 
megatons in 1978 to 571 megatons in 2011, an increase of 87 percent. Meanwhile, 
the population increased from 963 million to 1.35 billion, or 41 percent. The 
growth rate of grain outputs not only overtook population growth, but also 
overcame the obstacle of continuous reduction of grain acreage due to land 
degradation, desertification, urbanization and other reasons (BROWN, 1995; 
ROZELLE ET AL., 1997). According to NBS (2012) grain acreage reduced from 
120.6 million hectares in 1978 to 110.6 million hectares in 2011, decreasing 8.3 
percent.   
 
Figure 2.1: China’s grain production, 1978-2011 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook, (2012) 
Despite having only nine percent of the world‟s arable land, China successfully 
feeds 20 percent of the world‟s population (Carter, 2011). Obviously, the 
improvement of yields is the only means to break the constraints of land resources 
and achieve sustainable agricultural growth in China. As table 2.1 shows, the 
yields of wheat almost tripled, and the yields of rice and maize almost doubled in 
China from 1978 to 2011. China is currently one of the countries with the highest 
yields in the world, more than double of those in African countries (YU AND ZHAO, 
2009). Maize production grew faster than that of other grains to maintain exports 
for hard currency and to feed the growing livestock sector (LOHMAR ET AL., 2002). 
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Livestock production increased in the reform period, primarily for meat (mostly 
pork) and eggs, but in recent years, dairy production has taken off. For many 
products, China‟s share of world production exceeds its share of world agricultural 
land, and for some products, its share of world production exceeds its share of 
world population (figure 2.2). 
Table 2.1: Yield of major crops (ton/ha) 
Year Rice Wheat Maize Cotton Peanuts Rapeseeds 
1978 3.98  1.84  2.80  0.45  1.34  0.72  
1980 4.13  1.91  3.12  0.55  1.54  0.84  
1985 5.26  2.94  3.61  0.81  2.01  1.25  
1990 5.73  3.19  4.52  0.81  2.19  1.26  
1995 6.02  3.54  4.92  0.88  2.69  1.42  
2000 6.27  3.74  4.60  1.09  2.97  1.52  
2005 6.26  4.28  5.29  1.13  3.08  1.79  
2010 6.55  4.75  5.45  1.23  3.46  1.78  
2011 6.69  4.84  5.75  1.31  3.50  1.83  
Source: China Statistics Yearbook, (2012) 
 
Figure 2.2: China’s share of world agricultural production 2010 
Source: CARTER, 2011 
2.2.2 Poverty Reduction 
Agricultural growth has also created a huge rural market for consumer goods and 
generated a reservoir of savings that funds investment in rural enterprises. Growth 
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of the rural economy has been a key reason for rapid poverty reduction in China. 
The poverty rate in rural China has been substantially decreasing in the past three 
decades (FAN ET AL., 2004). Table 2.2 shows the changes in income and the 
poverty rate in rural China since 1978. The nominal net income for farmers 
increased from 133.57 Yuan in 1978 to 2622.20 Yuan in 2003, an increase of 
about 20 times in 25 years. When considering inflation, net income also increased 
by more than four times. The population in poverty and the poverty rate, 
respectively, decreased from 250 million and 30.7 percent in 1978 to 23.6 million 
and 2.5 percent in 2005. Economic growth in rural China does not only change 
poverty figures in China, but also changed the poverty map of the world (WORLD 
BANK, 2008). 
Table 2.2: Rural income and poverty in China (1978-2005) 
year Poverty 
Line 
(Yuan) 
Poverty 
Rate 
( percent) 
Population blow 
poverty line 
(million) 
Net Income 
(Yuan) Current 
price 
Net Income 
(Yuan) 1978 
price 
1978 100 30.7 250 133.57 133.57 
1980 130 26.8 220 191.33 186.46 
1990 300 9.4 85 686.31 324.45 
2000 625 3.4 32 2253.42 517.42 
2005 683 2.5 24 3254.90 708.71 
Source: YU AND ZHAO (2009) 
2.2.3 Market Liberalization 
As a result of price and market reforms, the structure of agricultural prices facing 
peasant producers has changed, greater liberalization of markets is allowed and 
state-owned marketing bureaus no longer monopolize agricultural marketing 
(WATSON, 1988; LOHMAR ET AL., 2009). Many small private traders and 
agribusinesses, as well as local and government-owned companies have entered 
the grain market. This situation induced state marketing companies to compete 
directly with private traders, but with preferred access to government-owned 
storage facilities and also charged with purchasing grain under recently established 
price support programs (LOHMAR ET AL., 2009). Recent surveys show that 
combined grain marketing systems including state grain trading companies, grain 
processing factories, grain wholesalers, private traders and grain retailers have 
emerged (CHEN, 2007). Grain marketing channels vary from region to region. 
Many farmers prefer to sell grain to small traders who come into villages to pick up 
grain, saving them time and transportation costs. In some regions, large feed mills 
or processing factories are the main purchasers (CHEN, 2007; LOHMAR ET AL., 
2009). 
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With respect to horticultural and livestock products, most of them are marketed by 
a vast army of small traders and private marketing companies that sprang up as the 
production of these products grew (HUANG ET AL., 2008). Produce is typically 
purchased directly from farmers, often just after harvest and on the roadside, by 
hundreds of thousands of private traders who cruise villages and the surrounding 
countryside in small trucks (BAGRIE ET AL., 2012). These traders then sell their 
load to larger traders or deliver it to wholesale markets where it is typically 
aggregated onto larger trucks for transport to faraway markets (LOHMAR ET AL., 
2009).  
Markets for inputs are largely free and lightly regulated, except with land and 
capital. Seeds are supplied by thousands of small seed companies that often 
repackage seed purchased in bulk and then sell it under their own label through 
small seed and input supply stores located in villages and townships throughout the 
countryside. The pesticide industry is similarly atomized and difficult to regulate. 
Fertilizer is typically supplied by larger companies, but is frequently sold by 
private traders with shops in the county seat, rural townships, and villages or by 
itinerant traders who visit villages and sell from the backs of their trucks (LOHMAR 
ET AL., 2009). For agricultural machinery equipment, farmers can buy tractors, 
harvesters, transplanters and other field machinery from companies in townships 
or cities (DAVIS ET AL., 2010). 
2.2.4 Agricultural Trade 
China‟s agricultural imports and exports were relatively low over most of the 
reform period, but have risen rapidly since WTO accession (figure 2.3). China 
became a net importer of agricultural products in 2003, and this trade deficit is 
likely to persist as future growth in food demand, driven by rapidly rising per capita 
income, is expected to outpace increases in domestic production (BONARRIVA, 
2011). China ranked as the world‟s second-largest agricultural importing country 
behind the United States as its agricultural imports increased five times between 
2002 and 2009 (HUANG, 2012). 
On the other hand, China‟s agricultural exports have grown as well, but not as 
dramatically as imports. In 2009, China was the fourth leading global agricultural 
exporting country (behind the United States, Brazil, and Canada). Agricultural 
exports rose from 13 billion (U.S. dollars) in 2002 to 36 billion (U.S. dollars) in 
2009 (BONARRIVA, 2011). Moreover, the composition of agricultural trade has 
changed. Over much of the reform period, China exported corn and imported wheat, 
but imported only limited amounts of cotton and oilseeds. Today, China is largely 
self-sufficient in wheat, corn and rice, but it imports large amounts of soybeans and 
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cotton (LOHMAR ET AL., 2009). Consistent with its natural resource endowments of 
abundant rural labor and limited agricultural land on a per capita basis, China‟s 
agricultural exports are concentrated in labor-intensive products, such as fresh and 
processed fruits and vegetables (BONARRIVA, 2011; CHEN, 2006). 
 
Figure 2.3: China’s agricultural imports and exports (1983-2010)  
Source: HUANG (2009) 
2.3 Land Tenure System in China 
Land tenure is the way in which people have access to land and natural resources. A 
more detailed definition, as stated by BRUCE ET AL. (2010), is that land tenure is 
“the institutional (political, economic, social, and legal) structure that determines (1) 
how individuals and groups secure access to land and associated resources 
including trees, minerals, pasture, and water and (2) who can hold and use these 
resources-for how long and under what conditions”. The land tenure system in 
China, as in most transition countries, is not simply an economic issue. It also has 
political, social and cultural dimensions and hence it is an asset of crucial 
importance, especially in rural areas of the country. In this section, the major issues 
of land tenure in rural China will be reviewed. 
2.3.1 Land Tenure System in the Pre-reform Era 
China‟s land tenure system prior to the socialist revolution of 1949 reflects the deep 
antagonism that existed in traditional rural Chinese society, which was comprised 
of four classes. Landlords, who held usufruct rights and imminent rights to large 
tracts of land, earned profits by renting to peasants. Rich peasants and middle 
peasants, distinguished largely on the basis of the size of their land leases, 
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cultivated the land and paid rent, sometimes in kind, to landlords. Poor peasants 
lacked any land of their own and earned a wage by cultivating land held by the 
higher classes (FEI, 1939). 
In 1949, China became a socialist country following the abolition of the feudalistic 
system. The Chinese government deprived landlords of land and distributed it to 
farmers. After the Community Party took power in 1949, about 700 million mu of 
land were redistributed from landlords to landless peasants and tenants, who totaled 
more than 300 million (ZHAO, 2010). By 1952, a system of small-scale family 
farming was successfully formed. This system lasted until 1955-1956, when it was 
replaced by collective farming (BRAMALL, 2004). Like other socialist countries, 
China shaped its farmland policy from the well-known model of the Soviet Union, 
which was characterized by collective ownership and unified collective operation. 
To reach this target, China carried out a campaign of collectivization in the 
mid-1950s. During the process, individual farmers were compelled to join 
collectives. The collectivization finally developed into an institution called the 
People‟s Commune. In 1958, about 800 million rural people were organized into 
52,000 People‟s Communes (WU, 1997). With centrally controlled property rights 
and a misapplied egalitarian principle of distribution, the communes destroyed 
farmers‟ operational freedom and their enthusiasm for production (CHEN AND 
DAVIS, 1998). 
Much literature illustrates the poor performance of the commune system (e.g. 
STAVIS, 1982; CHEN, 1994; WU, 1997). The most severe problem with collective 
farming was inefficiency. The communes‟ income distribution system provided no 
work incentives to farmers because it did not reward adequately individual effort. 
On one hand, assessing team members‟ performance was difficult and costly. 
Self-assessment of the quantity and quality of work was unlikely to produce an 
accurate measure of actual effort. Mutual assessment by team members could take 
up an enormous amount of time and lead to great tension among families because 
some would inevitably feel they were unfairly treated. Assessment by team leaders 
could involve unbearable monitoring costs because of the nature of farm work 
often involves shifting between many different tasks on a very irregular basis (LIN, 
1988). Ultimately, egalitarianism became the only acceptable reward system 
because while no one had incentive to work, everyone had incentive to claim his or 
her rights to collective property as a collective member (GUO ET AL., 1993). Most 
team members presented themselves in the field to obtain work points but did not 
make a serious effort (LIN, 1988). 
Resource allocation was also inefficient under the collective farming system since 
capital, labor and land mobility were heavily restricted. The planning system 
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restricted free resource movement because it was seen as a threat to that system. As 
most surplus was extracted from agriculture there was no additional capital to 
improve productivity, so keeping land and labor in grain production was crucial to 
maintaining grain output. Restriction on resource mobility also reduced the 
opportunity cost of both land (rents) and labor (wages) in grain production, thereby 
reducing the cost of grain (WU, 1997). 
2.3.2 Land Tenure System after Reform 
At the end of the 1970s, China launched economic reform, pioneered by rural 
reform. The Household Responsibility System (HRS) replaced the commune 
system in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The HRS was created by the peasants but 
spread nationwide with the support of the central government. It was first an 
experiment in selected villages in Sichuan and Anhui provinces. These 
experiments were met with initial success, and agricultural collectives throughout 
China were rapidly dismantled. By 1984, more than 99.5 percent of production 
teams had adopted the system (YANG, 2004). Under this system, land officially 
remains under collective ownership, but is allocated among village households to 
cultivate what they decide. LIU ET AL. (1998) reported four aspects of land rights 
that can vary among Chinese villages: residual income rights, unencumbered use 
rights, rights to secure possession, and transfer rights. Under the HRS, farmers are 
free to make crop selection decisions and sell crops on the market for profit, after 
fulfilling basic grain procurement requirements set by the state and contributing to 
the local collective‟s accumulation and administrative funds. These were the 
so-called residual income rights. However, after elimination of the agricultural tax 
during 2004-2006, farmers got full access to the income from agriculture 
production. Moreover, the HRS resolves work incentive problems of the collective 
system by tightening the link between labor effort and income (LIU ET AL., 1998). 
When the HRS was initially introduced, land-use rights were contracted to the 
farmers for a short period of one to two years; land could not be transferred 
between households, and it was subject to periodic reallocation at the discretion of 
the village leader. Reallocations were intended to account for household 
demographical changes. However, by 1984 the rights were extended to periods of 
15 years. In 1984, the government issued Rural Work Document No.1, which urged 
local officials to “prolong the time period of the contracted land” to 15 years or 
more in order to “encourage the farmers to increase their investment to foster the 
fertility of the soil and practice of intensive farming”. After expiration of the 15 
year contract period, in 1998, the government extended the contract for another 30 
years, and disallowed large-scale reallocations of land, limited small-scale 
re-adjustments and permitted transfers of land between households (PING LI, 
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2003). 
Land tenure arrangements relating to collective forest land in the south and 
southwest of China are similar to those concerning agricultural land, while 
forestland in the northeast of China is almost entirely state-owned (WANG ET AL., 
2004). The HRS was applied to collective forest land in the mid-1980s, a few years 
after it was introduced in the agricultural sector. Households were allocated plots of 
forestland or wasteland on which trees could be planted, as well as areas of forested 
land. Both of these land types were held under contract, and individual households 
had the rights to manage the land for timber. Any trees planted by the household 
belonged to them, but trees planted previously by the collective did not, and the 
revenue from harvesting the latter was shared between the household and the 
collective (LIU, 2001). In addition, the majority of villages retained some 
forestland that was collectively owned and managed (MULLAN ET AL., 2012). 
2.4 Land Problem in China 
2.4.1 Limited Land Resources 
China has a large population but limited resources per capital as well as insufficient 
reserves, which poses severe problems. The total area of China is 960 million 
hectares (9.6 million km
2
), of which there are only 121.72 million hectares of 
arable land, which accounts for 12.68 percent of total land area (Table 2.3). 
Moreover, current per capita cultivated farmland is about 0.092 hectares, which is 
only about 40 percent of the global average. The country faces great challenges in 
continuing to feed its large population. 
Table 2.3: Land resource in China 
Land type 
Area (in million 
ha) 
 percent of total land 
area 
Cultivated Land 121.72 12.68 
Garden Land 11.79 1.24 
Forests Land 236.09 24.83 
Area of Grassland 261.84 27.54 
Other Land for Agriculture Use  25.44 2.68 
Land for Inhabitation, Mining  
and Manufacturing 
26.92 2.83 
Land for Transport Facilities 2.50 0.26 
Land for Water Conservancy 
Facilities 
3.65 0.38 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook, 2012 
Even more alarming is that these limited resources are constantly diminishing. 
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According to statistical data released by the Ministry of Land and Resources of 
China (MLRC), total cultivated land decreased by approximately 8.35 million ha 
(about six percent) between 1996 and 2008, due to rapid urbanization and natural 
disasters. The Chinese government estimates they need to maintain 120 million 
hectares for crop production by 2020 in order to be self-sufficient in grain 
production. While some institutions, such as Bank of America estimate, that 
China‟s arable land has already fallen below the 120 million hectare threshold and 
could decrease to 117 million hectares by 2015. Therefore, there is great pressure 
on the government to protect the arable land resource from continued shrinkage. 
 
Figure 2.4: Arable land in China 
Source: Communique on Land and Resources, 1997-2011  
2.4.2 Small Farm Size and Fragmentation 
At the beginning of the HRS, land was distributed mainly on the basis of household 
size, and due to the scarce arable land resource and large population, each 
household got a small piece of land. Reallocations and readjustments were intended 
to account for changes in population and the formation of new households. With 
demographic change, farm size over time showed a declining trend. In 2008, the 
average farm size of a Chinese household was around 0.5 hectares, the average land 
holding per capital was 0.09 hectares (Figure 2.5 and 2.6). Besides, the situation 
varied by region. The central region, which is considered the most agriculturally 
productive, has the largest per household and per capita landholdings, followed by 
the western region, while the eastern region has the smallest per household and per 
capita landholdings, due to its high population density and rapid economic 
development. 
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Figure 2.5: Average farm size per household in China 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook, 1996-2009. 
 
Figure 2.6: Average farm size per capita in China 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook, 1997-2012. 
In addition to the small holding size, land fragmentation has also become a key 
problem of farming in China. Because of egalitarian principles, each household got 
several plots allocated based on soil fertility, irrigation conditions, location, etc. 
The average number of parcels owned by a farm household in 2007 was about six, 
with an average parcel size of only 0.085 hectares (FFTC, 2008). 
Such small farm size and fragmentation made it difficult to use advanced 
mechanical equipment. Thus, increasing productivity was difficult, due to the lack 
of economies of scale. In this situation, it is also difficult to invest in infrastructure 
like roads and irrigation systems, and to implement regional agricultural policies 
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such as the assignment of specific zones for commercial agricultural production. As 
a result, regional or national output is affected negatively (TAN, 2006). 
Table 2.4: Land fragmentation in China 
year Average plot size (ha) No. of plots per household Farm size (ha) 
1929-1933
1
 0.38 5.6 2.13 
1986
2
 0.07 9.0 0.61 
1999
2
 0.09 6.1 0.53 
2007
3
 0.085 6 0.54 
Sources: 
1
TAN (2006); 
2
 TAN (2001); 
3
 FFTC (2008) 
For individual households, land fragmentation may be detrimental to agricultural 
production by causing physical problems, operational difficulties and foregone 
investment. Physical problems may include the labor time lost in traveling; the land 
lost in marking the borders or constructing access roads, and higher costs for 
fencing or border construction (AWOTIDE AND AGBOLA, 2010). Operational 
difficulties include the moving of heavy equipment, use of tractors and other 
machinery, pest control, and so on. Moreover, it is more difficult to manage the 
farm and to supervise labor. Plots at relatively large distances from the homestead 
are therefore more likely to be abandoned. Finally, due to the existence of scale 
effects and externalities, investments in improved agricultural facilities, soil and 
water conservation, and on the like are less profitable on farms with severe land 
fragmentation (TAN, 2005). 
2.4.3 Tenure Insecurity 
Under the HRS, households are allocated land-use rights, but ownership to land 
remains in the hands of village collective authorities. When the HRS was initially 
introduced, land transfer was prohibited between households and subject to 
periodic reallocation at the discretion of the village leader. Many policy-makers 
and scholars have focused their discussion on the lack of clarity of rural land 
ownership as the key to the failure in economic and sustainable land use and 
chronic poverty (ZHAO, 2010). The currently predominant ownership of land by 
the collective is claimed to be the fundamental hindrance to scaling up agricultural 
development in China, since it is ambiguous in nature and often leads to local elite 
rent-seeking and corruption through illegal land expropriations (WANG, 2005; HO, 
2001; ZHAO, 2010). Local and regional land-use plans are easily manipulated by 
the local government in pursuit of lucrative deals in land sales (ZHAO, 2010). 
2.4.3.1 Unsustainable Use of Land 
As HU (1997) points out, the current land tenure system has encouraged 
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short-sighted decisions and irresponsible use of land resources by peasants. 
Peasants pursue immediate and short-term gains, and this is exacerbated by land 
fragmentation. The latter hampers irrigation and drainage and leads to the 
degradation of China‟s agro-ecological environment. Local governments do not 
function effectively in organizing agricultural production and overall rural 
development due to a lack of resources and democratic governance. On one hand, 
the lack of resources and good governance has hindered their role in sustainable 
rural development. On the other hand, slow agricultural development has generated 
insufficient resources for local governments to deliver basic rural services and thus 
win the support of the peasantry. Moreover, the Chinese peasantry has to a large 
extent not been organized in a way that their land can be better utilized and 
managed. As a result, they have not managed to gain substantial benefits from their 
land except for the purpose of subsistence. 
The situation is even worse in forest and grassland. County governments have 
made the forest a fundamental natural resource to be preserved and to be free from 
illegal logging. Tree plantation and preservation are regarded as crucial to 
ecological restoration. However, lack of linkages between tree planting and direct 
benefits from it offer no incentives for peasants in sustainable use of forest. 
Grassland left open to communal use for grazing results in the severe problem of 
land degradation from over-grazing. The rationale for the grassland management is 
based on the calculation of its carrying capacity. Accordingly, the number of 
livestock allowed for grazing was set. However, the administration of grassland 
protection is too costly and difficult to manage, even when there is a Grass Land 
Protection Program, the peasants can still find ways to enter the land (ZHAO, 2010). 
2.4.3.2 Land Expropriations 
Tenure insecurity with agricultural land under the HRS is exacerbated by the risk of 
land expropriation for urban expansion and infrastructure development (TAO AND 
XU, 2007). Rapid economic development, combined with high population density, 
has created high demand for rural land to be used for urban expansion and 
infrastructure projects. This has resulted in the widespread use of compulsory land 
acquisition (CHAN, 2003), with what many argue to have been insufficient 
compensation (GUO, 2001). Since 2004, the Chinese constitution has in fact had a 
clause stating that private property may be expropriated, but that it must be for 
“public use” and that “just” compensation must be provided (LIU, 2005). However, 
in practice, local governments have the authority to determine how “public use” is 
defined, while at the same time they have strong incentives to expropriate land for 
urban development because of the high prices at which the land can be sold to 
private developers once the designation is changed from rural to urban (DEININGER 
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ET AL., 2007). In addition, in most full-fledged market economies, the concept of 
“just” compensation is related to the market value of the land; but in rural China, 
the lack of well-defined property rights or functioning land markets makes this 
difficult, if not impossible to achieve (DING, 2007). 
2.4.3.3 Lack of Transferability 
In addition to the problem of tenure insecurity, the egalitarian principle used in 
distributing and reallocating land is the main driving factor for small farm size and 
land fragmentation (TAN, 2006). The Chinese agricultural economy is based on 200 
million farms, each with fewer than 0.5 hectares of cultivated land that is 
fragmented into 6 or more non-adjacent plots. Land rental is one of the main ways 
in which operational landholdings are supposed to be expanded (CAI ET AL., 2008). 
Nevertheless, China‟s land transfer market is in an emerging stage. The appearance 
of land rental activity was evident in the late 1990s (GAO ET AL., 2012). 
According to Rural Land Contracting Law, land transfers that do not affect the 
underlying contract with the village collective are technically permitted, subject to 
notification of the village leader (MULLAN ET AL., 2011). However, based on their 
investigation, DEININGER ET AL. (2007) found that only 21 percent of village 
leaders were aware that land transfer was permitted. According to a nationwide 
survey, HUANG ET AL. (2012) found that only 17.2 percent of households 
rented-out their cultivated land and 17.2 percent of households rented-in land in 
the year 2008.  
2.4.5 Current Change in Land Policy 
2.4.5.1 Land Protection Policy 
In response to conversion of farmland to industrial and residential uses as the main 
threat to the nation‟s food security, the Chinese government has introduced a 
number of measures aimed at protecting farmland, especially farmland with the 
greatest production potential. Two principal laws govern farmland preservation 
efforts in China: the Basic Farmland Protection Regulation, passed in 1994, and the 
New Land Administration Law, enacted in 1999. 
The Basic Farmland Protection Regulation applies only to land used to grow major 
food grains, feed grains, soybeans, and tubers. Not included is land that is used in 
other kinds of food production; in particular, the Basic Farmland Protection 
Regulation does not apply to tree fruits, viticulture, or fish ponds. The law requires 
governments at or above the county level to designate a basic farmland protection 
zone in every village or township. There are two kinds of basic farmland protection 
districts. The first level consists of high-quality land with high productivity; the law 
    OVERVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL, LAND AND LABOR POLICY IN CHINA  24 
prohibits converting such land to nonagricultural uses. The second level consists of 
good-quality land with moderate productivity; the law permits conversion of such 
land to nonagricultural uses under some circumstances, usually after a planned 
period of 5 to 10 years (LICHTENBERG AND DING, 2008). 
The 1999‟s New Land Administration Law is intended to protect environmentally 
sensitive and agricultural lands, promote market development, encourage citizen 
involvement in the legislative process, and coordinate the planning and 
development of urban land. The law reinforces farmland preservation efforts by 
requiring an approval from the State Council for any conversion of basic farmland. 
It states that urban development must be coordinated through planning to eliminate 
redundancy and duplicated construction, rationalized in layouts so that land use is 
efficient, and provided with sufficient infrastructure (DING, 2004). 
In the case of forest and grass land, various protection projects have been 
introduced, such as the Natural Forest Protection Program, the Green to Grain 
Program, etc. The former prohibits harvesting of timber on forestland. It was 
intended to apply only to state-owned land. However, it has been expanded to cover 
collectively owned land, which many describe as equivalent to a “taking” of the 
property rights of the collectives and the households with land-use rights 
(KATSIGRIS, 2002; MIAO AND WEST, 2004; ZUO, 2002). The latter, also known as 
Sloping Land Conversion Program, aimed at dramatically increasing forest and 
grass coverage to combat ecological degradation, over-cultivation of sloping land 
and soil erosion. The program was initiated in 1999 and expanded to be nationwide 
in 2002. By 2008, 8.22 million hectares of cropland had been converted to 
forestland (LIU AND WU, 2010). The program has made a positive contribution to 
over 2.5 million rural households‟ income growth as the subsidies they received 
were higher than the net profits from sloping cropland cultivation. However, there 
was also a negative effect as the enlargement of income disparity between 
participants and nonparticipants. Therefore, a more complete program that 
involves more participation of farmers, and subsidies that should be varied 
according to the net profits from their crop production should be implemented (LIU 
AND WU, 2010). 
2.4.5.2 Land Consolidation Program 
In order to promote land consolidation by encouraging transfer of land-use rights 
between farm households, improve farming infrastructure, and adjust the 
agricultural production structure, a comprehensive agricultural development (CAD) 
program was introduced in 1988 (WU, 2005; LIN, 2009). The major part of the 
CAD program is land consolidation measures, including trunk irrigation 
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construction projects. Land consolidation may be broadly defined as measures to 
improve land quality that include: (i) expanding irrigated area and improving plot, 
irrigation and drainage conditions; (ii) improving farm plot configuration, 
including the plot size, shape, and layout through a suitable merging of smaller and 
irregular-shaped plots into larger ones of regular size and shape; (iii) improving 
farm road systems to provide better access to plots for both workers and machinery; 
(iv) reducing fragmentation of farmers‟ land into many small, noncontiguous plots 
scattered across many locations (WU, 2005). 
The coverage of the program included land consolidation (land reclamation and 
consolidation, construction of trunk irrigation networks, and technical extension) 
and investment for diversified economic development. The latter also covers 
projects related to government concerns about poverty alleviation and 
environmental improvement. CAD is funded by four sources: the central 
government, local governments, bank loans, and farmer contributions. In 2007, 
total CAD investment was 36.3 billion Yuan, with the greatest share coming from 
farmer contributions at 38 percent, followed by 33 percent from the central 
government, 22 percent from local government, and seven percent from bank loans 
(LIN, 2009). Since the application of land consolidation in 1999, it is estimated that 
at least 2.5 million ha of cultivated land have been saved through land 
consolidation, and the increased grain production is equal to the output of 2.7 
million ha of cultivated land. However, China‟s land consolidation with the 
primary purpose of saving farmland is still at a low level (HUANG ET AL., 2011). 
Because the rural population in China will continue to grow while the total 
farmland area will diminish, the typically small operational scale of farms will, of 
course, remain an important feature of Chinese agriculture in the longer term. The 
CAD program is unlikely to change this significantly. Nevertheless, it is possible 
that through these land consolidation measures, land productivity and possibly also 
total factor productivity of farm households will improve (WU, 2005). 
2.4.5.3 Policies for Tenure Security 
When the HRS was initially introduced, the contract period was only 15 years, 
which mostly started in 1984, and land transfer between farm households was 
strictly prohibited. The duration of farmers‟ land-use rights was addressed again 
nearly ten years later, when the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and 
the State Council issued Document No. 11 in 1993, stating that contracting land 
may be extended for another 30 years upon the expiration of the first 15-years. 
Later, this was further guaranteed by the revised Land Administration Law in 1998. 
Farmers‟ land contracting rights were finally protected by law with the issuance of 
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a written land-use contract. Indeed, a survey by the Rural Development Institute in 
2005, found that just 45 percent of polled farmers had been issued written land-use 
contracts specifying the duration of use or other important privileges and 
obligations associated with their land rights (DUBOSE, 2011).  
The Rural Land Contracting Law (RLCL), implemented in 2002, aimed at 
strengthening the households‟ rights of secure possession. It stipulates that the 
village collective should compose written land contracts with individual 
households and the duration of the land contract should be 30 years (FENG AND 
HEERINK, 2008). The RLCL focuses on three areas, namely (i) a more strict 
definition of land rights as property rights rather than just private contracts; (ii) a 
ban on large-scale reallocations of land and limiting small-scale readjustments with 
clear conditions; (iii) permitting land transfer between households, and (iv) a 
commitment to issuance of land documents (DEININGER ET AL., 2012). This system 
of land-use rights are also granted under the 2007 Property Law. These landmark 
laws represent the most important legal breakthroughs for securing 30-year land 
rights for China‟s 210 million farm households since the adoption of HRS (LI, 
2003). To some extent, this new law was followed up on by the Central Party 
Committee‟s October 2008 report, which stated a further call for farmland transfer, 
lease, exchange and swap based on market-oriented mechanisms and peasant 
consent and willingness to enhance scaled farming and peasant incomes (ZHAO, 
2010). 
2.5 Labor Mobility Policy in China 
Like land policies, China‟s labor policies also changed dramatically before and 
after the economic reforms. 
2.5.1 Labor Mobility Policy in Pre-reform Era 
In the pre-reform era, rural labor were not allowed to work in off-farm activities or 
out of collective farms (CAI ET AL., 2009; MAURER-FAZIO ET AL., 2009). Labor 
markets were replaced by a centrally planned job allocation system, while food 
supply, housing, education and health care were brought under tight planning 
controls through a strict household registration (Hukou) system (ZHANG, 2009).  
The Hukou system in China originated in 1951. In principle, each individual in a 
household must be registered with a committee. In rural areas, these committees are 
called villager committees, in urban areas they are called resident committees. This 
registration not only documents the place of residence, it also classifies the 
household by function. This functional classification determines the individual‟s 
social and economic rights and privileges. Each household is classified either as 
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agricultural or as non-agricultural. In the case of villages, it involved rights for land, 
farming, and housing. In the case of cities, it involved rights to a welfare package, 
including access to guaranteed employment plus state-subsidized food and housing 
(WORLD BANK SYNTHESIS REPORT, 2007). By assigning the urban resident status, 
the administration can essentially control migration and assign economic and social 
privileges. 
It is valuable to point out that at the time of the introduction of the Hukou system, it 
was not intended to control the mobility of the people. It was thought that the 
government started to intensify the Hukou system and to strictly restrict the 
mobility of the population, including rural to urban migration, in the 1960s, 
following the collapse of the Great Leap Forward and the devastating famine of that 
decade. The main reason cited for this government action was food shortage (WU, 
1994; ZHAO, 2000). But as argued by LIN ET AL. (1996), the government needed to 
tie the farmers to the land so as to provide cheap agricultural products to the 
industrial sector. In this sense, the segregation of rural and urban populations was 
caused by more profound factors than food shortages (ZHAO, 2005). It is worth 
noting that the Hukou system deprived both rural and urban residents of their 
freedom of mobility. Migration between rural and urban areas was strictly 
controlled, essentially excluding rural people from urban employment and social 
security arrangements (WU, 1997). 
As a result, there was no voluntary migration in China during that period. Only 
forced migration or floating population occurred at times due to particular political 
purposes. For example, to build up the third front in the 1960s and 1970s, many 
people were moved to central and western China together with industries. Another 
example is the reeducation movement during the Cultural Revolution, which sent 
millions of urban graduates to the countryside (CAI ET AL., 2009). 
2.5.2 Labor Mobility Policy after Reform  
Pre-1978 policies built up a reservoir of underutilized human resources in rural 
China with bans on labor movement and entrepreneurial activity, low farm prices, 
and farmer income not influenced by effort or output (LOHMAR ET AL., 2009). 
Decollectivization released a flood of rural workers, fuelling industrial growth 
while simultaneously boosting agricultural production to meet the food needs of a 
large population with rising living standards (WU, 1997). CAI ET AL. (2009) divide 
the evolution of migration policy after reforms into five stages. In the first period, 
1979 to 1983, the government still prohibited migration. In the second period, 
1984 to 1988, the government started to allow farmers to enter the urban areas on 
the condition that food was provided by the farmers themselves. The third period 
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was from 1989 to 1991, the government slowed down rural to urban migration to 
protect the work opportunities for urban citizens. During the fourth period, from 
1992 to 2000, the central government, to some extent, encouraged rural-urban 
migration. The fifth period includes some evolution of migration policy after 
2000. 
2.5.2.1 Strict Restriction: 1979-1983 
In this period, from 1979 to 1983, the government prohibited migration and limited 
recruiting workers from rural areas to prevent the rural population from working in 
the cities. In addition, local governments removed the employees from rural areas 
who were hired by urban employers. Some other complementary policies were also 
implemented. For instance, the domicile control and food distribution in urban 
areas based on Hukou were enforced. Those policies are evidenced by the Notice to 
Strictly Control Rural Labor to Work in Urban Areas issued by the State Council in 
1981. 
In order to ease the pressure of labor mobility out of rural areas, rural industries 
were encouraged to provide local off-farm employment opportunities for rural 
labor forces. The so-called labor policy of leaving the land without leaving the 
village stimulated the development of Township and Village Enterprises by 
provision of plentiful labor resources, which also led to a unique way to 
industrialize rural China. 
2.5.2.2 Permission to Migrate: 1984-1988 
In the second stage, from 1984 to 1988, to meet the labor demand from TVEs in 
coastal areas and construction in urban areas, it was necessary to allow labor 
mobility between rural and urban areas and between regions. As a result, the 
government encouraged labor mobility in rural areas and implemented a new set of 
policies. For example, rural migrants who worked or were self-employed in towns 
could register their Hukou in towns under the condition of making their own grain 
rations. Farmers were also allowed to sell some agricultural products and to have 
their own businesses. 
Under economic development, the migration restriction was further relaxed over 
time. To encourage the integration of rural and urban economies, the service and 
transportation sectors were opened to farmers. In 1985, rural migrants were 
permitted to have a temporary urban Hukou (CUI, 2012). The State Owned 
Enterprises were permitted to hire rural migrants in 1986 (CAI ET AL., 2009). As an 
approach to poverty reduction for some rural areas, the government formulated 
policies facilitating rural labor transfer from the central and western regions. Those 
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active migration policies resulted in a fast growing migration flow in that period. 
2.5.2.3 Slow down the Blind Flow: 1989-1991 
The term “rural migrant wave” was coined in 1989 to describe the enormous 
number of rural migrant travelers during the Chinese New Year period in that year. 
However, following the “rural migrant wave” of 1989, serious inflation caused by 
the overheated economy triggered macroeconomic adjustment in China (ZHAO, 
2004). To protect the employment opportunities for urban residents, many migrant 
workers were fired and local governments were required to remove the rural labor 
forces from rural areas. The restrictive policy is evidenced by Emergency Notices 
on Strict Control with Farmers to Move out of Rural Areas issued by the State 
Council in 1989. That was the first time rural migration flow was defined as a blind 
flow. 
Furthermore, the government reemphasized the pattern of “leaving land without 
leaving village” for rural labor transfer and encouraged local governments to 
provide employment opportunities for rural surplus labor locally. However, the 
deteriorating macroeconomic situations formed a shock to TVEs. As a result, 
employment in TVEs began to decrease. Due to the strict control for rural 
migration, the total size of migration shrank during the period. In 1989, the number 
of migrants who lived in cities was significantly less than the number in 1988. 
2.5.2.4 Guiding the Migration Flow: 1992-2000 
During the fourth stage, from 1992 to 2000, the government sensed that migration 
was inevitable because of income disparities between regions and between rural 
and urban areas triggering by economic development, to some extent they started 
to encourage rural-urban migration. The first practice was to establish 50 
experimental counties developing rural human resources from 1991 to 1994, and 
then the pilot was extended to eight provinces from 1994 to 1996. At the same time, 
the government started emphasizing strengthened administration of rural to urban 
migration.  
Meanwhile, reforms of the Hukou system were piloted in various regions. In 1997, 
the state council approved suggestions from the Ministry of Public Security and 
allowed some of the migrants to become permanent residents of the towns and 
small cities on the condition that they had a regular job in the town or small city and 
had stayed there for more than two years. In 1998, this regulation was further 
applied to large cities. However, the enforcement of the regulation varies across 
cities. In particular, big cities where local residents were subsidized by local 
finance were reluctant to accept new comers, so the pace of reform in big cities was 
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very limited. In 2000, the state council made some new suggestions, which 
eliminated some requirements in the previous conditions and asked the local 
government to give equal rights to migrants. 
2.5.2.5 The Evolution of Migration Policy after 2000 
Since 2000, the government has been reforming the Hukou system to allow greater 
mobility. There were chiefly two types of reform related to the Hukou system. The 
formal award of permanent residency rights was made easier and non-Hukou 
migrants were enabled to access many public services from which they were 
previously excluded. In addition, the government started addressing the training of 
migrant workers. In 2003, the State Council issued Training Plans for Migrant 
Workers: 2003-2010, which proposed that central and local governments should 
finance the training programs for migrant workers. The trend of this policy was 
clearly written into the 10th and 11th Five-Year Plans published in 2001 and 2006 
respectively. By approaching the flow of labor with encouragement, moreover, by 
creating fair conditions to improve migrants‟ employment, accommodation, 
children‟s education, and social security, these policies have gradually became 
enforceable measures. 
Passage of the Labor Contract Law in 2007 indicates the great importance that the 
government attaches to protection of the rights and interests of ordinary workers, 
including migrants. The same year the “Employment Promotion Act” directly 
targeted barriers to employment faced by rural migrant workers, the arose further 
emphasis to treat migrant workers equally. In addition, in 2008 the Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security announced that the measures to implement 
transferable pension for migrant workers would be taken by the end of 2008 (YIN, 
2008). 
In recent years, local governments have made much greater efforts in reforming the 
Hukou system. One common practice in this reform area is the attempt to establish 
a unified Hukou regime integrating rural and urban population registration, by 
abolishing the distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural Hukou 
identities and integrating them into a unified residential Hukou. Such a reform 
however has failed in some cities because of fiscal constraints (CAI ET AL., 2009).  
2.5.3 Migration and Labor Market Development in China 
Starting in the mid-1980s, a large number of rural workers began to seek 
employment in rural off-farm work. Figure 2.7 shows the employment shares of 
rural agricultural workers, workers in TVEs, and workers in rural private and 
individual enterprises. In the late 1970s, more than 90 percent of rural employment 
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was engaged in agricultural work. The proportion of rural workers in agriculture 
started its long-term decline in 1984 when the government encouraged farmers to 
leave agricultural production and work in nearby small towns. By 2010, the 
percentage of rural employment in agriculture had already dropped below 50 
percent. The share of TVE workers rose from ten percent in 1978 to more than 35 
percent in 2010. Today, around ten percent of rural workers are employed in rural 
private and individual enterprises. 
 
Figure 2.7: Distribution of rural employment, 1978-2010 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2008-2011 
However, most of them are temporary migrants. MENG (2012) found from a 
migrant survey in 2009 that of the 5,214 migrant household heads, around 56 
percent were married, and of these only 63 percent had their spouse with them. 
Among the children of migrants below the age of 16, 56 percent were left behind in 
rural villages. Moreover, most rural migrants come back to their homes in the 
countryside, after some years spent working in urban informal labor markets 
(MURPHY, 2002). Migration thus seems to be a stage in the lives of rural people. 
From a survey, DE LA RUPPLE ET AL. (2009) found among all of the interviewed 
migrants that 39 percent intended to go back to their hometown as soon as they had 
accumulated enough savings. Rural migrants also tend to move back and forth 
between home villages and destination areas. 
After the deregulation of rural-urban migration in the late 1980s, the amount of 
rural migrants in cities increased rapidly. In 1983, the number of rural to urban 
migrants was only two million and after more than ten years, by 1993, ROZELLE ET 
AL. (2009) estimated that 154 million rural individuals worked off-farm in 1995, 
including 54 million long-term migrants. Migration has become the most prevalent 
form of labor supply for off-farm activities since the late 1990s. Rural to urban 
migration has exploded in recent years. Despite maintaining a slow pace during the 
period of the East Asian financial crisis and China‟s deepening of state-owned 
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enterprise reform in the late 1990s, the total number of rural to urban migrants 
reached 139 million in 2011, accounting for about 40 percent of total urban 
employment in China (table 2.5). The expansion of rural off-farm work and 
rural-urban migration has played a critical role in facilitating the integration of rural 
and urban labor markets in China. 
Table 2.5: Migrant workers and urban employment 
Year Migrant workers (million) Urban Employment (million) Ratio (%) 
2000 78.49 212.74 36.9 
2001 83.99 239.4 35.1 
2002 104.7 247.8 42.3 
2003 113.9 256.39 44.4 
2004 118.23 264.76 44.7 
2005 125.78 273.31 46.0 
2006 132.12 283.1 46.7 
2007 136.49 293.5 46.5 
2008 135.38 307.55 44.0 
2009 136.16 318.89 42.7 
2010 134.87 332.64 40.5 
2011 139.12 344.42 40.3 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2001-2012)
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3 CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter starts with brief definitions of key concepts used in the study such as 
farm land, land property rights, migration and then proceeds with review of 
related theories including structure change theory, migration theory and land 
rights theory. Finally, conceptual framework that this study is intended to assess 
is presented. 
3.1 Definition of Key Concepts 
3.1.1 Farm Land 
Farmland generally refers to agricultural land, or land suitable for agricultural 
production, both crops and livestock (UNITED NATIONS, 1997). It is one of the 
main resources in agriculture. The standard classification divides agricultural land 
into the following components: Arable land, land under annual crops such as 
cereals, cotton, other technical crops, potatoes, vegetables, and melons; and also 
includes land left temporarily fallow; permanent cropland, orchards and vineyards 
(e.g., fruit plantations); pasture, areas for natural grasses and grazing of livestock, 
such as meadows and pasture (OECD, FAO). The first two components arable 
land and land in permanent crops constitute so-called cultivable land. The part of 
arable land actually under crops is called sown land or cropped land. The term 
farmland is ambiguous in the sense that it may refer on the one hand to 
agricultural land and on the other hand to cultivable or even only arable land 
(FAO STATISTICS DIVISION). 
According to Land Administration Law of the People‟s Republic of China (2005), 
agricultural land refers to land that is directly used for agricultural production, 
including cultivated land, forestland, grassland, land for irrigation and water 
conservancy and water surfaces for aquaculture. Rural Land Contract Law (RLCL) 
further clarifies that land in rural areas includes the arable land, forestlands and 
grasslands owned collectively by the peasants and by the State and used 
collectively by the peasants according to law, as well as other lands used for 
agriculture according to law, shall adopt the system of contracted land 
management. Land contracts in rural areas shall take the form of household 
contracts within the village collective.  
It is important to have a clear definition of farmland in this study, since China‟s 
rural land system is quite unique and complex. Concerning the requirements for 
simplification of the econometric model, farmland in this study refers to the land 
that households contract from the village collective. 
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3.1.2 Land Property Rights 
In economics, property usually refers to ownership, the right to possess something, 
to control it, to determine its use, to receive the benefits from its use, and to 
dispose of it (ALCHIAN, 2008). It is the owner‟s exclusive authority to determine 
how a resource is used, and who owns that resource. The related concept of 
property rights (which could be called “ownership rights”) refers to the specific 
content and extent of the rights possessed by property owners, particularly the 
limitations that may exist on the exercise of those rights and the nature of 
enforcement of those rights (KOTZ, 2006). 
There are four basic categories of property rights: none (or open access), 
communal property, private property, and state (or crown) property. Under open 
access, rights are left unassigned. The lack of any exclusivity implies the lack of 
an incentive to conserve, and therefore often results in degradation of scarce 
resources. Under communal property, exclusive rights are assigned to a group of 
individuals. Under state property, management of the land is under the authority 
of the public sector (FEDER AND FEENY, 1991). In private property, an individual 
is assigned the rights. These four categories are ideal analytical types. All or some 
of these categories of property rights may exist in a single society for different 
tracts of land. Furthermore, because of the multifaceted nature of property rights 
of land, the same tract of land can be categorized under more than one regime 
(FAO, 2002). 
However, the concept of property rights in this study is understood in the 
Demsetzian or common law tradition as a “bundle of rights” (HO, 2005). Instead 
of the civil law definition of “ownership” as an absolute and all-inclusive right, 
property can include-with temporal and geographical variations-such rights as use, 
alienation, usufruct, access, management, and right of way (HO, 2005).  
Therefore, various rights in land can be pictured as consisting of a bundle of 
sticks, each of which represents a different right associated with land (FAO, 
2010). For example, a bundle of rights existing on a piece of land can be 
disaggregated into: the right to derive benefit from the land (e.g. through 
cultivation or grazing, which is a use right); the right to decide how to use the 
land and to decide who shall be permitted to use it and under what conditions 
(management right); the right to derive income from the use of the land (income 
right); the right to transform it (capital right); the right to convey the land to 
others (e.g. through intra-community reallocations) or to heirs (i.e. by inheritance), 
to sell it or to give it away (transfer right); and the right to exclude others from 
using the land or otherwise interfering with it. In this context, “property” refers to 
all these different rights and does not necessarily mean “owning” (FAO, 2010). 
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According to Land Administration Law, in China, land in rural and suburban 
areas is owned by village collectives, but exclusive use rights are given to 
individuals under a contractual arrangement with the village collective. Farmers 
actually have partial property rights to their land. They have the rights to use the 
land for agricultural production, to reap the yields and to transfer the land to other 
farmers, as well as the right to obtain appropriate compensation when their 
contracted land is expropriated. They do not have the rights to sell the land, or 
mortgage it, or change it to non-agricultural use (Property Law of People‟s 
Republic of China, 2007). If these use rights are transferable with few limitations, 
and if the contract is sufficiently long-term (for example, ninety nine years), then 
for most of the contract‟s duration there would be very little difference between 
possession of use rights and full property rights.  
3.1.3 Migration 
The concept of migration is rather broad. Migration is defined by many authors, 
organizations and disciplines to suit their particular objectives. Therefore, there is 
no universally agreed-upon single definition of migration. However, some of the 
key definitions of migration in use at present are: 
According to the United Nations Multilingual Demographic Dictionary- 
Migration is a form of geographic mobility of spatial mobility between one 
geographical unit and another general involving place of departure to the place of 
destination or place of arrival. 
According to LEE (1996) migration is a permanent or semi-permanent change of 
residence with no restrictions upon the distance involved and the nature of the act 
involved in the movement. 
Also migration is categorized into various types depending on various aspects of 
migration such as time period (Permanent, Temporary and Seasonal), purpose 
(labor migration, forced migration), location (internal and international), process 
involved (legal and illegal migration) etc. 
The concepts of permanent migration and temporary migration, in the context of 
China, are rooted in the institution of household registration. Temporary migrants 
refer to individuals whose place of residence differs from their place of 
registration. Permanent migrants, in contrast, refer to migrants who have changed 
their registration to the place of residence. It is where individuals are registered, 
rather than the duration of stay, that defines them as permanent or temporary 
migrants (GOLDSTEIN AND GOLDSTEIN, 1991). 
For the purpose of this study, household migration behavior in 2008 refers to a 
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household having at least one individual who has declared work out of his usual 
place of residence for more than three months. The restriction put on this definition 
is that not only the workplace of the migrant must be out of their home county, but 
also the duration of his migration must be more than three months, in order to rule 
out commuters and keep only genuine migrants. Another related definition also 
important in this study is local off-farm employment that refers to any household 
member pursuing non-agricultural work within their county, either part or full 
time. 
3.2 Theory of Structural Change 
Development, almost by definition, involves a transfer of labor from agriculture to 
manufacturing and services. Standard economic theory on development predicts 
that in a country with a large pool of surplus labor occupied in low-productivity 
agriculture, rapid growth and industrialization result in the relocation of 
agricultural labor into the non-agricultural sectors, where employment increases 
rapidly (KUIJS AND WANG, 2005). It was postulated that, as the economy grows, 
production shifts from the primary to the secondary to the tertiary sector (FISHER, 
1939; CLARK, 1940; KUZNETS, 1966; CHENERY AND SYRQUIN, 1975). It is also 
notably argued that the economy passes through various stages of development 
from the traditional stage to the take-off stage to the mass consumption stage 
(ROSTOW, 1960). The basic shift in distribution of economic activity within a 
country, from primary production to manufacturing, and later to services, is related 
to other types of structural change, of which the most notable are migration and 
urbanization. These changes can be interpreted as the set of structural changes that 
are deemed essential to continued growth. They both contribute to and are affected 
by economic growth (KUIJS AND WANG, 2005).  
3.2.1 Fisher Clark’s Division of Sectors and Structural Change Theory 
Two economists, FISHER (1935) AND CLARK (1940), put forward the idea that an 
economy would have three stages of production: Primary production is concerned 
with the extraction of raw materials through agriculture, mining, fishing, and 
forestry. Low-income countries are assumed to be predominantly occupied with 
primary production. Secondary production concerns industrial production through 
manufacturing and construction. Middle-income countries are often dominated by 
their secondary sector. Tertiary production is concerned with the provision of 
services such as education and tourism. In high-income countries the tertiary 
sector dominates. Indeed, having a large tertiary sector is seen as a sign of 
economic maturity in the development process (CHENERY AND SRINIVASAN, 
1989).  
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Countries are assumed to first pass through the primary production stage then the 
secondary stage and to arrive at the tertiary stage. As economies develop and 
incomes rise, the demand for agricultural goods will increase, but due to their low 
income elasticity, at a proportionally lower rate than income. However, the demand 
for manufactured goods has higher income elasticity, so as incomes grow, demand 
for these goods grows at a proportionately higher rate. Hence, the secondary 
industry will grow along with income. As incomes continue to increase, people 
start to consume more services, thereby promoting growth and development in the 
tertiary sector (SOLOW, 1956). 
However, this may be misleading. Some developing countries may have a large 
tertiary sector due to a large tourist industry without having developed a 
secondary industry. Economists argue that this could be somewhat risky. If the 
economic base is dominated by an economic activity such as tourism that has a 
high-income elasticity of demand then a recession in the consuming nations will 
have a disproportionately large impact on export earnings. A fall in income will 
bring about a proportionately greater reduction in demand for the service and this 
will have severe impact on the economy. If it does not have a primary or 
secondary production to fall back on, then debt might be the only prospect 
(SOLOW, 1956). 
3.2.2 Lewis’s Dual Sector Model of Development 
Lewis proposed his dual sector development model in 1954. It is also known as 
the surplus labor model. It focused on the need for countries to transform their 
structures, away from agriculture, with low productivity of labor, towards 
industrial activity, with a high productivity of labor.  
It was based on the assumption that many developing countries had dual 
economies with both a traditional agricultural sector and a modern industrial 
sector. The traditional agricultural sector was assumed to be of a subsistence 
nature characterized by low productivity, low incomes, low savings and 
considerable underemployment. The industrial sector was assumed to be 
technologically advanced with high levels of investment operating in an urban 
environment. 
Lewis suggested that the modern industrial sector would attract workers from the 
rural areas. Industrial firms, whether private or publicly owned, could offer wages 
that would guarantee a higher quality of life than remaining in the rural areas 
could provide. Furthermore, as the level of labor productivity was so low in 
traditional agricultural areas people leaving the rural areas would have virtually 
no impact on output. Indeed, the amount of food available to the remaining 
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villagers would increase as the same amount of food could be shared amongst 
fewer people. This might generate a surplus which could then be sold generating 
income. 
Those people that moved away from the villages to the towns would earn 
increased incomes and this crucially, according to Lewis, generates more savings. 
The lack of development was due to a lack of savings and investment. The key to 
development was to increase savings and investment. Lewis saw the existence of 
the modern industrial sector as essential if this was to happen. Urban migration 
from the poor rural areas to the relatively richer industrial urban areas gave 
workers the opportunities to earn higher incomes and crucially save more 
providing funds for entrepreneurs to invest. A growing industrial sector requiring 
labor provided the incomes that could be spent and saved. This would in itself 
generate demand and also provide funds for investment. Income generated by the 
industrial sector trickles down throughout the economy. 
However, this model was criticized. The main criticisms were: the idea that the 
productivity of labor in rural areas is almost zero may be true for certain a time of 
the year, however, during planting and harvesting the need for labor is critical to 
the needs of the village (SCHULTZ, 1964; SEN, 1967). The assumption of a 
constant demand for labor from the industrial sector is questionable. Increasing 
technology may be labor-saving, reducing the need for labor. In addition, if the 
industry concerned declines, the demand for labor will fall. The idea of trickle 
down has also been criticized. Will higher incomes earned in the industrial sector 
be saved? If the entrepreneurs and labor spend their new-found gains rather than 
save it, funds for investment and growth will not be made available (RANIS, 2004). 
The rural urban migration in many developing countries has been far larger than 
that for which the industrial sector can provide jobs. Urban poverty has replaced 
rural poverty. 
The above theories have contributed more or less to the explanation of economic 
growth and development as well as structural change during this process. 
3.2.3 Main Driving Factors of Structural Change 
Structural change is a complex, intertwined phenomenon, not only because 
economic growth brings about complementary changes in various aspects of the 
economy, such as the sector compositions of output and employment, 
organization of industry, etc., but also these changes in turn affect the growth 
process (MATSUYAMA, 2005). An inherent phenomenon in any growing economy 
is that economic growth without structural change is not possible in the long term. 
Additionally, it can be politically delayed, but not prevented. The transformation 
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from a rural agricultural society to an urban industrial society is one of the main 
aspects of structural change discussed in the literature. However, there are also 
other aspects of structural change, such as structural change within a sector 
(MATSUYAMA, 2005).There is an obvious linkage between structural change of 
the whole economy and change within one sector (CHENERYA ET AL., 1989). 
BAUER AND MICKAN (1997) proposed that the main driving factors for structural 
change and relative decline of the agricultural sector in developed countries are 
declining demand for food, technological advancement, the relationship between 
wage and interest rates, and specialized enterprises for food-processing and input 
industries. Specifically, by shortly reviewing the agricultural development in 
industrialized countries, they argued that in developed countries a continuous 
increase in agricultural production can be observed with potentially decreasing 
factors of production and growing productivity. They also suggested that as the 
relationship between wages and interest rates rise over time, mechanization and 
the use of capital-intensive production techniques are encouraged, as well as the 
invention of new technologies that aim at rising labor productivity. As 
agricultural output expands faster than the demand for agricultural products, the 
supply surplus grows. According to Engel‟s law, the demand for food stuffs 
declines relative to overall demand when income rises. Therefore, are relative 
decline of the agricultural sector in terms of GDP can be anticipated. 
Finally, they argued that the continuous specialization of individual farms is 
another main driving force for the structural change within this sector. It is 
important to acquire and use special farming and business knowledge for securing 
economic success with farming activities. Part of this specialization is the 
externalization of particular activities from the farming sector to specialized input 
and processing businesses. Besides this specialization at the farm level a 
geographical concentration of specialized farms can be observed as they often 
exploit similar comparative advantages that a region offers. 
CHENERYA ET AL. (1989) stated the following factors as being relevant 
determinants for agricultural structure and thus its changes. Firstly, various 
economic and technical determinants are of importance. They relate to 
technological and market-connected scale effects, technological developments, 
and numerous factors impeding factor mobility as well as general economic 
developments. Secondly, some influence can be attributed to the historical initial 
situation, e.g. farm-specific characteristics like farmer behavior and attitudes. 
Thirdly, there are political influences, especially associated with structural 
policies in agriculture. 
REIMUND ET AL. (1977) stated that structural change factors in the agricultural 
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sector are as follows. Firstly, new production and institutional technology exists 
and can be implemented. This new technology must be capable of reducing 
production costs, and meanwhile it develops new information systems that tend to 
bypass or supplement the traditional ones. The new institutional technology must 
cope with new risks associated with new methods of production. Secondly, 
interregional competition tilts in favor of other areas and shifts in the location of 
production begin to occur. The shift is related to utilization of input resources 
(including human), which are available in a particular region or area. Thirdly, 
innovative entrepreneurs, who are generally new entrants into the sub-sector, take 
advantage of the opportunity to adopt and extend the new technology in the new 
production areas. Finally, pecuniary economies develop in the new production 
area, nourishing further growth and development. Production tends to concentrate 
in new areas as a result of both this and lower combined production and 
distribution costs.  
3.2.4 Adjustments by Farmers to Structural Change 
Since the agricultural sector experiences significant pressure as a consequence of 
all these driving factors mentioned above, there are certain adjustments that 
farmers need to make to mitigate the negative effects of this transformation. 
Traditionally, farm size was increased to realize the required income for sustaining 
household livelihood. Because of the restrictions in total land availability, 
individual farm growth by means of acquiring additional land could only be 
achieved when other farms gave up their farming activities. This is typical for the 
structural change of agriculture based on family farms. Particularly in rural areas, 
this simultaneous process of growth and surrender of farming depends very much 
on the labor market situation outside agriculture (BAUER AND MICKAN, 1997). 
The second, rather traditional form of adjustment is that of multiple job-holdings 
by farmers. Many farms are managed only part-time, so that farmers can spend 
the rest of their labor hours working outside of agriculture. Alternatively, some 
family members work on the farm while others take jobs in another economic 
sector. All these kinds of multiple job-holdings make it possible for farmers to 
earn some steady and „secure‟ income in addition to their farm income (BAUER 
AND MICKAN, 1997). 
Moreover, there are further adjustment measures conceivable. As consumers 
become more and more aware of healthy nutrition, some farmers introduce 
organic farming practices for which product prices are higher relative to 
conventionally produced agricultural goods. For other farms, it can be profitable 
to engage in tourist activities, they might be able to produce agricultural 
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side-products and special commodities, and they can occupy themselves in private 
services and handicraft businesses depending on individual interests and talents 
(BAUER AND MICKAN, 1997). 
These different examples of conceivable additional income sources cannot 
necessarily be generalized. Instead, these activities can only be applied relative to 
farm and/or regional conditions (BAUER AND MICKAN, 1997). 
3.2.5 Structural Change in the Chinese Economy 
The Chinese economy has experienced massive structural change over the past 
several decades. In 1952, agriculture accounted for more than half of GDP (Figure 
3.1), while urban industry and services accounted for 35 percent and 14 percent, 
respectively. The Chinese economy was predominantly agrarian at that time, but by 
2011, agriculture‟s share had declined to about ten percent of GDP. 
 
Figure 3.1: GDP Shares by Sector 
Source: NBS, 2008, 2012 
Labor shifts among sectors in China were also phenomenal. In 1952, more than 80 
percent of the national labor force was in the agricultural sector, while only 7 
percent worked in urban industry and nine percent in the urban service sector. By 
2011, 35 percent of labor was engaged in agricultural activities, about 29 percent 
worked in the urban industrial sector and 36 percent in the urban service sector 
(Figure 3.2).  
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1952 1962 1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 2009 2011
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
ta
ta
l 
G
D
P
Agriculture
Manufacturing
Services
    CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  42 
 
Figure 3.2: Labor employment shares by sector 
Source: NBS, 2008, 2012 
 
Figure 3.3: Capital stock shares by sector 
Source: WU (2009) 
Over the years, though declining slightly, the manufacturing sector still dominated 
the Chinese economy. However, during 1978-2006, the service sector has shown 
the trend of rapid catch-up. In 1978, agriculture accounted for nearly 20 percent 
of total capital stock, while manufacturing and services accounted for 53 and 28 
percent, respectively. By 2006, given slow growth in agricultural capital 
investment, the share of agriculture in total capital stock declined dramatically to 
6 percent, while industry and services increased their shares to 51 percent and 43 
percent, respectively (Wu, 2009). 
3.3 Microeconomic Theories of the Labor Market 
The last section mentioned structural change involving a large amount of labor 
moving out of the agriculture sector. In this section, the various labor mobility 
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theories related to this study will be briefly reviewed. HAGEN-ZANKER (2008) 
grouped migration theories based on levels of analysis-micro, meso and macro. 
This study mainly focuses on the microeconomic theories that explain the factors 
involved in labor migration. To be specific, three of them, LEE‟s Push-pull, 
Neoclassical, and New Economics of Labor Migration theories are reviewed in 
this section. 
3.3.1 Neoclassical Micro-migration Theory 
The basic assumption in the neoclassical theory of labor migration is that an 
individual maximizes his/her utility, subject to a budget constraint (SMITH, 1976; 
RAVENSTEIN, 1889; IN BAUER AND ZIMMERMANN, 1999). The neoclassical 
assumptions associate migration with lack of economic opportunities at places of 
origin. As such, the decision to migrate is a decision to maximize individual 
income. The central argument revolves around wages. This means that economic 
opportunities, especially wage differentials, are the most important factors for 
migration (STRAUBHAAR, 1988). 
Spatial migration mainly occurs because of geographic differences in the demand 
and supply of labor markets. Regions with a shortage of labor relative to capital 
are characterized by a high equilibrium wage, whereas regions with a large supply 
of labor relative to capital are faced with low equilibrium wages. This wage 
differential causes a migratory flow from low wage to high wage regions. In 
response to this flow, the supply of labor in the high wage region increases; 
subsequently, the wage in this region falls. Similarly, due to migration, the supply 
of labor in the low wage region decreases and wages in this region rise. The 
migration flow ends as soon as the wage differential between the two regions 
reflects the costs of movement from the low wage to the high wage region. As a 
result, the model argues, labor migration emerges from actual wage differentials 
between regions, i.e. the larger the wage differential the larger the migration flow. 
Alternatively, a spatial difference in the demand and supply of labor markets 
triggers migration of labor (STARK, 1991).   
Neo-classical migration theory considers rural-urban migration as a fundamental 
part of the whole development process, by which surplus labor in the rural sector 
supplies the workforce for the urban industrial economy (LEWIS, 1954). By 
postulating that it is a well-known fact of economic history, that material progress 
usually has been associated with the gradual but continuous transfer of economic 
agents from rural-based traditional agriculture to urban-oriented modern industry 
(TODARO, 1969), neo-classical migration theory is firmly entrenched in 
“developmentalist” modernization theory based on teleological views interpreting 
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development as a linear, universal process consisting of successive stages 
(ROSTOW, 1960). 
However, the neoclassical assumptions were modified in the Todaro model 
(TODARO, 1969) where the assumption of full employment was dropped. The 
influential “Harris-Todaro model” was developed in order to explain the 
apparently contradictory phenomenon of continuing rural-to-urban migration in 
developing countries despite rising unemployment in cities. HARRIS AND TODARO 
(1970) argued that, in order to understand this phenomenon, it is necessary to look 
at the rural-urban “expected” income differential. The expected income in the 
destination area not only depends on the actual (or average) earnings at the 
destination, but also on the probability of employment. Migration occurs when the 
expected benefits of moving are greater than the expected costs of moving. 
Further extension of the model is possible by interpreting it within a human 
capital framework, in which migration is seen as an investment decision (DE HAAS, 
2008). This concept holds that the educational qualifications, abilities, skills and 
competencies that an individual possesses represent his/ her human capital. This 
approach explains that individual labor market characteristics in different regions 
would result in different wage rates. However, there are reasons that some in a 
country migrate but others in another area do not. This approach also emphasizes 
migration cost in the form of transportation costs and income losses and 
psychological costs due to separation from family members and one‟s familiar 
environment during migration (BAUER AND ZIMMERMANN, 1999). This model 
considers migration as a response to regional differences in both demand and 
supply of labor. Moreover, this theory explains that probability of migration 
increases with education level, but decreases with increase in age. This is because 
migrants calculate expected lifetime gains from moving (KENNAN AND WALKE, 
2011). 
Neo-classical migration theory can be positioned within the functionalist 
paradigm of social theory, as the central argument of factor price equalization 
assumes that economic forces tend towards an equilibrium and also because it 
largely ignores the existence of market imperfections and other structural 
constraints on development (DE HAAS, 2008). This is hardly realistic, particularly 
in the context of many developing countries. In most developing countries, factor 
markets (capital, insurance) are typically far from perfect, making access to 
financial services and capital difficult or even impossible for marginalized groups 
(MCDOWELL AND DE HAAN , 1997). This makes it difficult to explain actual 
migration patterns within a neo-classical framework that mainly focuses on 
expected income. Neo-classical migration theory is also not able to deal with 
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constraining factors such as government restrictions on migration.  
3.3.2 Lee’s Push-pull Theory 
LEE (1966) was the first to formulate migration in a push-pull framework on an 
individual level, looking at both the supply and demand side of migration. In his 
view, the decision to migrate is determined by the following factors: factors 
associated with the area of origin; factors associated with the area of destination; 
so-called intervening obstacles (such as distance, physical barriers, immigration 
laws, and so on), and personal factors (e.g. how the migrant perceives the factors). 
Positive and negative factors at the origin and destination push and pull migrants 
towards (and away from) migration, hindered by intervening factors and affected 
by personal factors. Lee makes a number of predictions, for example that greater 
diversity among people leads to more migration and for this reason there are high 
rates of migration within the United States (HAGEN-ZANKER, 2008).  
The push-pull model has gained enormous popularity in the migration literature. 
However, this theory is barely a theory; it is more a grouping of factors affecting 
migration, without considering the exact causal mechanisms (HAGEN-ZANKER, 
2008). As they are applied in practice, Push-pull models tend to ignore the 
heterogeneity and internal stratification of societies, while general contextual 
factors habitually defined as either push or pull factors are likely to work out in a 
differentiated way at the individual level, and might subsequently encourage some 
people to leave and others to stay (DE HAAS, 2008).  
Additionally, push-pull models are also not able to explain return migration and 
the simultaneous occurrence of emigration and immigration from and to the same 
locality or area, nor do they pay attention to the impacts of migration, and the way 
it may alter the structural contexts both at the destination and origin (DE HAAS, 
2008). In other words, the push-pull model is a static model focusing on external 
factors that “cause” migration that is unable to analytically define migration as an 
integral part of broader transformation processes, and therefore seems of limited 
analytical use (DE HAAS, 2008). 
3.3.3 The New Economics of Labor Migration 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the so-called new economics of labor migration (NELM) 
emerged as a critical response to, and improvement of, neo-classical migration 
theory (MASSEY ET AL., 1993). The new economics of labor migration departs 
from the neoclassical economics principally in two aspects the level of analysis 
and the consideration of markets other than the labor market (MASSEY, 2003). 
While in the neoclassical approach the individual is the unit of analysis, as the 
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migration decisions are believed to be made at the individual level based on the 
individual cost-benefit calculations, the new economics of labor migration 
considers the household or family as the unit of analysis. According to NELM, 
the migration decisions are not made at the individual level but at the more 
aggregate level of a household or family. And the migration decision reflects the 
household‟s strategy of maximizing the expected income, minimizing the risks 
and loosening the constraints associated with a variety of market failures like 
private insurance, futures markets, credit markets etc. (STARK AND LEVHARI, 1982; 
STARK, 1984; KATZ AND STARK, 1986; STARK AND TAYLOR, 1991).  
The new economics of labor markets also questions the assumption that income 
has a constant utility for various people across socioeconomic settings. This 
theory argues that households make migration decisions not only to improve their 
expected incomes in absolute terms but also to increase income compared to other 
households, and hence to reduce their relative deprivation compared to some 
other reference group (STARK ET AL., 1988; STARK AND TAYLOR, 1989; 1991; 
MASSEY ET AL., 1993). 
3.3.4 Farm Household Model and Labor Allocation 
The farm household model has a long history in the development literature and 
has been frequently applied to the study of household labor allocation 
(DONNELLAN ET AL., 2012). The model assumes decisions on how much time is 
divided between labor and leisure, and how hours of labor are divided between 
farm and off-farm labor to maximize utility are made as a family (D‟ANTONI AND 
MISHRA, 2013). 
In deciding how much time to devote to on-farm work, off-farm work and leisure, 
farm households confronts three kinds of constrains. First, they cannot spend 
more money on consumption than they earn. Second, neither of the income 
earners can spend more total time in work and leisure than is available. Third, for 
a given endowment of owned farm capital, the most important of which being 
owned farmland and farm-specific human capital, a household‟s net earnings 
from farming can not exceed the level obtained by choosing profit-maximizing 
levels of farm output and input use. These latter will be dictated by relative prices 
of farm outputs and inputs and the technical relationships embodied in the farm 
production function and, in particular, the diminishing marginal factor 
productivity of farm household labor (DEWBRE AND MISHRA, 2007). In theory, the 
household will allocate labor to participate in off-farmwork as long as their 
marginal value of farm labor (reservation wage) is less than the off-farm wage 
rate (BECKER 1965; GRONAU 1973). 
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The basic ideas of the analysis of labor allocation under the farm household 
model are illustrated in Figure 3.4. The horizontal axis indicates the amount of 
time spent working: zero hours on the extreme left to a maximum of T hours on 
the extreme right. The vertical axis measures total income, traced by the income 
possibility curve passing through the points A, B, and D; and terminating at Ymax. 
Three categories of income are distinguished. The first is non-labor income and is 
denoted as Y0. It is that income a farm household would receive even when zero 
hours are devoted to work, e.g. pensions, rents. The second category is farm 
income. The incremental contribution of income from this source is traced by the 
curve that starts at A and passes through the points marked B and D. Notice that 
the slope of this curve declines as more hours are allocated to farm work, 
reflecting the assumption of diminishing marginal productivity of farm labor. 
Atthe equilibrium depicted in Figure 3.4, farm income is represented on the right 
hand axis as Yf-Y0. The third category is off-farm income, shown as the 
difference between Yt and Yf. Off-farm earnings are determined by the off-farm 
wage rate represented by the (constant) slope of the income possibility curve over 
the segment B to Ymax. 
The indifference curves labeled U1 and U2 show equal-utility combinations of 
income and leisure. The household maximizes utility by choosing that 
combination of work time and leisure yielding the highest attainable utility given 
the constraints. In the absence of off-farm work opportunities, a household would 
maximize utility by choosing to allocate Tf‟ hours to on-farm work, and T-Tf‟ 
hours to leisure at the tangency point C of the indifference curve labeled U1 with 
the income possibility curve. This combination of work and leisure hours yields 
farm income maxYf  the optimal maximum, ignoring off-farm work opportunities. 
However, the existence of off-farm work opportunities at wage rate W means the 
household can obtain the higher income Yt, atthe higher utility associated 
tangency point D, working only Tf hours on the farm and Tw hours off the farm 
and spending T-Tw hours in leisure activities. This is because at all points to the 
right of point B on the income possibility curve, the off-farm wage rate, W, is 
higher than the marginal value product of farm household labor MVPf. Notice that 
under these conditions, the assumption of utility maximization-equating the 
marginal rate of substitution between income and leisure with the off-farm wage 
rate-is enough to ensure, that the farm household will allocate less time to 
on-farm work in the presence of off-farm earning opportunities. Compare Tf‟toTf. 
Changes in the off-farm wage rate, in the marginal value product of farm 
household labor or in the level of non-labor income could all potentially change 
the location and slopes of the income possibility curve. Any such change will lead 
to reallocation of a farm household‟s total time endowment between on and 
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off-farm activities and leisure. 
 
Figure 3.4: Time allocation and farm household income 
Source: Adapted from DEWBRE AND MISHRA (2007) 
3.4 The Role of Property Rights  
The objective of this section is to provide a review of the most important theories 
linking tenure security, factor markets development and agricultural productivity. 
3.4.1 Overview of Property Rights Theory 
3.4.1.1 Hardin‟s “Tragedy of the Commons” 
This theory had been among the most famous analyses of communal property. In 
fact, HARDIN (1968) assumed that common resources lacking ownership are 
bound for over-exploitation. He argued that each user would harvest the resource 
as soon as possible, before other users did so. When everybody owns the resource, 
nobody has incentive to conserve it for future use. Each use imposes an external 
cost on all other users in terms of reduced resource availability. The consequence 
is overgrazing, overfishing, clearing of forest and so on, which can in turn 
endanger the sustainability of a resource. 
HARDIN‟s model has been criticized by a number of writers. CITIACY-WANTRUP 
AND BISHOP (1975) showed that HARDIN failed to distinguish between forms of 
open access to common property. They conclude that the tragedy of the commons 
is really found in an open-access property category where the property rights and 
T 
N
o
n
-lab
o
r in
co
m
e 
U
1
 I Ymax 
Tw Tf‟ 
O
ff-farm
 in
co
m
e 
Yf
max
 
Yf Farm
 r in
co
m
e 
Y0 
Yt 
Leisure time Off-farm work On-farm work 
Tf 
• 
• 
• 
• 
0 
B 
D 
C 
A 
    CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  49 
the social authorities that define and enforce the rights are absent, but not 
necessary with common property per se. 
An immediate result of this was that economists recommended specification and 
enforcement of rights. Even before Hardin‟s theory, COASE (1960) showed that a 
clear assignment of rights, together with the market mechanism would solve the 
problems related to externalities, regardless of to whom the rights were assigned. 
However, this point of view was also criticized by a number of writers because it 
is not valid in the case of a communal property regime where rights are assigned 
to a well-defined group. In fact, when there is growing competition for the use of 
land as a result of population growth and growth in production demand, 
communal ownership becomes unstable and produces harmful effects in the form 
of mismanagement and/or overexploitation of the valuable resource (PLATTEAU, 
1995). Efforts at conserving it are discouraged and social benefits are lost because 
property rights are not there to guide incentives to achieve adequate 
internalization of externalities (ALCHIAN AND DEMSETZ, 1972). 
Therefore, common property is presumed by many economists to be inefficient. 
There are three sources of inefficiency. One is rent dissipation, because no one 
owns the products of a resource until they are captured, and everyone engages in 
an unproductive race to capture these products before others do (GORDON, 1954). 
The second is the high transaction cost of enforcement if communal owners try to 
devise rules to reduce the externalities of their mutual overuse (ALCHIAN AND 
DEMSETZ, 1972). The third is low productivity, because no one has an incentive to 
work hard in order to increase one‟s private returns (NORTH, 1990; YANG, 1987).  
3.4.1.2 The Property Rights School 
The property rights school argues that private property is the most appropriate 
way to achieve a greater internalization of externalities (DEMSETZ, 1967). The 
incentive effect of a private property regime has long been recognized, as attested 
to by Lloyd: “The common reasons for the establishment of private property in 
land are deduced from the necessity of offering to individuals sufficient motives 
for cultivating the ground, and of preventing the wasteful destruction of the 
immature products of the Barth” (LLOYD, 1833 AS QUOTED IN BALAND AND 
PLATTEAT, 1996).  
The ultimate superiority of private property rights has been expressed by POSNER 
(1980) as follows: the proper incentives for economic efficiency are created by 
the parceling out among the members of society of mutually exclusive rights to 
the exclusive use of particular resources. If every piece of land is owned by 
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someone, in the sense that there is always an individual who can exclude all 
others from access to any given area, then individuals will endeavor by cultivation 
or other improvements to maximize the value of land. The foregoing discussion 
suggests three criteria of an efficient system of property rights. The first is 
universality. Ideally, all resources should be owned by someone, except resources 
so plentiful that everybody can consume as much of them as he wants without 
reducing consumption by everyone else. The second criterion is exclusivity 
(BALAND AND PLATTEAU, 1996). The third criterion of an efficient system of 
property rights is transferability. If a property right cannot be transferred, there is 
no way of shifting a resource from a less productive to a more productive use 
through voluntary exchange. (POSNER, 1977 AS QUOTED IN BALAND AND 
PLATTEAT, 1996) 
In short, they argue that private property rights should be established. The 
property rights school does not however limit itself to bringing out the static gains 
in efficiency which may be engendered by private property. It also makes the 
contention that the institution of private property will spontaneously emerge in 
reality whenever a cost-benefit comparison makes it appear as more desirable 
than any other system (BALAND AND PLATTEAT, 1994). 
In short, efficiency considerations dominate the property rights school arguments. 
In this respect, private property rights are alleged to be superior. Furthermore, it is 
claimed that changes in property rights systematically achieve greater efficiency 
(Baland and Platteau, 1996). 
The property rights school theory had been criticized by a number of writers. The 
Land Tenure Center (LTC) studies questioned for instance, whether formal tenure 
provided effectively greater security than customary land tenure system. The LTC 
concluded that the theory of property rights school ignored that the communal 
arrangements are characterized by multi-tenure systems with different land uses. 
Thus, individual tenures can exist under such systems and individuals or the 
proportion of lands held under relatively well-secured rights (MIGOT-ADHOLLA ET 
AL., 1994). 
3.4.1.3 The Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights School 
The evolutionary theory of land rights (ETLR) posits that customary land tenure 
systems, based on common property and extensive practices, are efficient when 
there is weak pressure on resources (BARNES AND CHILD, 2012). However, under 
pressure from population growth and the market, there is a gradual move towards 
individualization of rights and expansion of commercial transaction. The result of 
this inevitable process is the efficiency of resource allocation. 
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Property rights formalization, through imparting greater tenure security to 
landholders, leads to increased incentive to invest in the land, higher land values, 
more land transactions, and greater availability and use of credit. A dynamic land 
market, it is argued, will ensure that land is transferred into the hands of more 
efficient farmers and in the process will consolidate sub-economic land holdings 
into more viable units. Credit availability and longer investment horizons will 
improve land stewardship leading to more sustainable forms of development. 
Finally, property rights formalization will promote peace and harmony by 
clarifying property boundaries and conflicting interests (BARNES AND CHILD, 
2012). 
Briefly, this school perceives a gradual but unavoidable move away from 
common property to individual property rights. Therefore, the task of the 
Government consists of supporting a change that is under way (RANAIVOARISON, 
2004). For this, there is a land titling program where land has become so scarce as 
to make it a source of strong competition (PLATTEAU, 1996). 
Researchers criticized the ETLR mainly focus on its two shortcomings. First, it 
takes a distinctly western perspective of property rights which views land as a 
divisible commodity that is mostly held by individuals (BARNES AND CHILD, 
2012). This is definitely not the case for land held under customary or indigenous 
tenure which is mostly held by communities. Proponents of the ETLR argue that 
it is just a matter of time before these tenures evolve to the privatized model that 
is predominant in the US and Europe (DE SOTO, 2000). BARNES AND CHILD (2012) 
acknowledge that customary and indigenous tenures are dynamic, but do not 
agree that these diverse forms of tenure will naturally converge into a 
homogeneous private individual system. 
Secondly, efficiency and equity considerations are hardly separable in the ETLR. 
Empirical works in Sub-Saharan Africa shows that only one small part of a 
population can register their land (RANAIVOARISON, 2004). There is risk that land 
registration might be manipulated by the elites to turn it to their advantage. 
Consequently, the situation is characterized by the mistrust of State government 
and uncertainties surrounding loss of control over land. This problem of 
legitimacy of land titling leads in turn to high transaction costs, malfunctioning of 
land markets and other rural factors markets (PLATTEAU, 1996), which will further 
result in efficiency losses.  
3.4.2 Property Rights and Agricultural Productivity 
There are three distinct channels through which property rights may influence 
productivity and efficiency (FEDER AND FEENY, 1991). Property rights influence 
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productivity through their effect on investment incentives, the way land is 
allocated across households and use of land as collateral in credit markets.  
3.4.2.1 Property Rights and Investment incentives 
Property rights provide agents with incentive to use land efficiently and to invest 
in land conservation and improvement, which are likely to improve long-run 
productivity (FEDER AND FEENY, 1991). Policies that frequently reallocate land 
among households or prohibit permanent land bequests may undermine tenure 
security (BRANDT ET AL., 2002). Short-term tenures or uncertainty over the 
duration of tenure can lower the household‟s expected returns to its investment 
and reduce the optimal level of investment. By contrast, farmers with 
well-defined tenure rights will be more likely to invest in land saving, 
productivity-enhancing activities such as irrigation, drainage and terracing. They 
will also be more likely to convert land to higher-value uses or maintain soil 
fertility through practices such as the application of organic fertilizers (BRANDT ET 
AL., 2002; CHIRWA, 2008). The returns to these types of investment are usually 
insufficient to pay back the initial outlay in a single year but are distributed over a 
longer period. Freedom to rent out land also enhances investment incentives 
because it strengthens a household‟s future ability to capture the returns to its 
current investment in the land should it later opt not to farm the land (BESLAY, 
1995).  
Proponents of this viewpoint also argue that insecure rights over land use may 
discourage households from investing in labor-saving, productivity enhancing 
farm machinery and other capital goods. This type of investment is particularly 
important in areas where there are good off-farm opportunities. Insofar as there 
are technological possibilities for substituting capital for labor and experience 
elsewhere in Asia suggest that incomplete markets for renting farm machinery or 
weak incentives to invest may hamper the growth of land and labor productivity, 
and agricultural growth more generally (BRANDT ET AL., 2002). 
Certain factors, however, can dampen the adverse effect of insecure tenure on 
long-term investment and reduce the imperative to solidify rights. If some 
supra-household organization, such as a village, makes the investment decisions, 
the negative impact of poor land rights could be mitigated (DONG, 2000). Indeed, 
many farm investments require coordination among households, and a collective 
organization that has its own resource base and/or ability to mobilize households 
could be effective in making fixed investments in the land (BRANDT ET AL., 2002). 
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3.4.2.2 Property Rights and Land Rental Markets 
The development of land rental markets can enhance agricultural productivity and 
incomes by facilitating transfers of land to more productive farmers and 
facilitating the transfer of labor to the non -farm economy (DEININGER AND JIN, 
2002; LOHMAR ET AL., 2001; KUNG, 2002; ZHANG ET AL., 2004 ). Clear property 
rights activate land rental markets by providing protection in state legislatures and 
thus facilitating land transfer. Additionally, the clarity increases the efficiency in 
resources allocation (BESLAY AND GHATAK, 2010). 
In China, when productivity differentials exist among households in a village (i.e., 
when there is allocative or static inefficiency), a reallocation of land toward 
households with relatively more labor and a greater desire to work the land (i.e., 
households with a higher marginal productivity of land) and away from those 
with a lower marginal productivity should lead to higher overall output. This can 
be done administratively, as when local cadres reallocate land among households, 
or can occur in a decentralized way if farmers are able to rent their land to other 
households through local rental markets (BRANDT ET AL., 2002). In a transitional 
economy, however, where markets are underdeveloped, high transaction costs 
may limit the number of rentals, and in general, these constraints on rentals will 
affect productivity (GALIANI AND SCHARGRODSKY, 2010). 
3.4.2.3 Property Rights and Credit Transactions 
Proponents of land privatization argue that well-defined land rights provide 
small-scale farmers with a form of collateral that can assist the development of 
formal and informal rural credit markets. Financial institutions are not frequently 
willing to offer credit to farmers due to limited information about actual farming 
conditions and the risk involved. Giving loans against collateral is then the 
preferred manner in which formal credit institutions reduce uncertainty 
(HELTBERG, 2002). Land is an asset with a number of characteristics that make it 
appropriate for use as collateral. It is immobile and it cannot be stolen or 
destroyed. Consequently, it can remain in the possession of the borrower, to 
whom it yields a positive expected return (BISWANGER AND ROSENZWEIG, 1986). 
Most farm households in China, like those in many other developing countries, 
are effectively excluded from formal channels of credit (PARK, 1999; LI ET AL., 
2011). Although the use of rural land as collateral is not permitted, land can still 
provide a productive asset that farmers can invest in for their old age. Historically, 
elderly farmers have been able to maintain their consumption and incomes in old 
age by accumulating land earlier in life (BENJAMIN ET AL., 2000). As well as being 
a productive asset for farming, land plays a number of other roles in rural China. 
    CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  54 
Most importantly, farming provides jobs and security. When credit markets are 
poor and labor markets underdeveloped, access to land enables families, 
especially those who are poorer and less educated, to more effectively use their 
labor, which is often their most abundant resource (BRANDT ET AL., 2002). 
Moreover, when markets are unreliable and the transaction costs of buying and 
selling grain and other commodities are high, access to land can provide rural 
people with a cheap source of food (GILES, 1998). 
3.4.3 Property Rights and Structure Change 
The literature holds that secure property rights to land can facilitate structural 
transformation in two ways (BESLEY AND GHATAK, 2010). Increased tenure 
security and the associated reduction of expropriation risk will increase 
investment incentives. Formal documentation of rights, e.g. through certificates, 
makes it easier to unambiguously identify legitimate owners and thereby reduces 
the transaction cost of market-based land transfers. If other conditions -such as 
differences in productivity between producers because of availability of other 
sources of employment or a sufficiently liquid land sales market- are in place, this 
can facilitate either efficiency-enhancing land transfers to more productive users 
or use of land as collateral in credit markets (DEININGER AND FEDER, 2009). 
Adapting these principles to Chinese conditions, where use of rural land as 
collateral is not permitted, reallocations could threaten those moving out of 
agriculture, and coverage with certificates is uneven, allows us to derive testable 
hypotheses (DEININGER ET AL., 2012). 
Regarding land reallocation, in China, the risk of dispossession for a resident 
cultivator who uses the land for agricultural purposes is low. This is one of the 
reasons why many studies find higher tenure security, defined as reduced 
probability of administrative reallocation, to have limited investment impact 
(JACOBY ET AL., 2002; LI ET AL., 1998). At the same time, the danger that renting 
out of land by somebody exiting agriculture could be perceived as a signal that 
the land is no longer required and could be transferred by administrative 
reallocation has long been identified as a potential challenge (BRANDT ET AL., 
2004; YANG, 1997). Reallocation may thus discourage exit from the sector at the 
margin, consistent with findings that, where factor markets function reasonably 
well, such intervention significantly reduces technical efficiency (ZHANG ET AL., 
2011). 
Regarding transferability, measures to facilitate market-based land transfers, e.g. 
by increasing coverage with land certificates and outlawing reallocation have a 
potential to make a very positive contribution to the economy (CARTER AND YAO, 
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2002). Indeed, China witnessed rapid emergence of land rental markets which had 
hardly existed as late as by the mid-1990s (DEININGER AND JIN, 2005). In a 
situation where land loss by cultivators is unlikely and use of rural land as 
collateral not allowed, certificates or transferability could affect outcomes through 
two channels (DEININGER ET AL., 2012). First, by making contract enforcement 
easier, thus facilitating land transactions with individuals who are not close kin so 
that use of informal mechanisms for contract enforcement is not an option. 
Second is to reduce the fear of land loss even if land is transferred for longer 
periods, thus allowing use of long-term contracts that can make a more 
substantive contribution to structural transformation, e.g. by allowing tenants to 
make long-term plans and investment. Both of these can allow land users who 
might temporarily or permanently move out of the sector to earn higher and less 
risky returns from their land, thereby facilitating operation of factor markets and, 
if some of the proceeds are invested locally, creating the basis for a more vibrant 
rural economy (DEININGER ET AL., 2012). 
3.5 Conceptual Framework of the Research 
The objective of this study is to identify the determinant factors of household 
decisions regarding off-farm employment and land rental markets, especially the 
impact from land tenure arrangements, and evaluate the decision‟s influence on 
agriculture production. Based on the theories discussed in the previous sections, 
the conceptual framework is derived to present the linkage between research 
objectives and the empirical analysis procedures (Figure 3.5). 
The study begins with the determinants of off-farm employment, particularly the 
impact from land tenure arrangements. This part of research seeks help from the 
New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) to meet the objectives. In China, 
family ties are very strong and most decisions by household members are made 
jointly after consulting with household members. Off-farm labor allocation is an 
important household livelihood strategy and therefore the household should be the 
basic unit of analysis and not the individual. The NELM considers the household 
as the basic unit of analysis and migration is considered to be a household 
decision. Therefore, in this study the household characteristics are considered in 
analyzing the household off-farm employment decisions. Furthermore, unlike 
other theories of migration NELM does not imply that migration decisions are 
only the result of labor market conditions, that is wage or income opportunity 
differences, either actual or perceived, or market failures such as the insurance 
market, credit market etc., but also contribute to the household migration decision 
(STARK, 1991). Rural areas in China are constrained by a variety of market 
failures, such as land rental markets, credit markets and also the lack of social 
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security. Therefore, the NELM that considers these factors would be an 
appropriate theory for explaining the migration decision as well as off-farm 
employment decision of households. 
 
Figure 3.5: Conceptual framework of the study 
Source: Own presentation 
Liberalization of labor markets in China began as early as the start of economic 
reform. In contrast to the other factor markets, the land rental markets, have just 
emerged and are mainly constrained by communal property rights. Hence, the 
next step of this research is to analyze the households land rental market 
participation decision, in particularly, how land tenure arrangements and labor 
market participation impact the land rental market participation decision. This 
part of the study is theoretically based on the theory of the property rights school. 
Even though political considerations constrain the implementation of a system of 
rigorously enforced property rights, a compromise can be made such that a 
nationwide land registration program gives the farmers land-use rights with more 
official certificates, and extends the contract period. Therefore, with these 
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quasi-private property rights, the property rights school theory would be more 
suitable for this part of analysis. 
When the analyses of the main factors markets are settled, the analysis of how the 
land tenure arrangements and participation in these markets affects household 
agricultural productivity will be carried out. This part of the research is based on 
the blending of all of the structural change, property rights and migration theories, 
and a detailed analysis is given in chapter 7.
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4 DESCRIPTION OF FIELD STUDY 
This chapter is divided into three distinct sections: the study area, research design 
and descriptive analysis results. The chapter begins with a detailed description of 
the study area and rationale for the choice of the study area, along with its 
location, topography, demographic features, land-use profile and a comparison 
between the three study regions. The second section provides detail on research 
design, sample size, sampling procedure, data collection and data processing. The 
third section presents descriptive results from the field study, including major 
household characteristics, resource endowments, land tenure-related variables, 
household market participation and crop production. 
4.1 Description of the Study Area 
Before proceeding to the detailed data collection issues and descriptive analysis, 
an effort is made to provide some background information such as geographic and 
socio-economic characteristics of the study area. 
4.1.1 Selection of Study Area 
China occupies much territory, but only about 15 percent of China‟s total land 
area can be cultivated. From the map of China‟s agricultural regions (figure 4.1), 
China‟s arable land is primarily in the eastern region. Henan province is located in 
the middle of this region. It ranks first in China in agriculture and grain 
production and second in arable land available, only after Heilongjiang province. 
Henan province plays an important role in China‟s economic development and 
social progress. Its grain production‟s fluctuation inevitably influences national 
grain security and even causes economic and social fluctuation (LI ET AL., 2012). 
Moreover, Henan has historically been one of the most highly-populated centers 
in China. It now is the most populated province in the nation that has a population 
of 104.89 million, living in 167 thousand square kilometers. Although, its 
population density rank second after Chongqing, it still stands, at 628 persons per 
square kilometer, almost four times the average national density (144 
inhabitants/km
2
) (NBS, 2012). In addition, compared to other regions, it has the 
smallest per capita land ratio, with 0.07 hectares per rural person (more than 14 
persons per hectare).  
Henan is also the number one source of labor migration. Due to its high 
labor-land ratio, and the improvement of agricultural mechanization, there are 
millions of surplus laborers in the agricultural sector. Since 1995, more than 3 
million rural laborers have migrated out of Henan each year (ZHANG ET AL., 2008). 
During 2000 to 2008, the off-farm participation rate of agricultural labor in Henan 
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Province increased from 24.36 percent to 41.40 percent, which is higher than the 
national average (26.34 percent to 31.15 percent) (ZHU AND LIU, 2012). 
As mentioned above, Henan is one of China‟s major grain-producing areas. As 
grain production is easily mechanized and suitable for large-scale operations, 
economies of scale achieved by increasing farm size through land rental markets 
will have a profound impact on regional economic development as well as 
national food security. In fact, land rental markets have been emerging since the 
late 1980s, however, after the mid-1990s, land rental activities started to expand. 
By the year 2010, transferred land area reached 782,000 hectares in Henan 
province, accounting for 12 percent of total cultivated land, and almost 7 times 
the land transfer area in 2001 (115,333 hectares), with an average increase of 
74,000 hectares (MIAO, 2011). 
The main purpose of this study is to explore the linkage between land tenure 
arrangements, factor markets (off-farm employment and land rental markets) 
development, and agricultural productivity. Even though Chinese authorities have 
implemented uniform land laws and policies, different village collectives have 
their own land institutions, such as different rules in land distribution, adjustment, 
and transfer, different timing of implementing land laws and policies, different 
durations of land contracts, etc. (FENG AND HEERINK, 2008). All of these 
variations allow us to use a model to investigate the impact of land tenure 
arrangements on off-farm employment, land rental markets and agricultural 
productivity. Henan‟s important position in China‟s agriculture and the 
development of both off-farm labor markets and land rental markets, make it the 
rational province to carry out this research. 
4.1.2 General Information about Henan Province 
Henan Province is located in the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River of 
mid-eastern China (LI, ET AL., 2009). It is situated between110°21‟-116°39‟ east 
longitude and 31°23‟-36°23‟ north latitude, with higher altitude in the west and 
lower altitude in the east (LI, 2009). It is surrounded by four mountain ranges, the 
Taihang, Funiu, Tongbai and Dabie, which stand to its north, west and south. In 
its middle and eastern parts there is a vast fluvial plain created by the Yellow, 
Huaihe and Haihe rivers (ZHANG, ET AL., 2008). It borders Shaanxi, Shanxi, Hebei, 
Shandong, Anhui, and Hubei and has an area of 167,000 square kilometers, 
accounting for 1.74 percent of the national total (ZHANG, ET AL., 2008; LI, 2009). 
Its mountainous area comprises about 44,000 square kilometers, accounting for 
26.6 percent of the provincial total. Hills cover around 30,000 square kilometers, 
taking up 17.7 percent of the total. Plains cover around 93,000 square kilometers, 
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55.7 percent of the provincial total (ZHANG, ET AL., 2008).  
 
Figure 4.1: Map of China indicating percentage of cultivation 
 
Figure 4.2: Map of Henan province 
Source: http://www.maps-of-china.com 
Henan Province is mostly warm temperate with a subtropical zone in the south 
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between subtropical and warm temperate zones (LI, 2009). It also has the 
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characteristics of transition from plain to hill and mountain topography from east 
to west with hot, rainy summers; dry, inclement winters and windy springs 
(ZHANG, ET AL., 2008; LI, 2009). The range of annual average temperature from 
north to south in Henan province is 13°C-15°C, annual average precipitation of 
600-900 millimeters, annual average sunshine of 1848-2489 hours and an annual 
frost-free period of 189-240 days, which makes it suitable for the growth of many 
crops (ZHANG, ET AL., 2008; LI, 2009).  
Henan is one of the cradles of China‟s agriculture. The development of 
agriculture in this province plays an important role in China. As one of the major 
agricultural product bases in China, the province teems with wheat, maize, rice, 
cotton, sesame, peanut, flue-cured tobacco and many other local products (ZHANG, 
ET AL., 2008). As one of the most important grain producing provinces in China, 
Henan has a variety of crops and complicated planting modes. Double-cropping 
of winter wheat and summer maize is the major planting mode in the province. 
The area and total output of the two crops and also the commodity grain provided 
each year rank among the top in China. 
Henan is a semi-industrialized economy with an underdeveloped service sector. In 
2011, Henan‟s nominal GDP was 3.20 trillion RMB (US$427 billion), making it 
the fifth largest economy in China, although it ranks nineteenth in terms of GDP 
per capita (NBS, 2012). The contributions of the agriculture, industry and service 
sectors are 5.2 percent, 64.8 percent and 30 percent respectively (HENAN 
STATISTIC YEARBOOK, 2012). 
Directly under the jurisdiction of the provincial government are 18 cities and 
prefectures that govern 158 counties
3
 and districts, and 1,892 towns (ZHANG, ET 
AL., 2008; LI, 2009). By the end of 2011, the province had 62.34 million rural 
residents, accounting for 59 percent of the total population (HENAN STATISTIC 
YEARBOOK, 2012). 
4.1.3 Description of the Actual Study Area 
4.1.3.1 Location and Physical Environment 
This study focuses on the north of Henan Province. The climate in this area is 
classified as a semi-humid area in terms of agro-ecology, which also represents 
the semi-humid areas in western Henan Province, the Fenwei Plain and Low 
Coastal Plan in Northern China. The terrain is mostly low and hilly, where the soil 
is cinnamon and yellow-colored, and soil fertility is low (organic matter content is 
                                                             
3 According to the administrative divisions of China, there are five practical levels of local government: the province, 
prefecture, county, township, and village (http://www.gov.cn). 
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1.43 percent) (WANG, ET AL., 2008). In terms of climatic conditions, light and heat 
resources are adequate, rainfall is unevenly distributed, and seasonal drought is 
distinctive. The main crops in this area include winter wheat, maize, sweet potato 
and miscellaneous grain crops. There is a large disparity in inter-annual grain 
output. The cropping systems include one harvest per year, three harvests in two 
years and double harvest. It is an important dry-farming area in China. The field 
survey was conducted in the three counties Mengzhou, Wenxian and Huaxian 
4.1.3.2 Demographic Characteristics 
The three counties under study differ in terms of demographic characteristics. 
According to the 2010 Sixth National population census, Huaxian had the greatest 
population, Mengzhou had the least, and Wenxian stood in-between. In contrast, 
Mengzhou had the highest proportion of population living in urban areas, Huaxian 
had the lowest percentage of urban population, where around 80 percent of the 
population lives in rural areas, and again Wenxian was in the middle. However, 
urbanization rates for the three counties are less than the provincial average of 
40.6 percent, indicating that they are all agricultural counties. The population 
growth rates of the three counties are more or less similar to the province average 
of 0.5 percent, with the exception of Mengzhou, which is only at 0.42 percent. 
Wenxian is the most populated county among the three with a population density 
of 942 persons per square kilometer. Additionally, all of the three county 
population densities are higher than the provincial average. Details are presented 
in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Some demographic indicators of the study counties     
Indicator Mengzhou Wenxian Huaxian Province 
Population (million person) 0.37 0.43 1.339 104.89 
Urban population (%) 37.93 35.96 20 40.6 
Rural population (%) 62.07 64.07 80 59.4 
Population growth rate (%) 0.416 0.517 0.499 0.50 
Population density (persons per km
2
.) 812 942 734 628 
Households number (thousand hhs) 103 133 369 31020 
Source: Henan Statistic Yearbook 2012. 
4.1.3.3 Land Use and Crop Production 
The three counties have different land endowments. Huaxian covers a large 
geographical area, cultivated land and sown areas are both almost more than twice 
that of the other two counties added together. Compared to Mengzhou and 
Huaxian, Wenxian has the highest percentage of irrigated land, more than 88 
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percent of its cultivated land having access to irrigation. This is high even 
compared to the other parts of Henan province. 
Table 4.2: Land utilization in the study counties (1,000 hectares) 
 Mengzhou Wenxian Huaxian Province 
Land  54.1 46.2 181.4 16700 
Cultivated land 27.3 29.7 130 7926.4 
Sown areas 53.9 53.5 258.8 14258.6 
Irrigated land ( % of 
cultivated land) 
63.7 88.6 75 65 
Source: Henan Statistic Yearbook 2012. 
Details on land utilization are given in Figure 4.3. As mentioned earlier, Henan 
province is one of the nation‟s major grain producing provinces, with about 37 
percent of the sown area cultivated with wheat, about 21 percent of the sown 
areas cultivated with maize. The percentages of sown area for wheat in the three 
counties are slightly higher than the province average, at 40 percent in Mengzhou, 
39 percent in Wenxian, and 44 percent in Huaxian. Similar are the ratios of 
maize-sown areas, indicating that these three counties are the main 
grain-producing regions in the province. 
  
  
Figure 4.3: Percentage of sown areas by crop (2011). 
Source: Henan Statistic Yearbook 2012.  
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sown with vegetables is 12 percent of total sown area in the province, the figure is 
exactly the same in Wenxian, while in Huaxian it is slightly higher, at 15 percent. 
Huaxian has the smallest sown area for vegetables, only 8 percent. The other 
agricultural crops include fruits, beans, rapeseed, cotton, peanuts, etc. 
As can be seen in Table 4.3, the productivity of major crops in the three counties 
is all higher than the province average. Particularly, per hectare output for both 
wheat and maize in Wenxian is the highest among the three. Considering that land 
in Wenxian is relatively scarce; farmers probably use more variable inputs such as 
labor and chemical fertilizer to increase productivity. Further analysis regarding 
this will be carried out in chapter 7. 
For other grain crops, Mengzhou has the highest per-hectare output of beans; 
Huaxian has the highest yield of tubers. Oil crops are another important crop in 
Henan province. Per-hectare output of peanuts in Wenxian is the highest among 
the three counties, while the highest yield of rapeseed is in Mengzhou, which is 
also the forerunner in per-hectare output of cotton. For vegetables and fruits 
production, Wenxian is again first, at around 1.5 times the provincial average 
yield. 
Table 4.3: Yields of major farm crops by county in 2011(ton/ha)  
Crops Mengzhou Wenxian Huaxian Province 
Wheat 7.65  8.08  7.34  5.87  
Maize 7.37  7.85  7.86  5.61  
Beans 3.51  1.79  3.47  1.88  
Tubers 8.25  7.53  9.25  4.66  
Peanuts 4.60  4.80  4.50  4.25  
Rapeseeds 3.01  2.80  2.13  2.02  
Cotton 1.03  0.82  0.92  0.96  
Vegetables 56.92  61.67  47.33  39.01  
Source: Henan Statistic Yearbook 2012 
4.2 Sampling Design 
The research was initiated with an extensive review of the existing literature, to 
identify and specify the problem. Once the problem was identified, general and 
specific objectives were developed. Next, the data required to meet the objectives 
were identified and collected from various sources using various tools. The 
collected data was then analyzed and reported.  
 4.2.1 Sampling Procedures 
The objective of sampling is to ensure a representative picture of the agricultural 
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households in the study area. In addition, the sample frame allows reasonable 
aggregation of the study analysis in order to control the driving force (regional 
patterns) and to isolate the true effects of land tenure arrangements. A multistage 
sampling procedure was used as presented in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Multistage sampling procedure 
Source: Own compilation 
Initially Henan province was selected based on its agriculturally important 
position in China. Then later, three counties in north Henan were selected based 
on their agricultural production and economic development. In the next stage, 
three townships in Mengzhou and Huaxian and two townships in Wenxian were 
selected based upon economic development; and then two to three administrative 
villages in each township were chosen based on the outcome of group discussion. 
In each village 30 households were randomly chosen for interviews. In total, the 
sample size included eight townships, 17 villages, and 479 households.  
Table 4.4: Sample distribution 
County Town Village Households 
Mengzhou 3 6 178 
Wenxian 2 5 155 
Huaxian 3 6 146 
Total 8 17 479 
Source: Author‟s survey 
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4.2.2 Data Collection  
4.2.2.1 Primary Data 
To meet the objectives of the research both primary and secondary data were used. 
The primary data set were generally collected at two levels: village and household. 
The village level data were collected using group discussions; in which about 
7-10 individuals consisting of township leaders, representative farmers, and 
related experts from local college (Henan Polytechnic University) were involved. 
Village level variables included institutions in the village, off-farm employment 
and land rental activity at the village level, market access, population density, and 
village resource endowment. Household level data were collect by structured 
questionnaire.  
A standard questionnaire was administered, and most of the respondents were 
household heads, since the survey was conducted mainly in September to October, 
most of the household labor who engaged in off-farm activity had come back for 
harvest. In case the household heads were absent, their spouse replaced them. The 
interviews were conducted directly by the survey team, without interference from 
local officials, and the use of face-to-face methods ensured a high level of 
completeness and accuracy of the data. Household level data included variables 
like land tenure, agricultural production, household labor allocation including 
both local off-farm work and migration, and the demographic and economic 
characteristics of the household. 
For in-depth information at the county level and other aspects of the research, 
small workshops, focus-group discussion and key information interviews were 
carried out. Additionally, consulting with government officers like the county 
Agriculture Bureau and Land Resource Bureau were also done. 
4.2.2.2 Secondary Data 
Secondary data were collected by reviewing the existing literature and from 
published and unpublished reports and documents from various organizations and 
government offices including the Statistics Bureau, Agriculture Department, Land 
Resource Department, and Labor Department of Henan Province and their 
subdivisions at both prefecture and county levels. This information consisted of 
statistics, reports and documents on agricultural production, labor out-migration, 
land transactions as well as related policies. 
4.3 General Analytical Approach 
The main purpose of this study is to analyze the relationships among land tenure 
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arrangements, off-farm employment, land rental market development, agricultural 
productivity and their determinants. The dependent variables analyzed in this 
study include off-farm labor market participation and its intensity, land rental 
market participation and transaction amount, land and labor productivity. 
The selection of econometric tools was based on literature review and 
consideration of the theoretical framework. The research used various 
econometric tools covering both single regression as well as two-stage regression. 
These models basically take into account the nature of the dependent variables, 
dependence of error terms across equations (simultaneity problem), correlation of 
error terms to one or more independent variables in the models (endogeneity 
problem), and other econometric considerations (KETEMA, 2011). 
Probit model, poisson model, and tobit model were used for analyzing the 
determinants of off-farm employment participation, off-farm employment labor 
allocation and their work duration. A double-hurdle model was used for 
identifying factors affecting land rental market participation and its transaction 
amount. Simple Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression was used for 
investigating the impact of land tenure, off-farm employment and land rental 
participation on agriculture land and labor productivity. Finally, one-step 
Stochastic Frontier Production model was employed for examining the 
determinants of technical efficiency. Detailed specifications of these econometric 
models and their applications are explained in subsequent chapters of this study. 
4.4 Field Study Results 
This section explores the data with the aim of generating descriptive statistics. It 
begins with a description of selected socioeconomic characteristics of the survey 
households. The second section covers household-resource endowment. The third 
section presents land tenure related variables and their statistical features. The 
fourth section provides a descriptive analysis of household‟s market participation. 
The final section provides a general picture of agriculture production of surveyed 
households. The information presented in this section represents the empirical 
base for the econometric models in the next three chapters. 
4.4.1 Household Demographic Characteristics 
Different household-specific demographic characteristics are presented in this 
sub-section in order to get some insights into the main features of the sample 
households. As table 4.5 shows, the mean age of the household head in the total 
sample is 50.22 years. Mean age differences among Mengzhou, Wenxian and 
Huaxian are statistically significant examined in an ANOVA test. The average 
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age of household head ranges from 48.48 years in Wenxian to 52.98 years in 
Mengzhou, while the average age of household head in Huaxian was found to be 
48.7 years.  
Table 4.5: Demographic characteristics of households by county 
Variables County Mean S.D F Sig. 
Age of HH head (yrs) Mengzhou 52.98  10.36  9.99  0.000  
Wenxian 48.48  10.05      
Huaxian 48.70  10.81      
Total 50.22  10.60    
Education of HH head (yrs) Mengzhou 7.36  2.09  1.42  0.244  
Wenxian 7.76  2.49      
Huaxian 7.38  2.64    
Total 7.49  2.40      
Household size (number) Mengzhou 4.63  1.33  2.63  0.073  
Wenxian 4.91  1.23    
Huaxian 4.59  1.43      
Total 4.71  1.34      
Dependency ratio
1
 Mengzhou 0.21 0.19 0.45  0.638  
Wenxian 0.21 0.18   
Huaxian 0.23 0.20     
Total 0.21  0.19      
1
The dependency ratio is defined as the number of household members below 16 and above 65 
divided by household size. 
Source: Field survey (2009) 
The average education level of household heads ranges from around 7.4 years in 
Huaxian and Mengzhou to 7.7 years in Wenxian, thus the interregional difference 
is not substantial. The table further reveals that there are also significant 
variations among regions in terms of household size. A slightly higher average 
household size was observed in Wenxian followed by Mengzhou and Huaxian. 
The average dependency ratio of the three survey regions is almost the same; 
ANOVA test further confirmed that there is no significant difference. 
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4.4.2 Household Resource Endowment 
4.4.2.1 Resource Endowment 
Resource endowments of sample household are examined in this section. From 
descriptive analyses, it is evident that the differences between households in the 
three counties are clearly observable. Land is the most basic of all economic 
resources and hence crucial for the livelihoods of rural households in the study 
area and in China in general. Size of land holdings and fragmentation are both 
important determinants in reaping economic benefit out of land. It is widely 
recognized that fragmentation adversely affect agriculture productivity, since 
fragmented land needs more labor input (TAN ET AL., 2008), it also constrains 
mechnical implimentation and infrustruction construction such as irrigation and 
drainage facilities.  
Table 4.6: Household resource endowment by county 
Variables County Mean S.D F Sig. 
Farm size (mu) Mengzhou 3.00  1.35  130.75  0.000  
Wenxian 2.62  0.98      
Huaxian 5.93  3.03      
Total 3.77  2.42    
Av. plot size (mu) Mengzhou 2.32  1.28  59.03  0.000  
Wenxian 1.64  0.96      
Huaxian 3.40  1.88    
Total 2.43  1.57      
Labor (number) Mengzhou 3.64  1.03  3.84  0.022  
Wenxian 3.82  1.02    
Huaxian 3.48  1.15      
Total 3.65  1.07      
Agricultural assets (number) Mengzhou 0.77  1.86  5.69  0.004  
Wenxian 0.81  1.90    
Huaxian 1.44  2.09      
Total 0.99  1.97      
Source: Field survey (2009) 
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Household farm size in the study area is very small, moreover the land is highly 
fragmented. The average size of a land holding in the three counties is about 3.77 
mu (0.25 hectare), where Huaxian has the largest average farm size of 5.39 mu 
(0.36 hectare) (Table 4.6). The average land holding in the study areas is 
generally less than the national average of about 0.5 hectares per household, 
indicating a very intense land scarcity problem in the survey region. In terms of 
average plot size, the average for all the three counties is about 2.43 mu (0.16 
hectares) with a relative larger value of about 3.40 mu (0.22 hectares) for Huaxian. 
The Smallest average plot is found in Wenxian at only 1.65 mu (0.11 hectares) 
per plot. 
In terms of plots operated by farmers in the three counties, a large proportion of 
farmers have two parcels (52.4 percent) followed by three parcels (25.1 percent) 
and four parcels (11.3 percent) as indicated in Figure 4.5. The result from 
Chi-square test suggests that the distribution of plot number varies substantially 
across regions. The percentage of households who have two parcels in Mengzhou 
is higher than in the other two counties. While the proportion of households in 
Wenxian who have more than four parcels is the highest among the three 
counties. 
 
Pearson Chi-square =48.701, df=14 and Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 0.000 
Figure 4.5: Distribution of households by the number of parcels 
Source: Field survey (2009) 
Labor is another important resource in agricultural production. Like in other 
developing countries, agriculture in China is highly labor intensive. The labor 
demand peaks during planting and harvesting seasons. The average labor 
endowment in the total sample is 3.65 laborers per household. From ANOVA test, 
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there is a statistically significant difference in the average labor resources among 
the three survey counties. As regards agricultural assets, which refer to the 
number of valuable production tools such as (draft) cattle, seeders, tractors, 
combines etc., the average number of such tools per household in the survey area 
is one. For households in Huaxian, the average number of assets is more than one, 
while for households in Wenxian and Mengzhou the average is less than one 
agriculture production tool. Again, the interregional differences in the three 
surveyed counties is substantial. 
4.4.2.2 Household Perception of Irrigation Facilities and Soil Quality 
In the survey, households were also asked about their perception of the irrigation 
and drainage facilities serving their contracted land, as well as the soil quality of 
the land they cultivated. For ranking purposes, a value range from one to four was 
used to demonstrate poor to very good irrigation and drainage systems and low to 
very high soil quality. 
Table 4.7: Household perception of irrigation and drainage facilities 
County Rating of irrigation and drainage facilities Total 
 Poor Medium Good Very good  
Mengzhou 50 54 58 16 178 
28.1% 30.3% 32.6% 9.0% 100% 
Wenxian 44 48 48 15 155 
28.4% 31.0% 31.0% 9.7% 100% 
Huaxian 35 64 41 6 146 
24.0% 43.8% 28.1% 4.1% 100% 
Total 129 166 147 37 479 
26.9% 34.7% 30.7% 7.7% 100% 
Pearson Chi-square=9.941, df=6 and Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 0.127 
Source: Field survey (2009) 
Table 4.7 shows households‟ rating of the irrigation and drainage facilities serving 
their land. About one third of total households thought their land‟s irrigation 
infrastructure was medium, less than one third of households rated it good, about 
27 percent of households consider their irrigation facilities as poor, only eight 
percent of households gave a high rating to their irrigation and drainage facilities. 
However, there is no statistically significant difference in irrigation rating across 
regions. Specifically, the distribution of ratings is more or less similar in all 
counties, a large number of households give a medium rating to their irrigation 
facilities. As mentioned in section 4.1.3, Wenxian has the highest percentage of 
irrigated land among the three counties, in this survey, around ten percent 
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households in Wenxian think highly of their irrigation and drainage facilities, 
while still 28.4 percent of households considered these facilities poor.  
As regarding soil quality, less than half of the total households thought their soil 
was in medium condition, while another 39 percent household gave a good rating 
to their cultivated land, only 6.5 percent of households considered their soil 
quality very good (Table 4.8). Again, there is no significant difference in soil 
quality ratings across counties. The Majority of households consider the quality of 
their cultivated land‟s soil as medium to high. Comparing households across 
counties, ten percent of households in Huaxian rated their soil quality as very high, 
followed by Mengzhou, while only 4.2 percent households in Wenxian gave a 
very high rating to their soil quality. 
Table 4.8: Household perception of soil quality 
County Rating of soil quality Total 
 Low Medium High  Very high  
Mengzhou (N=149) 
 
13 62 65 9 149 
8.7% 41.6% 43.6% 6.0% 100% 
Wenxian (N=119) 17 58 39 5 119 
14.3% 48.7% 32.8% 4.2% 100% 
Huaxian (N=114) 7 53 43 11 114 
6.1% 46.5% 37.7% 9.6% 100% 
Total (N=382) 37 173 147 25 382 
9.7% 45.3% 38.5% 6.5% 100% 
Pearson Chi-square=9.799, df=6 and Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 0.133 
Source: Field survey (2009) 
4.4.3 Land Tenure Arrangements Related Variables 
Based on the notion of tenure security and transferability as the main ways through 
which land tenure affects behavior, this study uses four variables to measure land 
tenure arrangements.  
4.4.3.1 Land Tenure Security 
Two variables were chosen to represent tenure security, the number of 
reallocations that had taken place in a village since the HRS was established and a 
household‟s expectation of land reallocation in the next few years. Under China‟s 
land tenure system, tenure security is largely determined by the frequency and 
magnitude of village-wide reallocations (ROZELLE ET AL., 2002). Therefore, the 
number of past reallocations was chosen as a proxy of tenure secure. Furthermore, 
since there is a risk that households in a village that had experienced a larger 
    DESCRIPTION OF FIELD STUDY  73 
number of reallocations in the past would likely expect frequent reallocation in 
the future, the first variable alone is not enough to capture the probability of 
reallocation. The second variable is assigned a value of one if the household 
thought there would be reallocation in the future, and otherwise a value of zero. 
This variable complements the first by accounting for household expectations of 
future reallocations. 
Figure 4.6 presents the distribution of household by past reallocations. All of the 
households experienced at least one reallocation. To interpret this fact, recall that 
many villages experienced a reallocation around 1998 in the context of renewal of 
land use contracts that had expired after the first 15-year period following the 
HRS (DEININGER ET AL., 2012). A large percentage of households experienced at 
least two land reallocations, second-most common was three reallocations. 
According to Chi-square test, there is a statistically significant difference across 
counties concerning land reallocation frequency. The proportion of households 
that experienced more than two reallocations is highest in Huaxian, partly due to 
the birth rate there being relative higher, resulting in a more active demographic 
change. 
 
Pearson Chi-square=30.343, df=16 and Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 0.016 
Figure 4.6: Distribution of households by the number of land reallocations 
Source: Field survey (2009) 
Expectancy theory proposes that the motivation of behavior selection is 
determined by the expectation of the outcome (OLIVER, 1974). Therefore, famer 
expectations of future land reallocation are assumed to have a certain impact on 
household land and labor allocation through their off-farm employment and land 
one two three four five
six and 
more
Mengzhou 20.8% 32.6% 22.5% 10.1% 8.4% 5.6%
Wenxian 19.4% 40.0% 27.1% 6.5% 4.5% 2.5%
Huaxian 13.0% 39.0% 19.2% 16.5% 4.8% 7.5%
Total 18.0% 37.0% 23.0% 9.5% 6.1% 6.4%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
past reallocation times
    DESCRIPTION OF FIELD STUDY  74 
rental market participation behavior. As indicated in Table 4.9, households in 
Huaxian feel relatively more secure about their land use rights as compared to the 
other two regions. The highest percentage of households who expected further 
reallocation soon is in Mengzhou, followed by Wenxian.  
Table 4.9: Household expectation of future land reallocation 
County Expectation of land reallocation Total 
 Yes No   
Mengzhou 99 79 178 
55.6% 44.4% 100% 
Wenxian 77 78 155 
49.7% 50.3% 100% 
Huaxian 62 84 146 
42.5% 57.5% 100% 
Total 238 241 479 
49.7% 50.3% 100% 
Pearson Chi-square=5.550, df=14 and Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 0.062 
Source: Field survey (2009) 
4.4.3.2 Land Transferability 
The share of households with certificates in a village and land transfer rights 
possessed by a household are used to indicate household land transferability. 
According to land laws and regulations, a village collective should sign a written 
land contract with an individual household, and the township government should 
grant them a land-use certificate. However, in reality, different villages have 
different rules in implementing land laws and policies. According to DEININGER 
ET AL. (2012), formal documentation of rights, e.g. land certificates, makes it 
easier to unambiguously identify legitimate owners and thereby reduce the 
transaction cost of market-based land transfers. Households that possess land 
certificates find it easier to transfer their farmland. In the survey, households were 
also asked whether they had the right to transfer land. There were four choices, 
from one to four, respectively: land transfer is forbidden; land can be transferred 
within the village; land can be transferred outside the village with the permission 
from the village committee; land can be transferred freely to anyone.  
Table 4.10 illustrates that only around one third of households confirmed that they 
had a land use certificate. An AVOVA test shows that although issuance of 
certificates has progressed more uniformly, there is still variation in land 
certificate issuance, in contrast to variable levels of compliance with policies to 
stop land reallocations. 
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Table 4.10: Village level shares of land certificate (%) 
County Mean S.D F Sig. 
Mengzhou 40.11  0.33  11.99  0.00  
Wenxian 34.77  0.85  
  
Huaxian 38.59  1.14  
  
Total 37.92  0.47  
  
Source: Field survey (2009) 
Table 4.11 shows household land transfer rights in the survey region. For around 
six percent of households in the total sample, land-use rights transfer are 
forbidden. Up to 27 percent of households can only transfer their land within the 
village. Another 39 percent of households have the right to rent out their land to 
anyone if they get permission from their village committee. Only 28 percent of 
households have the right to rent out their land to anybody they want. These 
results indicate that even with the guarantee of the RLCL for the free transfer of 
land use rights, there is still village or local government intervention on household 
land rental behavior.  
Table 4.11: Household land transfer rights 
County whether households have the right to transfer land Total 
 forbidden within village with permission freely  
Mengzhou 6 25 98 49 178 
3.4% 14.0% 55.1% 27.5% 100% 
Wenxian 5 64 48 38 155 
3.2% 41.3% 31.0% 24.5% 100% 
Huaxian 16 39 42 49 146 
11.0% 26.7% 28.8% 33.6% 100% 
Total 27 128 188 136 479 
5.6% 26.7% 39.2% 28.4% 100% 
Pearson Chi-square=53.940, df=6 and Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 0.000 
Source: Field survey (2009) 
Moreover, from the Chi-square test, it can be learned that the variation of 
intervention across counties is significant at the one percent level. Households in 
Mengzhou have freer land transfer rights, since the proportion of households who 
are forbidden to rent out their land is only six percent, the percentage of 
households who have free land transfer rights is also relatively high and a large 
number of households fall into the category of being able to rent out their land on 
the condition of getting permission from their village committee. A large 
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percentage of households in Wenxian only get the right to transfer their land to 
farmers in the same village. The situation is divergent in Huaxian. The 
percentages of households who are forbidden to rent out land and who can freely 
rent out land are both the highest of the three counties. The divergence of these 
land tenure-related variables allows the opportunity to analyze the impact on 
household market participation and production behavior. 
4.4.4 Household Market Participation 
This section provides a descriptive profile of market participation in the survey 
areas. Household participation in markets covers off-farm labor market 
participation, land rental market participation, and agricultural products market 
participation and their statistical features. 
4.4.4.1 Off-farm Employment Participation 
Local off-farm employment and migration are the two basic off-farm employment 
categories. Their impact on household incomes and the village economy may 
differ substantially, because migrants live apart from other household members 
and spend a large share of their earnings outside the village. Local off-farm 
employment includes farm hiring employment, non-agricultural wage 
employment, and self-employment (SHI, 2007). Participation in off-farm 
employment in the three surveyed villages in 2008 is presented in Table 4.12. 
Table 4.12: Off-farm labor market participation by county in 2008 
County Off-farm employment participation No 
participation migration local 
off-farm 
both
1
 off-farm
2
 
Mengzhou 99 152 85 166 12
3
 
 55.6% 85.4% 47.8% 93.3% 6.7%
4
 
Wenxian 102 132 85 149 6 
 65.8% 85.2% 54.8% 96.1% 3.9 
Huaxian  88 109 67 131 15 
 60.3% 74.7% 45.9% 89.7% 10.3% 
Pearson Chi-square 3.594 7.786 2.746 4.815  
df 2 2 2 2  
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
0.166 0.020 0.253 0.090  
Total 289 393 237 446 33 
 60.3% 82.1% 49.5% 93.1% 6.9% 
Notes: 
1 
households participate in both migration and local off-farm activities; 
2 
households take 
part in either migration or local off-farm activities; 
3 
number of households participate in each 
activities; 
4 
percentage of households participate in each activities to the total households. 
Source: Field survey (2009) 
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Up to 93 percent of surveyed households participated in off-farm employment in 
2008. Of all the sample households in the three counties, 82 percent participated 
in local off-farm employment and 60 percent in migration, half of them engaged 
in both local off-farm work and migration. The Chi-square test shows that there is 
no substantial variation in migration across counties, while the difference of 
participation in local off-farm employment across regions is statistically 
significant. As much as 85 percent of farm households participated in local 
off-farm work in both Mengzhou and Wenxian, where per capita farmland 
resources are scarce while market access is good. The overall participation in 
off-farm employment is also much higher in these two counties (93 percent and 
96 percent respectively) than in Huaxian (89 percent). 
4.4.4.2 Land Rental Market Participation 
A summary of household land rental participation is provided in Table 4.13. In 
2009, among the 479 households included in our dataset, 152 households (or 32 
percent of the sample households) rent land, while 90 households (or 19 percent) 
rented-out land, indicating that the land rental market is active in the study area. 
By looking at renting of land, Mengzhou has the highest land renting rate of 38 
percent, followed by Huaxian, where 34 percent of sample households rent land, 
while Wenxian has the lowest land renting rate, 22 percent. Concerning 
renting-out land, about 21 percent of households in Wenxian rented-out land, 
followed by Huaxian with 21 percent and Mengzhou with 15 percent.   
Table 4.13: Land rental market participation by county in 2009 
county Land rental participation No participation Total 
Rent-in Rent-out 
Mengzhou  61 27 90 178 
 34.3% 15.2% 50.5% 100% 
Wenxian  35 33 87 156 
 22.6% 21.3% 56.1% 100% 
Huaxian  56 30 60 146 
 38.4% 20.5% 41.1% 100% 
Total 152 90 237 479 
 31.7% 18.8% 49.5% 100% 
Pearson Chi-square=11.716, df=4 and Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 0.020 
Source: Field survey (2009) 
Compared to the high land renting rate, the land renting-out rate is low, possibly 
indicating that rural households that had migrated out of the village were not 
covered in the sample. These households still hold land-use rights in the villages 
from which they migrated, but have generally rented their land out to other 
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households (TU, HEERINK AND LI, 2006). The reason why more households in 
Huaxian rent land is that the average farm size is larger in this county, agricultural 
incomes are a large part of total income, thus households have more motivation to 
rent farm land to increase their farm size. In contrast, the status of economic 
development in Mengzhou and Wenxian is better, households more easily find 
off-farm employment and therefore have more reason to rent-out their land. 
Table 4.14 describes the percentage of households‟ intentions to participate in 
land rental markets. The potential land rent demand is larger than rent-out supply; 
43 percent of households in the sample want to rent land, while only 26 percent of 
households have the intention to rent-out land, the other 30 percent of households 
do not want to participate. Among the study areas, there is no significant 
difference in the proportion of household‟s land rental intention. Generally, there 
are more households who want to rent land than households who want to rent-out 
land, indicating a certain gap between the potential demand and potential supply.  
Table 4.14: Household perceptions of land rental markets participation 
 Mengzhou Wenxian Huaxian Total 
Share of HH wanting to rent land (%) 40.6 44.1 50.3 43.3 
Share of HH wanting to rent-out land 
(%) 
27.2 27.7 21.4 26.4 
Share of HH not wanting to rent land (%) 32.1 28.2 28.4 30.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Pearson Chi-square=1.970, df=4 and Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 0.741 
Source: Field survey (2009) 
Even for households very willing to rent land, the reality is that there are many 
obstacles constraining the realization of their land rental intentions. Table 4.15 
lists several main obstacles confronted by households in the study area. The two 
main reasons are “to their knowledge, no households want to rent-out land” and 
“they do not know who wants to rent-out land”, 58.9 percent of households chose 
the former and 28.8 percent households chose the latter. Households in Huaxian 
consider these the two main reasons at 71.2 percent and 46.2 percent respectively. 
This further confirms the previous conclusion that land rental demand is far 
greater than land rental supply.  
Moreover, the remaining 25.2 and 12.3 percent of respondents consider the 
control at the village level and high rental prices things that make it difficult to 
transfer land. Although land transfer is permitted by RLCL, the reality is that 
despite local governments undertaking extensive dissemination of information 
about the law, only a few village leaders were aware that land transfers were 
permitted (DEININGER ET AL., 2007). Land transfer is subject to notification of 
village leaders. In some village, the leaders still strongly control land rental 
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between households. In Mengzhou, 31.3 percent of farmers think village-level 
constraints are one of the obstacles. 
The other seven percent of farmers regard “too much trouble negotiating with 
other households” as a constraint. Lack of information regarding who wants to 
rent-out land and the difficulty in negotiation both increase the transaction costs 
of land transfer. That is why 1.9 percent of households prefer to wait for 
adjustment by the village committee. Finally, 3.3 percent of the sample 
households consider the renting time too short to make any profit. This finding is 
consistent with DEININGER AND JIN (2007), they find that contracts remain 
informal and unwritten, and are frequently made with relatives seasonally or 
annually. 
Table 4.15: Percentages in household perceptions of obstacles to rent land 
 Mengzhou Wenxian Huaxian Total 
No HH want to rent-out land 52.0 63 71.2 58.9 
Do not know who wants to rent-out land 25.3 25 46.2 28.8 
Village constraints 31.3 25 7.7 25.2 
High rental prices 16.0 12 1.9 12.3 
Too much trouble negotiating with other 
HH 
9.3 6 1.9 7.0 
Renting time is too short to make any 
profit 
4.7 2 1.9 3.3 
Waiting for adjustment by the village 7.0 9.3 6 1.9 
Source: Field survey (2009) 
4.4.4.3 Agricultural Product Market Participation 
As FRANK ELLIS (1993) stated, famers are not wholly and inextricably linked to the 
market economy. Their main factors of production, land and family labor, are not 
purchased in the market, and often only a proportion of their output is sold in the 
market. In order to measure farmer participation in agricultural product markets, 
this study uses the ratio of sold output to total output as a proxy. Table 4.16 
illustrates household agricultural product market participation. On average, 
households sell up to 70 percent of total products. While this variable is 
significantly different at the one percent level across regions. Households in 
Huaxian are more active in product markets, since an average of 86 percent of 
household products are sold, followed by Mengzhou, while households in 
Wenxian are the least active participants. The possible reason that the share of 
sold output to total output is very low in Wenxian is that households in Wenxian 
possess the smallest per household farm size among the three counties, most of 
their output is consumed by family members so there is not so much to sell for 
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cash income. 
Table 4.16: Shares of sold agricultural products to total products (%) 
County Mean S.D F Sig. 
Mengzhou (N=149) 0.697  0.016  64.690  0.000  
Wenxian (N=119) 0.554  0.022    
Huaxian (N=114) 0.856  0.014    
Total (N=382) 0.700  0.012  
  
Source: Field survey (2009) 
4.4.5 Crop Production 
The dominant cropping pattern in the study area is double cropping of winter 
wheat and summer maize. Every year in June, right after the harvesting of wheat, 
farmers start to plant summer maize, and from June to September is the growing 
season for maize, then after the harvesting of maize, it is time to plant wheat. 
Frequent spring drought during the wheat growing season requires additional 
irrigation to achieve a high yield. While the summer maize growing season is 
during the rainy season in the study area, the farmers usually irrigate the land 
before sowing to maintain soil moisture. 
Omitting 90 households who rented out their land, as well as households whose 
farms were too small, 382 households were left for production analysis. Table 
4.17 presents the average yield of wheat and maize achieved by households. On 
average, the yield levels of wheat and maize production is about 478 kg per mu 
(7.15 tons per hectare) and 487 kg per mu (7.3 tons per hectare) for all households. 
Specifically, for wheat production, the highest average yield level is achieved by 
households in Mengzhou, followed by households in Huaxian, while households 
in Wenxian have the lowest average wheat yield. By contrast, households in 
Huaxian are first in maize production, while households in Mengzhou rank next 
and households in Wenxian obtain the lowest average yield also with maize. The 
results from ANOVA test show that the difference is significant at the one percent 
level. 
As regards inputs of agricultural production in the survey region, labor demand 
usually peaks during planting and harvesting seasons, such as mid-May to the end 
of June and mid-September to the end of October. The seasonality of the 
agricultural sector makes labor demand seasonal as well. However, rural China 
typically faces the problem of underemployment. As mentioned in the previous 
section, large amounts of surplus labor work in the non-agricultural sector, having 
either migrated to the country‟s coastal region or provincial capital city, or 
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pursuing local off-farm work. For those engaged in local off-farm employment, 
part-time farming is common; they often go back to the family farm during the 
peak season. 
Table 4.17: Yields of wheat and maize by county in 2009 (kg/mu) 
County Wheat F Sig. Maize F Sig 
 Mean S.D   Mean S.D   
Mengzhou (N=149) 499.39  46.73  28.44  0.00 492.59  56.64  17.46  0.00 
Wenxian (N=119) 454.06  54.76    462.38  61.48    
Huaxian (N=114) 473.79  46.53    506.79  59.22    
Total (N=382) 477.63  52.75    487.42  61.44    
Source: Field survey (2009) 
The average amounts of various farm inputs are reported in Table 4.18. According 
to ANOVA test, there is a significant difference in input use between the three 
counties. In Wenxian, households used the most labor days among the three 
counties, 10.5 days per mu, followed by Mengzhou at 8.6 days per mu, while 
households in Huaxian have the lowest labor input per unit of cultivated land 
which is only 6.6 days. 
The average seed cost of all three counties is 29.6 Yuan per mu. For households 
in Mengzhou and Wenxian, average seed input was 29.6 and 28.8 Yuan 
respectively, while households in Huaxian used slightly more seed per mu, this is 
partially due to the fact that households in Huaxian use different seed varieties 
with a relative higher price. 
The average unit of herbicides and pesticides input use varies from county to 
county. As can be seen in Table 4.18, households in Mengzhou used the most 
herbicides and pesticides per unit of land, followed by Wenxian and Huaxian. In 
terms of average chemical fertilizer use per unit of land, it is again low for 
households in Huaxian, only 128.73 Yuan, while households in Mengzhou use the 
greatest value of fertilizer among the three (around 164 Yuan per mu).  
For wheat and maize, sowing, plowing and tilling with machines are quite 
common in the study area. Mechanization in wheat harvesting is also popular, 
whereas harvesting of maize is still highly dependent on manual labor. Table 4.18 
also shows that the average cost of machinery use ranges from 24.15 Yuan per mu 
in Huaxian to 39.64 Yuan per mu in Mengzhou. Wenxian stands in between at 
29.31 Yuan per mu. The higher input levels of pesticides, fertilizers and 
machinery is the reason that households in Mengzhou obtain the higher yields in 
both wheat and maize production. 
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Table 4.18: Input use per unit of cultivated land by sample households 
Variables County Mean S.D F Sig. 
Labor (day/mu) 
 
Mengzhou 8.61  3.28  27.38  0.000  
Wenxian 10.50 5.60     
Huaxian 6.60 2.69     
Total 8.60  4.28    
Seed (Yuan/mu) 
 
Mengzhou 29.55  13.83  0.67  0.515  
Wenxian 28.81 10.17     
Huaxian 30.60 10.70   
Total 29.63  11.86      
Pesticides (Yuan/mu) 
 
Mengzhou 34.45  19.26  5.64  0.004  
Wenxian 28.53 15.41   
Huaxian 28.18 16.49     
Total 30.73  17.53      
Fertilizer (Yuan/mu) Mengzhou 154.70  48.19  4.04  0.018  
Wenxian 146.38 51.94     
Huaxian 137.99 40.85     
Total 147.12  47.75    
Machinery (Yuan/mu) 
 
Mengzhou 40.69  15.06  37.45  0.000  
Wenxian 29.31  10.29      
Huaxian 29.01  11.56    
Total 33.66  13.86    
Irrigation (Yuan/mu) Mengzhou 33.27  18.15  6.39  0.002  
Wenxian 40.87  19.04    
Huaxian 35.10  15.60    
Total 36.18  17.97      
Source: Field survey (2009) 
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As mentioned above, irrigation is important for both wheat and maize production. 
Table 4.18 shows that households in Wenxian paid the most for irrigation, at 
40.87 Yuan per mu, while households in Huaxian paid the least (33.67 Yuan per 
mu), whereas households in Mengzhou on the average spent 34.20 Yuan per mu 
of land. 
4.5 Summary 
This study was conducted in Henan province across three counties, namely 
Mengzhou, Huaxian and Wenxian. These regions differ not only in location and 
topography, but also in demographic features, land use profiles and crop 
production. Using multistage sampling techniques, data were collected from 479 
randomly selected farm households in 2009. A structured questionnaire was 
administered to household heads or their spouses. Key informant interviews and 
observation were also used to gather primary data. Secondary sources completed 
the procurement of pertinent information. 
The descriptive analysis gives an overview of the characteristics of the sampled 
households, their resource endowments, markets participation behavior and crop 
production. The analysis and discussion presented in the previous sections suggest 
that there are active off-farm labor markets and land rental markets in the study 
area; however, households still face obstacles to transferring their land.  
A closer look into the descriptive statistics shows that the average size of sample 
households is 4.7, with a dependency ratio of 0.21. More than 90 percent of 
sample households operate a relatively small area of land, less than 0.5 hectares. 
As far as crop production is concerned, the study area exhibited yields above 
national averages in wheat and maize production. The descriptive statistics of 
input analysis shows these high yields a result of intensive use of fertilizers, 
pesticides and mechanical power. There is a significant difference in land 
tenure-related variables among counties. This variation of former reallocations, 
expectations of future reallocation, share of certificates at the village level, as well 
as household land transfer rights across regions allow us to use econometric tools 
to measure their impact on household market participation and production in the 
next three chapters. 
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5 LAND TENURE AND OFF-FARM LABOR MARKETS 
DEVELOPMENT 
Given the scarce land resources and surplus labor of rural households in China, 
working off-farm is an important livelihood strategy of rural households. As 
explained in previous chapters, more and more farm households are becoming 
involved in off-farm employment. However, migration of rural labor is still 
constrained to some extent by institutional and other related factors, while local 
non-farm employment opportunities differ greatly between regions (SHI, 2007). 
China has the world‟s largest rural population and the most unique land tenure 
system. Experts believe that the only way to solve Chinese rural problems is to 
transfer most of the 657 million rural residents (almost 49 percent of total 
population) to urban areas (LI AND YAO, 2001). With the easing of the household 
registration (Hukou) system and reduction of the disparities between rural and 
urban areas, the importance of the influence by the current land tenure system on 
migration has emerged (MULLAN ET AL., 2011). 
5.1 Introduction 
The development of off-farm employment plays an important role in improving 
agricultural productivity and rural household incomes (OECD, 2005; REARDON ET 
AL., 2001; ROZELLE ET AL., 1999a; TAYLOR ET AL., 2003; WOUTERSE, 2006). The 
emergence of a labor market in China is the result of economic reforms (FENG AND 
HEERINK, 2008). In the past, off-farm employment was constrained by the 
household registration system (Hukou). Since the mid-1980s, however, it has 
become a significant phenomenon in rural China. Of China‟s more than 500 
million-strong rural labor force, 265 million people were estimated to have 
off-farm employment in the mid-2000s (ZHANG ET AL., 2008). Local off-farm 
employment and migration are the two basic off-farm employment categories. In 
other developing countries, permanent rural-urban migration is very common 
during economic development (TODARO, 1969; COLE AND SANDERS, 1986). 
However, Chinese farmers normally engage in temporary jobs in cities, and move 
back and forth between home villages and destination areas. Besides, a vast number 
of rural labors have found local employment in nonagricultural activities. 
The unique labor and land system in China is the main reason for this distinct 
pattern of rural labor mobility. The Hukou System, which was originally 
established to prohibit rural labor migration, has been gradually relaxed, but still 
restricts migrant labor access to public healthcare, pension systems, legal aid, 
social services, etc. (ZHAN, 2005). Therefore, the land of the migrants at their 
original home often acts as a safety net when they lose their job or get old. On the 
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other hand, land tenure arrangements characterized by small farm size and frequent 
reallocation due to the egalitarian distribution principle, make it risky to migrate for 
a long time because migrants may lose their land in the next session of land 
reallocation. While pursuing local off-farm jobs, farmers can still stay in the village 
and partially engage in farm activities, they can enjoy the increase of their income 
while avoiding the risk of losing their land. Thus, studying the effects of land 
arrangements on rural labor mobility can provide theoretical and practical support 
for building relevant systems and policies to promote the efficient use of both land 
and labor resources which are vital to China‟s further economic development. 
This chapter focuses on the effects of the rural land tenure system on off-farm labor 
market development. Section 2 begins by reviewing literature on the impacts of 
land tenure arrangements on off-farm employment. The subsequent section 
presents the analytical framework and describes the variables while section 4 
presents the econometric results. Finally, section 5 summarizes this chapter with 
policy messages arising from the discussion of the results. 
5.2 The Role of Land and Off-Farm Labor Markets 
5.2.1 Farm Size and Off-farm Labor Markets 
VENWEY (2005) develops four perspectives on the way land might influence the 
decisions of rural household members regarding migration. Three of them are 
suitable in the context of China. Land represents a source of wealth that can provide 
the initial financial support for migration (VENWEY, 2005; LI AND YAO, 2001). 
Alternatively, land can be considered as a source of employment. The more land 
owned by a given household, the more members can be employed in the home 
community (VENWEY, 2005). As another alternative, land can be considered as an 
investment opportunity (VENWEY, 2003; 2005).  
Land can be considered simply as another form of wealth, enabling household 
members to pay for expensive or risky migrations. In the current context of China, 
migration is characterized by a fair number of risks. The first one is the risk of not 
finding a job, or of losing the job after finding it. Following the 2008 downturn in 
the global economy, more than 49 million rural migrants, 17.6 percent of those 
employed in the off-farm employment sector in September 2008, were laid off 
from factories and returned to their home villages between October 2008 and April 
2009 (HUANG ET AL., 2011). The second type of risk is the existence of a high 
incidence of wage arrears and non-payment of migrants (LI ANDYAO, 2001). 
Added to these risks are the substantial fixed costs involved in migration, such as 
the costs of transportation, accommodation, and job search. As long as households 
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do not have the right to sell land in China, the extent to which land can be used to 
finance migration or used as collateral for obtaining credit is limited. However, the 
accumulation of several years‟ income generated on the land is sufficient to finance 
the fixed costs of temporary migration (LI ANDYAO, 2001). Because the wages 
earned by migrants are much higher than agricultural earnings, the investment is 
worthwhile. As described above, wealthier households are able to bear the costs of 
migration and more likely to have migrants, leading to a positive effect of amount 
of land on migration.  
Land is also a place to work, providing employment opportunity. The amount of 
land possessed by a household determines the demand for labor inputs. China‟s 
population recently reached 1.3 billion, with about 49 percent of them still living in 
rural areas. The average size of landholdings is only around 0.5 hectares per family 
(NBS, 2011), and normally cannot fully employ a family‟s labor force (FENG AND 
HEERINK, 2008). Controlling for other employment opportunities, as farm size 
increases, its ability to absorb more labor increases (VANWEY, 2005). This 
subsequently decreases migration and other off-farm activities. Considering land in 
this way, we expect a generally negative relationship between farm size and 
off-farm employment. 
Land represents the household-level opportunity for productive investment. 
Increasing the productivity of land in many areas depends on the households‟ 
investment ability, e.g. purchasing of fertilizer, herbicides, and high-yielding seeds 
etc. These require a large amount of capital that is often inaccessible in rural areas 
of developing countries. The cash income from off-farm employment can be a 
crucial enabler of production investment (SHI, 2007). Following this line of 
argument, the size of the landholding will have a positive effect on off-farm 
employment. It is important to point out here that these sorts of productive 
investments exhibit economies of scale (VENWEY, 2005). Larger returns to 
investment are realized on larger pieces of land. This curvilinear effect shows the 
highest probabilities of off-farm employment for members of households with 
small or large farm size and the lowest probabilities of migration for members of 
households with medium farm size (VENWEY, 2003; 2005). 
Previous work on the relationship between farm size and off-farm employment 
shows mixed results. Studies in many contexts show a negative effect of farm size 
on migration. TAYLOR AND YUNEZ-NAUDE (2000) found landholding had a 
negative relationship with internal migration within Mexico, while had no 
significant effect on Mexico-to-U.S migration. A one-hectare increase in 
landholding is associated with a 1.5 percent decrease in the likelihood of internal 
Mexico migration. By investigating the determinants of rural to urban migration in 
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Bangladesh, KUHN (2005) concluded that the likelihood of both family and 
individual migration drops with larger land holdings. VENWEY (2003) had similar 
findings in Nang Rong, Thailand. However, other studies have found a positive 
relationship between farm size and migration. OLOWAAND AWOYEMI‟s (2012) 
findings showed that land size is positively and significantly associated with 
internal migration in Nigeria, with a one hectare increase of land size increasing the 
probability of internal migration by 0.32 percent. 
Furthermore, several studies found that farm size had a curvilinear effect on 
migration. BHANDARI (2004) found that Nepalese households with medium-sized 
farms were more likely to have their members migrate. WINTERS ET AL. (2001) 
discovered that households with more than 15 hectares of land sent fewer migrants, 
while those with over 30 hectares of cropland tend not to provide migrants. In 
addition, a number of other studies (e.g., STARK AND TAYLOR, 1991; HABERFELD 
ET AL., 1999) have found insignificant effects of farm size on migration. 
For existing studies which focus on China, ROZELLE ET AL. (1999) found that 
households with more land are likely to be more capital-constrained in crop 
production, thus more likely to seek income from migration to North China. In 
contrast, ZHAO (1999b) found that workers from land-scarce households tended to 
have higher probabilities of migration. However, LI AND YAO (2001) observed an 
inverse U-curve relationship between landholdings and migration and concluded 
that households with medium farm size are more likely to migrate. LI AND 
ZAHNISER (2002) found statistically that land had no significant impact on an 
individual‟s migration decision. SHI ET AL. (2007) suggested that types of 
landholdings also had an impact on labor migration decision-making, with irrigated 
cropland having a negative effect, while dry-land and forest having no significant 
effect.  
5.2.2 Land Tenure Security and Off-farm Labor Markets 
An abundance of theoretical research suggests that insecure property rights may 
have important impacts on productivity, factor allocation and economic 
development in China as they have elsewhere in the developed and developing 
world (BESLEY, 1995; BENJAMIN AND BRANDT, 2002; FENG AND HEERINK, 2008; 
JACOBY ET AL., 2002; LI, ROZELLE AND BRANDT, 1998; LIU ET AL., 1998). Under 
China‟s land management system, land tenure is not fully secure since land use 
rights may be lost (or gained) in village-wide reallocations. In other words, tenure 
security is largely determined by the frequency and magnitude of village-wide 
reallocations (ROZELLE ET AL., 2002). Renting out of land by somebody exiting 
agriculture could be perceived as a signal that the land is no longer required and 
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could be transferred by administrative reallocation (BRANDT ET AL. 2004, YANG 
1997). Reallocation may thus discourage exit from the sector at the margin. 
However, this negative effect is counter balanced by a positive effect if the farm 
size and off-farm employment exhibits an inverse U relationship, which guarantees 
that a person with an average landholding is more likely to pursue off-farm 
activities. Land allocation draws households closer to the mean landholding in the 
village. Therefore, the increase in tenure security associated with the decrease of 
reallocation may have a positive or negative net effect on migration. 
Regarding transferability, measures to facilitate market-based land transfers, e.g. 
by increasing coverage with land certificates and outlawing reallocation, have 
potential to make a very positive contribution to the economy (CARTER AND YAO 
2002). If land cannot be rented out, households have to forfeit the revenue from 
land due to the loss of labor through migration. This represents the opportunity cost 
of migration. However, If households are able to lease out land at competitive 
prices, they would receive the future stream of rentals, and their decision to leave 
farming would be primarily based on labor earnings alone (YANG, 1999).  
The influence of tenure security on labor market, off-farm activities and migration 
has been found in more recent empirical research. DO AND IYER (2008) find that a 
land titling program in Vietnam led to increases in the proportion of cultivated land 
devoted to perennial crops and facilitated shifting of land to non-farm activities. 
VALSECCHI (2010) finds that access to a formal land title increases Mexican 
emigration to the US, and DE BRAUW AND MUELLER (2011) show a positive 
correlation between land transferability rights and internal migration in Ethiopia. 
DE LA RUPPLE ET AL. (2009) explored the causes of temporary migration, and found 
that land rights insecurity is a manifest constraint on the labor allocation of rural 
households. FENG AND HEERINK (2008) found a negative relationship between 
household land renting and migration decisions. MULLAN ET AL. (2011) examined 
the relationship between tenure insecurity and households‟ participation in labor 
markets in China. Their results indicated that rural land tenure arrangements act as 
a further constraint on migration. Past land reallocations discourage households 
from exiting agriculture (DEININGER ET AL., 2012). A higher probability of 
village-wide land reallocation will reduce farmers‟ migration probability by 2.1 
percent (GILES AND MU, 2012). 
5.2.3 Land Quality and Off-farm Labor Markets 
Land is a resource endowment, its quality has an impact on household agricultural 
production and investment decisions, thereby affecting the household labor 
allocation. Since land classification and gradation are different between regions. 
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This study does not consider indicators such as soil quality, land degradation and 
agro-biodiversity, but only examines land-use conditions from two aspects, the 
first one is the rating of the irrigation and drainage facilities, and the second one is 
land fragmentation.  
Well-developed irrigation and drainage infrastructure can increase agricultural 
output with relatively less labor input. Thus, households are able to allocate more 
time to off-farm work. Therefore, irrigation and drainage facilities are expected to 
increase household off-farm activity. Additionally, various researchers have 
pointed out that land fragmentation is the cause of productivity losses (NGUYENET 
AL., 1996; WAN AND CHENG, 2001; CHEN ET AL., 2009). TANET AL. (2008) found 
that fragmented farm structure correlates well with higher labor costs, that is, 
farmers with more fragmented land use more labor in order to compensate for the 
negative effects of fragmentation. While JIA AND PETRICK (2011) found that land 
fragmentation indeed leads to lower agricultural labor productivity, land 
fragmentation makes labor less productive, so a rational response is to use less of it 
on-farm and rather switch to off-farm income generation activities. Therefore, the 
above analysis suggests that the prosperity resulting from land quality may have 
two countervailing effects on off-farm employment. 
5.3 Analytical Framework 
5.3.1 Model Specification 
This chapter focuses on the analysis of impacts of current land tenure arrangements 
on household off-farm employment behavior. To identify the impact and other 
determinants, a reduced form equation was used as follows: 
 
Where M represents either (i) an indicator variable that is equal to one if the 
household derives all its income from non-farm activities and zero otherwise; (ii) 
the number of individuals in the household who derive their main income from 
off-farm activities; or (iii) the number of labor days supplied to off-farm labor 
markets. Whereas, Z is a vector of institutional variables including the number of 
experienced land reallocations, household expectation of land reallocation, the 
share of households in the village who received land certificates and the freedom of 
land transfer rights. A is household land endowment (in mu, 1 mu = 1/15 hectare). 
qZ is a vector of land quality factors. 
hZ is a vector of household characteristics 
including household demographics, assets, etc.  
A drawback of the linear model for discrete responses is that partial effects are 
 1.5ZM 4
p
3210  
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constant throughout the range of dependent variables and that negative fitted values 
show inconsistent conditional variance. For the decision to move off-farm, the 
dependent variables expressed are as a dichotomous variable, which means a probit 
model can be used. For the number of individuals moving off-farm, the dependent 
variables are non-negative integer values with a large proportion at zero; 
accordingly, the poisson model is suitable. For the off-farm work duration 
expressed as a continuous variable with an optimum value of zero, the censored 
regression model (tobit) which captures both the limit (zero) and non-limit 
(continuous) observations is chosen. 
5.3.2 Variables 
The variables used in the empirical equations are reported as following. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, there are four variables to indicate land tenure 
arrangements. Among them, two variables representing tenure security are the 
number of reallocations that have taken place in a village since the HRS was 
established and a household‟s expectation of land reallocation in the next few years. 
Since households that experienced a larger number of reallocations in the past 
would feel less secure of their land-use rights, reallocations are expected to be 
negatively related to off-farm employment. Similarly, if households predict an 
eminent reallocation, their decision to participate in off-farm activities, particularly 
by migrating, would be less likely. Hence, an expectation of land reallocation 
discourages household off-farm employment. Two variables representing land 
transferability are the share of households in a village with certificates and land 
transfer rights possessed by a household. Possession of land certificate may reduce 
land transaction costs. Consequently, households in a village with greater coverage 
with certificates are more likely to increase their off-farm employment 
participation behavior. Additionally, a high value for the land transfer rights 
indicator is expected to have a positive impact on off-farm employment. 
Other variables related to land are a household‟s farm size, the rating of irrigation 
and drainage facilities and average plot size. Farm size is measured by per capita 
landholding (expressed in mu) of the household that a person belonged to. In order 
to capture any curvilinear effect of farm size on migration, per labor landholding 
squared will be added to the regressions. As mentioned earlier, well-developed 
irrigation and drainage infrastructure reduce the labor required for agricultural 
production, thus providing farmers with time to participate in off-farm activities. 
Therefore, this variable is expected to have a positive effect on off-farm 
employment. In addition, average plot size is used to measure land fragmentation. 
Fragmentation is correlated with higher labor costs, households with more 
fragmented land use more labor (TAN ET AL., 2008) and therefore have less 
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inclination to engage in off-farm work.  
The other independent variables used in the models are those that would be 
expected to affect household off-farm employment decisions. These are selected on 
the basis of previous literature on migration in China (e.g., YAO, 2001; GILES AND 
MU, 2007; MULLANET AL., 2011). These are household size, average age of adults, 
average years of schooling of household adults, number of dependents and 
household fixed assets. According to NELM, migration can be viewed as part of a 
family adaptive strategy. Hence, the assumption here is that off-farm labor market 
decisions, especially migration decisions are made jointly by all household 
members. Therefore, the average adult age and education level were used to 
specify the equation. While average schooling years captures a household‟s human 
capital potential, average age captures the experience a household has accumulated. 
It is expected that a household with more members will be more likely to pursue 
off-farm employment, whereas a household with more dependents will be less 
likely to work outside of the agricultural sector. Household fixed assets refer to 
household possession of valuable production tools, from conventional assets such 
as cattle to expensive modern machinery, the choice is from one to six, the larger 
the value, the more expensive the assets a household has. The rationale is that 
households with more agricultural assets tend to be less likely to migrate, but more 
likely to participate in local off-farm work. Because those households invest more 
in the agriculture sector, they are, as professional farmers, more reliant on farming, 
besides they can get extra income from renting out machines, therefore migration is 
not attractive enough for them.  
Finally, except the county dummies, following STARK, TAYLOR (1989; 1991) and 
QUINN (2006), this study also incorporate relative income deprivation into the 
empirical models. Relative deprivation is defined as a household viewing their 
situation as less than a reference point such as a community standard or as less than 
the outcome of a particular group (QUINN, 2006). Households relatively deprived in 
a village are more likely to migrate. Income deprivation is calculated as a ratio of 
the household‟s income as compared to the village average income as given in the 
formula. 
 
household income
Relative Income Deprivation=1- 5.2
village average income
 
5.4 Empirical Results 
As shown in table 5.1, coefficients of column 2 to 4 are average partial effects for 
the probability of moving off-farm (including off-farm employment, migration and 
local off-farm employment), coefficients of column 5 to 7 are the number of 
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individuals participating in different types of non-agricultural activities, and 
coefficients of column 8 to 10 are the number of days spent in the various off-farm 
labor markets.  
The regression results indicate that number of experienced reallocation 
significantly reduces labor moving out of the agricultural sector, whether for local 
employment or migration. Households who have experienced more reallocations 
are less likely to exit agriculture than those who have experienced less. The results 
show that the impact is especially distinction migration, where each additional land 
reallocation in the past results in a 12 percent decrease in the propensity to migrate, 
a 9 percent decrease in the number of migrants supplied to migration destinations, 
and a 22-day decrease of household labor supply to such markets. This suggests 
that legal restrictions on reallocation may be less than perfectly enforced 
(DEININGER ET AL., 2012). Part-time labor supply to non-agricultural labor markets 
is estimated to be less affected by reallocation, except the participation in local 
off-farm labor markets, other coefficients are negative but insignificantly different 
to zero. Reallocations thus seem more important in affecting household decisions 
on migration rather than engagement in local off-farm activities. Also, expectations 
of land reallocation in the near future appear to affect household decisions to stay in 
agricultural production rather than the specific choices of whether to engage in 
migration or local off-farm activities. Farmers who expected land reallocation in 
the coming years, compared to farmers who did not have such expectations, are 78 
percent less likely to participate in off-farm employment, and the household labor 
supply to non-agricultural markets would reduce by 48 days.  
The share of certificates at village level, as a proxy for the transaction cost of land 
transfers, appears to affect both exiting decisions and the supply of labor days. 
Availability of certificates significantly contributes to participation in off-farm 
labor markets. The magnitude of estimated coefficients is large, compared to a 
village with no land certificates, issuance of land-use certificates to every 
household in the village is predicted to result in a 61 percent increase in the 
likelihood of moving off the farm, an 8 percent increase in the number of 
individuals supplying labor to non-agricultural labor markets or an increase of 
household supply of labor to such markets of 59 days. Specifically, it would 
increase the likelihood of migration by 15 percent and the migrants‟ working days 
by 45. It would also increase the propensity for local off-farm work by 30 percent 
and local workdays by 27 days. The size of this effect is particularly remarkable 
given that data collection was conducted right after a financial crisis. Land transfer 
rights have a significantly positive influence on off-farm employment and its 
duration. Households with more land transfer rights are 46 percent more likely to 
exit agriculture, and work 29 more days in the off-farm sector compared to 
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households with less land transfer rights. 
Farm size has a significant negative impact on off-farm employment. Regarding 
movement of labor out of the agricultural sector, whether for local employment or 
migration, households who have more land are less likely to participate in off-farm 
activities. The estimated marginal effect indicates that per capita land holding 
increasing by one mu decreases the propensity of moving out of the agricultural 
sector by 84 percent, and decreases the number of laborers supplied to external 
markets by 16 percent, and reduces the supply of man-days by 90 days. To be 
specific, the increase of each additional mu of per capita farm size leads to a 27 
percent decline in migration inclination, a 14 percent decrease in migrants, or 68 
migration days. It also reduces the probability of working locally by 33 percent, the 
provision of laborers to such markets by 18 percent, and the duration of such supply 
by 57 days. 
The irrigation and drainage facilities rating has a significant positive impact on 
labor moving off-farm, which indicates that improving irrigation and drainage 
facilities in rural areas will release more labor from the agricultural sector. This 
result is mainly driven by the impact of these facilities on encouraging migration. 
Construction of this infrastructure is predicted to increase the propensity of labor 
moving off-farm by 29 percent, and the off-farm workdays by 36 days. Specifically, 
it would increase the likelihood of migration by 29 percent, the number of migrants 
by 11 percent and the workdays by 60. However, another variable representing 
land quality, land fragmentation measured by average plot size, positively affect 
the household decision on migration but negatively affects their decision to seek 
local off-farm work. One possible explanation is that fragmentation makes on-farm 
work less attractive by increasing the cost and reducing the profit, so that farmers 
prefer to migrate to engage in wage-earning work. While for farmers who pursue 
local off-farm employment are normally part-time farmers, fragmented land incurs 
more labor cost in agricultural production and thus the supply of labor to the local 
off-farm labor market will decrease. 
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Table 5.1: Regressions results of household members moving off the farm and the labor supplied to off-farm activities 
 Participate in No. of individuals employed in Days worked in 
 off-farm migration local  off-farm migration local  off-farm migration local  
Land tenure variables          
Land reallocations
4
  
(number) 
-0.145
*
 -0.116
**
 -0.139
***
 -0.054
*
 -0.090
**
 -0.037 -14.92
**
 -22.08
**
 -7.308 
(-1.71) (-2.25) (-2.68) (-2.27) (-2.37) (-1.21) (-2.11) (-2.22) (-1.13) 
Expectation of land 
Realloca.
5
 (dummy) 
-0.775
**
 0.003 -0.057 -0.050 -0.058 -0.026 -48.42
**
 -30.38 -15.99 
(-2.39) (0.02) (-0.37) (-0.79) (-0.62) (-0.30) (-2.39) (-1.11) (-0.86) 
Share of land 
 certificates
6
 (%) 
0.608
***
 0.154
*
 0.295
***
 0.077
**
 0.078 0.077 58.83
***
 44.72
***
 27.27
**
 
(2.78) (1.70) (2.95) (2.04) (1.40) (1.50) (4.81) (2.76) (2.41) 
Land transfer 
rights
7
(number) 
0.464
**
 0.044 -0.129 -0.007 -0.011 -0.010 -29.16
*
 -8.060 -19.15 
(2.23) (0.42) (-1.12) (-0.17) (-0.16) (-0.16) (-2.05) (-0.43) (-1.47) 
Land variables          
Farm size (mu) -0.841
***
 -0.265
**
 -0.328
***
 -0.155
**
 -0.140
*
 -0.180
**
 -90.27
***
 -67.55
***
 -57.27
***
 
 (-4.09) (-2.20) (-2.77) (-2.61) (-1.73) (-2.10) (-5.30) (-2.89) (-3.48) 
Irrigation rating 0.288
*
 0.287
***
 -0.104 0.038 0.108
**
 -0.035 35.73
***
 56.92
***
 -9.649 
 (1.73) (3.44) (-1.24) (1.13) (2.19) (-0.77) (3.28) (3.92) (-0.96) 
Plot number 0.095 0.137
**
 -0.100
**
 0.006 0.048 -0.029 -0.165 21.41
**
 -14.38
**
 
 (1.02) (2.62) (-1.99) (0.26) (1.50) (-0.96) (-0.02) (2.33) (-2.22) 
Household variables          
HH size (persons) 0.167 0.614
***
 0.011 0.237
***
 0.435
***
 0.103
**
 127.6
***
 158.5
***
 31.59
***
 
 (1.28) (7.39) (0.14) (7.30) (8.47) (2.43) (12.45) (10.62) (3.35) 
Dependant Ratio  
 (%) 
-0.221 -1.080
***
 0.139 -0.316
***
 -0.755
***
 -0.034 -159.5
***
 -266.3
***
 0.517 
(-1.21) (-8.93) (1.26) (-6.59) (-9.29) (-0.57) (-11.19) (-12.15) (0.04) 
                                                             
4 Past land reallocations that a household has experienced.  
5 1 if household expect land reallocation in the near future, 0 otherwise. 
6 Share of households with certificates in a village. 
7 The freedom of household land transfer rights, from 1 to 4, the higher the value the greater the right. 
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Average adult age 
 (yrs) 
-0.018 0.001 -0.048
***
 -0.008 0.010 -0.018
**
 -3.197
*
 2.431 -6.788
***
 
(-1.01) (0.10) (-3.99) (-1.35) (1.10) (-2.50) (-1.91) (1.01) (-4.48) 
Average  Adult 
 education (yrs) 
0.230
**
 0.149
***
 0.022 0.040
**
 0.067
*
 0.010 31.95
***
 38.37
***
 3.614 
(2.47) (3.16) (0.51) (2.13) (2.48) (0.41) (5.33) (4.73) (0.66) 
Agricultural assets -0.119
*
 -0.081
**
 0.038 0.003 -0.045
*
 0.038
*
 4.832 -19.61
***
 19.74
***
 
(-1.85) (-2.27) (0.93) (0.18) (-1.74) (1.92) (0.95) (-2.83) (4.25) 
Income  
deprivation (%) 
-0.199 -0.284
**
 -0.049 -0.075
*
 -0.127
**
 -0.040 -83.17
***
 -64.43
***
 -42.25
***
 
(-1.07) (-2.16) (-0.44) (-1.72) (-2.07) (-0.64) (-5.53) (-3.21) (-3.03) 
Mengxian dummy -0.989
**
 -0.427
**
 0.274 -0.023 -0.041 0.023 -24.57 -63.62
*
 31.76 
 (-2.27) (-2.24) (1.37) (-0.30) (-0.35) (0.23) (-0.99) (-1.91) (1.38) 
Wenxian dummy 0.583 0.039 0.032 -0.048 0.001 -0.076 -75.83
*
 -22.92 -62.40
*
 
 (1.14) (0.13) (0.11) (-0.36) (0.00) (-0.42) (-1.92) (-0.41) (-1.70) 
Constant -1.257 -3.288
***
 2.938
**
 -0.050 -2.500
***
 0.514 -37.20 -799.4
***
 428.9
***
 
 (-0.83) (-3.63) (3.26) (-0.13) (-4.13) (1.02) (-0.31) (-4.75) (3.91) 
No. of observations 479 479 479 479 479 479 479 479 479 
Chi-square 122.09 233.44 82.98 170.56 228.46 48.62 413.64 331.30 142.69 
Log likelihood -59.073 -204.568 -183.974 -701.035 -510.867 -587.08 -3048.3 -2140.8 -2714.9 
Pseudo R2 0.5082 0.3633 0.1840 0.1085 0.1827 0.0398 0.0635 0.0718 0.0256 
sigma _cons       210.5
***
 258.9
***
 191.6
***
 
Notes: 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. z-statistics for probit and passion model and t-statistics for Tobit model are in parentheses. 
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Concerning other variables, the positive coefficients of household size across all 
measures of off-farm participation, point to the importance of the labor endowment 
for off-farm labor supply. In particular, the influence on labor supply is prominent. 
Having one more member in the household is predicted to result in a 24 percent 
increase in individuals with off-farm pursuits, and an increase in household 
off-farm labor supply by 128 days. Specifically, it would increase the number of 
migrants by 44 percent, and migrant workdays by 159. It would also increase the 
number of individuals engaged in local off-farm work by 10 percent, and the 
supply to local off-farm labor markets by 32 days. However, the number of 
dependents in a household significantly reduces the household migration 
propensity but has no influence on its local off-farm employment decision. To be 
specific, one additional dependent leads to an 11 percent decrease in migration 
propensity, a 75 percent decline in number of migrants and 266 fewer days supplied 
to off-farm labor markets. These findings confirm the results of earlier studies, 
which show that larger households and households with fewer dependents tend to 
provide more migrants (DE BRAUW ET AL., 2002; ROZELLE ET AL., 1999; FENG AND 
HEERINK, 2008).  
Generally, average adult age negatively affects the off-farm labor supply, while the 
size of this impact is tiny, and particularly prominent in local off-farm employment. 
On average, one additional year in average adult age leads to a 4.8 percent decrease 
in the likelihood of assuming a local off-farm job, a 1.8 percent decline in 
individuals pursuing such jobs, and a seven days decrease of labor supplied to that 
market. Furthermore, higher levels of education emerge as being positively 
correlated with higher levels of off-farm participation. On average, each additional 
year of education translates to a 23 percent increase in total off-farm participation 
probability, four percent more individuals, and 32 more labor-days supplied to all 
non-farm sectors. In particular, this effect is mainly driven by the impact on 
migration. Specifically, one additional year of education increases the propensity to 
migrate by 15 percent, the number of migrants by seven percent as well as 
migration days by 38. 
The fact that assets are predicted to reduce the likelihood of migration while 
increasing the propensity to engage in local off-farm employment is in line with the 
notion that a lack of assets or local demand for labor is a key reason for households 
to decide in favor of migration rather than participate in local off-farm employment 
(DEININGER ET AL., 2012). From a policy perspective, this reinforces the 
importance of policies favoring local asset accumulation. According to the 
estimates, increases in the number of assets lead to a decrease in the number of 
individuals migrating by 4.5 percentage points on average, migration days by 20, 
supply of labor to the local off-farm sector by 3.8 percent or 20 workdays. Income 
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deprivation is significant and negatively related to off-farm labor supply as well as 
migration, which is opposite to relative deprivation theory. One possible 
explanation for this phenomenon is that the calculation of current income in this 
study includes remittance, which increased the income ranking of the household in 
the village. Therefore, households who do not have migrants are relatively deprived 
in the village. Differences in signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on county 
dummies also point towards marked inter-regional variation in non-agricultural 
labor market participation. Compared to Wenxian, moves into off-farm 
occupations are less likely in Mengzhou, whereas the supply of labor days to local 
off-farm labor market in Huaxian is less. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter investigated the impact of land tenure arrangements on off-farm labor 
market development. Based on the notion of tenure security and transferability as 
the main ways through which land tenure affects behavior, the hypothesis is that 
reallocations may impede a smooth transfer of labor from agriculture to other 
sectors, whereas certificates could make it easier to transfer land and leave the 
current residence to join the non-agricultural labor force on a temporary basis. 
The empirical results show a number of land-related factors to be statistically 
significant in affecting the development of off-farm labor markets. First, 
experiencing more reallocations reduces the incentive to exit agriculture, while the 
affect is more noticeable on migration than on temporary local non-agricultural 
labor supply. Second, certificates seem to affect participation in non-agricultural 
labor markets mainly through their impact on increasing the duration of off-farm 
work. In this case, the estimated coefficients are large, having certificates for all 
households in a village would increase an average household‟s supply of labor days 
to the off-farm sector by 59. Therefore, issuance of more official means of 
contracting, e.g. promoting a nationwide rural land registration and certification 
program will stimulate rural labor migration, which will further facilitate the 
structural transformation of the Chinese economy. Third, households with more 
land transfer rights have greater propensity for and longer duration of participation 
in off-farm labor markets. Limiting the direct intervention of village committees in 
household land transfers will not only promote the development of land transfer 
markets but also benefit the off-farm labor supply. Finally, investing in irrigation 
and drainage facilities will have spill-over benefits for off-farm employment. 
Developing infrastructure in irrigation and drainage will not only facilitate 
agricultural development, but will help release more labor from the agricultural 
sector. 
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In sum, policies aimed at improving land tenure security and promoting land 
transfer (e.g. rural land registration and certification programs, limiting village 
regulation of land transfer, developing infrastructure in irrigation and drainage etc.), 
together with other policies, such as further reform of the Hukou system, improved 
rural social security etc., will promote market-based rural labor transfer, which will 
improve allocative efficiency and rural economic development and further 
facilitate the structural transformation of the Chinese economy. 
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6 LAND TENURE, OFF-FARM EMPLOYMENT AND 
LAND-RENTAL MARKETS 
With the economy gradually moving from one in which resources were allocated 
by planners to one in which markets play a major role, commodity, input and labor 
markets have gradually developed in China, leading to higher efficiency and 
welfare gains for its population (ROSEN ET AL., 2004). Rural off-farm labor markets, 
which feature large amounts of rural to urban migration and a booming rural 
industry, have thrived ever since the late 1980s (FENG, 2006; SHI, 2007). However, 
development of land-rental markets was most evident in the late 1990s (KUNG, 
2002). As mentioned in previous chapters, the Chinese agricultural economy is 
based on 200 million farms with on average fewer than 0.5 hectares (GAO ET AL., 
2012). This small scale has become the main obstacle for agricultural economic 
development in China, while land-rental markets play a uniquely important role in 
allocating resources efficiently across farm households (KUNG, 2002; DEININGER 
AND JIN, 2002). The incredibly low incidence of land-rental transactions could be 
explained by the type of land tenure system and the development of other factor 
markets in China, e.g. off-farm labor markets (KUNG, 2002; HUANG ET AL., 2012).  
6.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, agricultural land in China is very scarce and 
the land-labor ratio is very small, demand for land is immense while supply of it is 
very limited (TU, HEERINK AND LI 2006). Considering the current land tenure 
system in China, where agricultural land is collectively owned by villagers, land 
rental seems to be the main way in which operational land holdings are supposed to 
expand (CAI ET AL., 2008). Moreover, the development of well-functioning 
land-rental markets is one of the most feasible means to increase factor allocation 
and raise the efficiency of land use in rural areas of developing countries by 
facilitating transfers of land to more productive farmers and facilitating the transfer 
of labor to the non-farm economy (DEININGERAND JIN, 2002; LOHMAR ET AL., 2001; 
KUNG, 2002; ZHANG ET AL., 2004). This is especially true in a developing country 
experiencing a rapid growth in the number of out-migrants and off-farm workers 
(HOKEN, 2012). 
Rapid economic growth in China has induced a huge demand for labor from rural 
areas. High productivity in the manufacturing sector has been achieved by using 
cheap labor from the rural sector (CHEN ET AL., 2004). By 1995, there were more 
than 150 million farmers who had off-farm jobs (ROZELLE ET AL., 1999), this rose 
to 279 million by September 2008, accounting for 37 percent of total employment 
(HUANG ET AL., 2011). In contrast to the burgeoning development of China‟s urban 
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manufacturing sector, development of rural land utilization, notably the rental 
market for farmland, has lagged (HOKEN, 2012). The appearance of land-rental 
markets was not evident until the late 1990s. In the late 1980s and 1990s few 
farmers engaged in rental activities (TURNER ET AL., 1998; BRANDT ET AL., 2004; 
DEININGER AND JIN, 2005); after the promotion of the RLCL, land-rental activities 
started to expand. According to a nationwide survey, GAO ET AL. (2012) found that 
by 2008, 19 percent of cultivated land was rented. Among that, over 20 percent 
transactions were in the developed coastal provinces (SC and NBS, 2008). 
However, most of the rental contracts remain verbal, informal, often annual and 
frequently made with relatives (DEININGER ET AL., 2007; GAO ET AL., 2012). 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the factors affecting the development of 
land rental markets in the study area, particularly the impact from land tenure 
arrangements and off-farm labor markets. The study focuses on both the demand 
and supply side of a land-rental market. In view of these, section 2 reviews 
literature on determinants of rental transactions in China. Information on model 
specification and variable description is presented in section 3, while section 4 and 
section 5 present the empirical results of the determinants for both land rental and 
renting-out. Finally, brief concluding remarks are presented in section 6. 
6.2 Determinants of the Emergence of Land-Rental Markets 
6.2.1 Land Tenure Arrangements and Land-rental Markets  
The low incidence of land-rental activity in rural China can be explained largely by 
a number of institutional factors, of which the land tenure arrangement is the most 
important (KUNG, 2002). Property rights to land were vested in villages or 
village-centered small-groups, local cadres, particularly those at the township and 
village levels still exert control over land allocation and reallocation (WANG ET AL., 
2011). This is one of the reasons why many studies have regarded greater tenure 
security as capable of reducing the probability of administrative reallocation 
(Brandt et al., 2004; JACOBY ET AL., 2002; KUNG , 2006; WANG ET AL., 2011). The 
literature holds that tenure insecurity can hinder land rental market development in 
two ways. Insecure property rights discourage households from renting out land, 
because doing so can be seen as a signal that the household no longer needs the 
farmland, which will potentially result in negative repercussions, such as receiving 
less land or land of inferior quality in future reallocations (LOHMAR ET AL., 2001). 
In addition, some researchers consider administrative land reallocation as a 
substitution for land-rental markets. BRANDT, ROZELLE AND TURNER (2004) argued 
that since village leaders‟ chances of promotion and bonuses are closely related to 
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aggregate village farm output, they have incentives to reallocate land from low 
productive households to high productive ones through periodic land reallocation. 
In contrast, the function of land-rental markets is also to transfer land from 
low-intensity users to higher-intensity ones. Consequently, administrative land 
reallocation and land-rental markets are substitutes and land reallocation should 
have a discouraging effect on household land-rental behavior. This view is also 
supported by DEININGER AND JIN (2005). They found that households with high 
farming ability receive more land administratively and households with low 
farming ability are more likely to lose their land during the process of land 
reallocation. 
Lack of transferability, e.g. low coverage with land certificates and local 
government intervention in land transactions, are also obstacles that deter the 
development of land rental markets. A certificate of land ownership can allay fears 
that rental land can be taken away, either by the government through redistribution 
or by a tenant who does not vacate it at the end of the lease period. Certificates can 
help when migration requires land owners to be absent temporarily or if the 
number of registration transactions increases beyond the capacity of informal, local 
mechanisms to handle them transparently (DEININGER ET AL., 2009). Land-use 
certificates can also reduce the transaction cost of renting land. In a situation where 
land loss by cultivators is unlikely and use of rural land as collateral not allowed, 
holding certificates makes land transactions more formal and possible with 
individuals who are not close kin (DEININGER ET AL., 2012). In contrast, 
government intervention will increase the transaction cost of land rental. A number 
of recent studies provide partial empirical support for these arguments. KIMURA, 
OTSUKA AND ROZELLETHE (2007) found transaction costs in tenancy markets lead 
to smaller numbers of rental transactions. CARTER AND YAO (2002) employ an 
agricultural household model to prove that uncertainty in land transfer rights and 
high transaction costs prevent efficient farmland reallocation through the rental 
market.  
6.2.2 Off-farm Employment and Land-rental Markets 
The development of off-farm labor markets is also considered to be a significant 
determinant of the emergence of land-rental markets (KUNG 1995; DEININGER AND 
JIN 2005). Predicated on the premise that the demand for rental transactions is 
essentially a derived demand that is contingent upon the rate at which households 
with alternative off-farm economic opportunities leave the farms (KUNG, 2002). 
In China, with both access to off-farm employment and wages rising (DE BRAUW 
ET AL., 2002), it is possible that the rise of off-farm employment is one of the forces 
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that have been driving the rise of cultivated land-rental. When farmers are able to 
earn substantially more off the farm, they begin to consider ways to rent-out their 
land to those with less opportunity to work off the farm (or to those relatively better 
at farming). 
YAO (2000) theoretically formalized the effect of the imperfect labor market on the 
farmland lease market using a general equilibrium model and household panel data. 
He showed empirically that product heterogeneity and a freer labor market promote 
more land leasing. This impact of off-farm employment on the land-rental market 
has also been examined by KUNG (2002), who examined the impact of 
administrative land reallocation and unevenly developed off-farm labor markets on 
farm efficiency, and concluded that inefficiency in labor allocation is alleviated to 
some extent by administrative land reallocation and development of the off-farm 
labor market. KIMIRA ET AL. (2011) also empirically suggest that higher off-farm 
wage rates increase off-farm employment opportunities inducing a more active 
land-rental market. 
6.3 Analytical Framework 
The econometric estimates below identify the influence of land tenure and 
off-farm employment, as well as other household and village characteristics on 
household land rental market participation decision. 
 6.3.1 Model Specification 
Farmers in the survey villages are assumed to follow sequential decisions; first, 
whether to participate in a land-rental market or not; second, how much land to rent 
or rent-out. For these, the dependent variables are decisions of land-rental market 
participation expressed as a dichotomous variable and its intensity, expressed as a 
continuous variable. The censored regression model (tobit) which captures both the 
limit (zero) and non-limit (continuous) observations seems suitable. However, the 
decisions on whether to transfer land and how much land to transfer can be made 
jointly or separately. The assumption here is that the decision to transfer land may 
precede the decision on its intensity. In such a situation, it is more suitable to apply 
Cragg‟s double hurdle model in which a probit regression on participation (using 
all observations) is followed by a truncated regression on the non-zero observations 
(CRAGG, 1971).  
If we let *
iD as a latent variable describing the household‟s decision to participate in 
a land-rental market, *
iY  as a latent variable describing household‟s decision on the 
amount of land to rent or rent-out, and iD  and iY  as their observed counterparts, 
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then based on the specification by CRAGG (1971), and MOFFATT (2003), the 
double-hurdle model essentially contains two equations as follows: 
* '
* '
*
*
* * *
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Cragg‟s double-hurdle model is perhaps the most flexible of the two-stage models 
as it allows for censoring at either stage of the model (BROUHLE AND KHANNE 
2005). The advantage of the Cragg model over the Tobit model is that the former 
allows variables to have differing effects on the land-rental market participation 
and the land transfer amount decisions (BROUHLE AND KHANNA 2005; BURKE, 
2009). This means that the land-rental intensity equation and the participation 
equation are allowed to have different coefficients (KETEMA AND BAUER, 2012; 
GROUND AND KOCH, 2007; BROUHLE AND KHANNA, 2005; DRAMMEH ET AL., 2002 ; 
YEN AND HUANG, 1996). 
The double-hurdle model postulates that to observe positive level of land transfer, 
the farmer must pass two hurdles: (i) be a participator in a land-rental market, and 
(ii) actually rent or rent-out land in the market. 
In the Cragg model, Equations (6.1) and (6.2) are assumed to be independent, and 
therefore, the error terms are randomly and independently distributed, - (0,1)iv N and
2- (0, )i N   . This means: 
2
0 1 0
- ,
0 0
i
i
v
N
 
      
      
        
In the first stage we run a probit model to capture the decision of whether the 
farmer participates in a land-rental market or not. The second stage is a truncated 
model for land transfer amount, conditional on participation in the rental market 
(i.e. for participators). 
The log-likelihood function for the version of Cragg‟s model that assumes the 
probit and truncated regressions to be uncorrelated is given as follows (CARROL ET 
AL. 2005): 
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Where   and   are the standard normal cumulative distribution function and 
density function, respectively. The first portion is the log-likelihood for a probit, 
while the second portion is the log likelihood for a truncated regression, with 
truncation at zero. Therefore, the log-likelihood from the Cragg model is the sum 
of the log-likelihood from a probit and a truncated regression. More useful, 
however, is the fact that these two components are entirely separable, such that the 
probit and truncated regression can be estimated separately. This means that the 
probit parameters are not included anywhere in the truncated regression, while the 
truncated regression parameters are not included anywhere in the probit regression 
(KETEMA, 2010). 
It is also obvious that the double-hurdle model reduces to the tobit model when the 
probit mechanism (i.e., * 0iD  ) is absent in Equation (6.2). This is also seen in the 
likelihood function (Equation 6.3) when   1iZ   . The tobit model arises if 
   and X Z (Martinez-Espineira, 2004). Cragg‟s model allows the 
parameters to differ in the two decisions and tobit model allows the same 
parameters in these decisions. In fact, it is possible to compare the tobit model and 
the Cragg‟s double-hurdle model. 
The appropriateness of each of these models can be tested by comparing the log 
likelihood estimates of the Tobit, probit and truncated models (GREENE, 1997). The 
underlying assumption of the Tobit model may be tested using the following 
likelihood ratio statistic (LRT): 
     22 ln ln ln 6.4T P TRLRT L L L k        
Where TL  is the likelihood of the Tobit model with the same coefficients, P
L
 is 
the likelihood of the probit model, TRL  is the likelihood of the truncated regression 
model, and k  is the number of independent variables in the equations. 
The procedure involves separate estimation of the probability model for the 
decision to make transactions or not (probit model), OLS with zero observations 
excluded (truncated regression model) and a regression with observations of zero 
included using maximum likelihood technique (tobit model). The test is based on 
the fact that the tobit log-likelihood is the sum of the log-likelihood for the 
truncated and the probit models separately. 
If the LRT of TRL  is significantly higher than the theoretical 
2 distribution, this 
leads us to reject the null hypothesis that the regressors have the same effect on the 
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decision to transfer land and the amount of land to transfer. 
Equation (6.3) is estimated using the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) 
technique. However, the estimates of the double hurdle model might not be 
efficient if the error term is homoscedastic across observations. However, this 
problem can be further improved by allowing the standard deviation to vary across 
observations (YEN AND SU, 1995). Heteroskedasticity is integrated into the model 
by assuming that the variance of the error term is an exponential function of a set of 
exogenous variables ik , a subset of iX . In, particular, the standard deviation i is 
parameterized as follows: 
'exp( )i ik h   
Where h  is a conformable parameter vector (CARROLL ET AL., 2005; KETEMA AND 
BAUER, 2012; NEWMAN ET AL., 2003). 
6.3.2 Variables 
The variables used in the double hurdle model are specified in this section. 
Consistent with the previous section, the four variables indicating land tenure 
arrangements are former land reallocation times, expectation of land reallocation, 
village-level share of certificates and land transfer rights. As discussed in the 
previous section, weak tenure security would discourage households from renting 
out their land by increasing the expected loss of losing tenure rights in the future, 
also, from renting their land by increasing the risk of losing the investment in the 
rental land. Lack of certificates would increase the transaction cost, thus 
discouraging both the land renting and renting-out decision. A high value of the 
land-transfer rights indicator is expected to have a positive impact on both renting 
and renting out of land (LI AND YAO, 2002). 
In order to figure out the effect of off-farm employment on households‟ land-rental 
activity, two variables are used in the model, they are migration days and local 
off-farm days. The former refers to the total number of days that all migrants in a 
household work. Similarly, the latter represents the total number of days that all 
members in a household work in a local off-farm sector. These two factors are 
expected to have a positive influence on land renting-out but a negative influence 
on renting land. 
Different from labor market participation, land-rental decisions are assumed to be 
made in particular by the household head. As a consequence, household head sex, 
age and education level are used to specify the land-rental model. Other household 
characteristic variables include household labor and land endowment and the cadre 
dummy. Households with relatively more labor endowment are expected to rent 
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more land and rent-out less land. Households with relatively more land are 
expected to rent more land and rent-out less land as they have the inclination to 
become a specialized farmer by achieving economies of scale. 
For both the demand and supply sides, an active village land transfer markets, 
which can reduce transaction costs, is an important determinant of the efficiency of 
the land-rental market. Therefore, a village‟s land transfer rate is introduced in the 
regression model as a proxy for this transaction cost. If the village land transfer rate 
is high, the transaction cost to rent or rent-out the same size of land is expected to 
be low because the households that want to transfer land are easy to find and 
negotiate with by other households seeking to rent or rent-out land. Thus, a positive 
relationship is expected between village land transfer rate and household land 
rental transfer decisions and its amount. 
The development of village non-farm employment is an important prerequisite for 
a land transfer market. In order to test the effect of village non-farm employment 
on household land transfer behavior, village-level off-farm employment rates, 
which is the ratio of migration and local off-farm participants to the total labor in 
the village, is used as a proxy for the active level of the off-farm labor market in a 
village. It is expected to have a negative relationship with the land rent decision and 
its amount, and a positive relationship with land rent-out decision and its amount. 
In a well-developed land-rental market, land-rental prices play a vital role in 
determining land transactions. However, the land-rental market in the field study 
area is just in the emerging stage. As analyzed in chapter 4, the potential land-rental 
demand is much greater than land-rental supply in the study area. Consequently, 
land-rental prices have little impact on household land rent-in decision, while it has 
more impact on household land rent-out decision. Thus, we only involve the rental 
price in the land rent-out model. Village average land-rental rates are used as a 
proxy for measure of land rental rates. It is expected to have a positive relationship 
with the land rent-out decision and its amount. 
Finally, two regional dummy variables for Mengxian and Wenxian Counties reflect 
the economic development and other factors that systematically differ between the 
counties. 
6.4 Determinants of Household Land Rent Decision 
The first step of the analysis consisted of testing the double-hurdle model (probit 
plus truncated regression models) against the tobit model. The results of the formal 
test based on the log-likelihood functions (Equation 6.4) between the tobit and the 
two-step modeling favors the use of the double-hurdle model. The test statistic 
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LRT=68.32 exceeds the critical value ( 2 (17) = 33.41) at the one percent level of 
significance. For comparison purposes, both the tobit results and the double-hurdle 
results are presented at the end (see Appendix 1). Here, discussions are based on 
the results of the Cragg‟s double-hurdle model presented in Table 6.1. 
The analysis reveals that there are some differences in terms of the magnitude and 
direction of determinants significantly affecting household decisions to rent land 
and its corresponding amount. 
The development of an off-farm labor market correlates negatively with both land 
rent participation and its amount. The two off-farm employment variables, 
migration days and local off-farm days, are negative and highly significant at the 
one percent level in both estimations. Only migration days has a negative impact on 
land rent amount significantly. Since the dependent variable is whether a household 
participates in land-rental markets or not and a measure of the demand for land rent, 
households that participate more actively in off-farm activities are predicted to be 
less likely to participate in land rental activity, moreover, households that 
participate more actively in migration work are predicted to rent less land. Albeit 
the small size of the coefficients indicate that the effects are in only a marginally 
significant way. 
The effect of land reallocation practices on land rent-in activity is mixed. The 
coefficients for previous land reallocations are found to be negative and significant 
at the one percent level in both of the land rent participation and rent amount 
estimations, whereas the perceptions of tenure security (the expectation of land 
reallocation in the near future) have no significant effect on land rental and its 
amount. The negative sign of the coefficients of the land reallocation times 
suggests households that have experienced more land reallocations have a 
decreased propensity to participate in land rental activity by 18.6 percent and a 
decrease of land rent amount by 0.77 mu. 
The share of certificates at village level, as a proxy for the transaction costs of land 
transfer appears to affect both participation decisions and the scale of demand for 
land-rental. Availability of certificates significantly contributes to participation in 
land-rental activity. The estimated coefficients for share of certificates indicate that 
compared to a village with no land certificates, issuance of land-use certificates to 
every household in the village is predicted to result in a 4.6 percent increase in the 
likelihood of participating in land rent activity, and a 0.1 mu increase in land rent 
amount. Another finding of interest is that land transfer rights only have a positive 
significant impact on land rent amount. Households with more land transfer rights 
would rent 1.07 mu more land compared to households with less land transfer 
rights. 
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Table 6.1: Estimates of Double Hurdle Model for household land rent decision 
Variables Land rent participation Rent amount (mu) 
Coef. z  S. E. Coef. t  S. E. 
Off-farm employment       
Migration days -0.002
***
 -5.64 0.0003 -0.002
**
 -2.25 0.001 
Local off-farm days -0.001
***
 -2.66 0.0005 -0.001 -1.32 0.001 
Land tenure variables       
Land reallocations
1 
(number) 
-0.186
***
 -2.87 0.065 -0.770
***
 -4.51 0.171 
Expectation of 
reallocation
2 
(dummy)  
-0.009 -0.07 0.134 -0.532 -1.51 0.352 
Share of certificates
3
 0.046
***
 4.09 0.011 0.105
***
 3.93 0.027 
Land transfer rights
4
 -0.535
***
 -4.40 0.121 1.070
***
 3.15 0.340 
Household variables       
Labor (number) 0.329
***
 3.7 0.089 0.148 0.72 0.205 
Farm size (mu) 0.273
*
 1.72 0.158 1.434
***
 5.82 0.246 
Plot number -0.048 -0.94 0.051 0.061 0.50 0.122 
HH head‟s gender dummy 0.058 0.23 0.249 0.174 0.28 0.624 
HH head‟s age (yrs) -0.006 -0.76 0.008 -0.054*** -2.78 0.019 
HH head‟s education (yrs) -0.012 -0.32 0.037 -0.144 -1.64 0.088 
Cadre dummy 0.008 0.03 0.286 0.399 0.57 0.697 
Village variables       
Village land transfer rate
5
 0.038
***
 5.3 0.007 0.064
***
 3.64 0.018 
Village off-farm 
employment rate
6
 
-0.014 -0.84 0.017 -0.192
***
 -5.11 0.038 
County dummy (cf. 
Huaxian ) 
      
Mengxian 0.332 0.89 0.375 3.001
***
 4.37 0.687 
Wenxian 0.186 0.46 0.406 3.346
***
 4.49 0.745 
Constant -1.828
*
 -1.94 0.941 0.983 0.46 2.130 
No. of observations 479 152 
Chi-square 209.75
***
 108.52
***
 
Log likelihood -194.425 -273.250 
sigma  2.432
***
 
Notes: 
1
Past land reallocations that a household has experienced; 
2 
1 if household expect land reallocation in the 
near future, 0 otherwise; 
3
 Share of households with certificates in a village; 
4
 The freedom of household land 
transfer rights, from 1 to 4, the higher the value the greater the right; 5share of households participate in land rental 
market in a village (%); 6 share of households participate in off-farm employment in a village (%). ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The first model (selection equation) is a probit for 
land rent-in participation, and the second model (intensity equation) is a truncated regression for land rent-in 
amount.   
Concerning other household characteristic variables, the positive coefficients of 
household laborers to land rent participation point to the importance of the labor 
endowment for agricultural production. Households gaining one more laborer are 
predicted to increase their land rent-in participation propensity by 33 percent.  
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The positive coefficient of farm size confirms that the demand for rental land is 
likely to be higher among households with larger farm size. Households with large 
land endowment are more likely to become specialized farmers with the intent to 
rent more land, seeking economies of scale. One additional mu of farm size should 
increase the likelihood of participating in land rent-in activity by 27 percent, the 
amount of land rent-in by 1.42 mu. Household head age only has significant impact 
on land rent amount, suggesting that households with older heads rent less land 
since they become physically less capable of engaging in farming.  
For the two village-level variables, village land transfer rate is positively related to 
land rent-in participation and its amount, while the village off-farm employment 
rate only significantly affects land rental scale. The coefficients for size indicate 
that a household in a village with a more active land transfer market is predicted to 
have an increase in the probability of pursuing land rental activity by 3.8 percent, 
and an increase in the amount of land rented by 0.06 mu. Whereas, households in a 
village with a more active off-farm labor market would reduce the amount of land 
rental activity.  
Finally, the results for the two county dummy variables indicate that 
county-specific factors such as the wage rate and land rent make households in 
Mengxian and Wenxian rent larger amounts of land than households in Huaxian. 
6.5 Determinants of Household Land Rent-out Decision 
Similar with the last section, in this session the double-hurdle model is tested 
against the tobit model. The result of the formal test favors the use of the 
double-hurdle model. The likelihood ratio statistic is 69.35, substantially exceeding 
the critical chi-squared statistic (33.41) at a one percent level. For comparison 
purposes, both the tobit results and the double-hurdle results are presented at the 
end (see Appendix 1). Here, discussions are based on the results of the 
double-hurdle model presented in Table 6.2. 
There are big differences in terms of the magnitude and direction of determinants 
significantly affecting land rent-out participation and its amount. Local off-farm 
days and family labor only affect the decision to participate in land rent-out activity 
in a significantly positive and negative way, respectively. While land transfer 
rights only significantly and positively affect the decision of how much land to 
rent-out. Both farm size and land fragmentation affects the decision to participate 
and the decision of how much land to rent-out in different directions. 
The effects of off-farm employment on participation in rent-out activity are 
remarkably strong and robust. The two variables, migration days and local off-farm 
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days, are positive and highly significant at the one percent level in the participation 
estimation. This result confirms findings of previous studies that improved 
off-farm job opportunities increase the supply of land and are a major factor 
driving the development of village land-rental markets (TU, HEERINK AND LI, 
2006). Only migration days positively impacts land rent-out amounts significantly. 
Since the dependent variable is whether or not a household participates in a 
land-rental market and a measure of the supply for land rent-out, households that 
participate more actively in off-farm activities are predicted to be more likely to 
participate in land rent-out activity, moreover, households that participate more 
actively in migration work are predicted to rent-out more land.  
Regarding the effect of the tenure security on rent-out activity, former reallocations 
negatively and significantly affect both rent-out participation and its amount, 
whereas the perceptions of tenure security (the expectation of land reallocation) 
was found to have no significant effect on rent-out activity. The negative sign and 
the coefficients of land reallocation occurrences suggest households that 
experience more land reallocations have a decreased propensity to participate in 
land rent-out activity of 28 percent and a decrease of land rent-out amount of 0.25 
mu. 
The impact of land transferability on household land rent-out activity is mixed. The 
two variables, share of certificates at village level, which is a proxy for the 
transaction cost of land transfer, appears to positively affect both participation 
decisions and the supply of land rent-out scale at the one percent significant level. 
Meanwhile, land transfer rights only have a significant and positive impact on land 
rent-out amount. The size of estimated coefficients for share of certificates is small, 
which indicates that compared to a village with no land certificates, issuance of 
land-use certificates to every household in a village is predicted to result in a 9.1 
percent increase in the likelihood of participating in land rent-out, and a 0.03 mu 
increase in land rent-out amount. Moreover, land transfer rights were found to 
influence land rent-out amount in a way that households with more land transfer 
rights would rent-out 0.23 mu more land compared to households with less land 
transfer rights. 
A number of the coefficients on the household characteristic variables are found to 
be significant. Family labor significantly and negative affects land rent-out 
participation. Households with one more laborers are predicted to decrease the land 
rent-out participation propensity by almost 40 percent. Similarly, the sign of 
education is consistent with other research findings by KUNG (2002) AND FENG 
(2008). The positive coefficient of household head‟s level of education means that 
households with a more educated head are more likely to rent-out, and possibly 
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tend to rent-out more land, because of higher returns to off-farm work. This finding 
highlights the importance of education in enhancing income generation, because 
households with higher-educated heads earns higher income from off-farm 
employment and therefore have less incentive to earn income from agriculture. 
Table 6.2: Estimates of Double Hurdle Model for household land rent-out decision 
Variables Rent-out participation Rent-out amount 
Coef. z  S. E. Coef. t  S. E. 
Off-farm employment       
Migration days 0.003
***
 6.29 0.0005 0.0007
**
 2.02 0.0004 
Local off-farm days 0.003
***
 4.70 0.0005 0.0002 0.60 0.0004 
Land tenure variables       
Land Reallocations 
(number) 
-0.281
**
 -2.98 0.094 -0.245
**
 -2.21 0.111 
Expectation of 
reallocation
 
(dummy)  
0.215 1.31 0.165 0.044 0.49 0.090 
Share of certificates 0.091
***
 6.63 0.014 0.030
**
 2.52 0.012 
Land transfer rights -0.180 -1.58 0.113 0.229
**
 2.77 0.083 
Household variables       
Labor (number) -0.396
***
 -3.38 0.117 -0.028 -0.34 0.082 
Farm size (mu) -0.231
**
 -2.93 0.078 0.600
***
 9.45 0.063 
Plot number 0.162
**
 2.01 0.081 -0.213
***
 -3.61 0.059 
HH head‟s gender 
dummy 
0.065 0.23 0.284 -0.097 -0.47 0.207 
HH head‟s age (yrs) 0.017 1.51 0.011 0.0003 0.04 0.009 
HH head‟s education 
(yrs) 
0.079
*
 1.79 0.044 0.064
**
 2.04 0.031 
Cadre dummy -0.231 -0.58 0.399 0.152 0.58 0.264 
Village variables       
Village land transfer rate -0.008 -1.01 0.008 -0.002 -0.23 0.007 
Village average rent price 0.001
*
 1.87 0.0006 0.0007
*
 1.81 0.0004 
County dummy (cf. 
Huaxian ) 
      
Mengxian 0.220 0.52 0.426 -0.744
**
 -2.41 0.309 
Wenxian 0.316 0.71 0.446 -0.984
**
 -2.99 0.329 
Constant -5.099
***
 -4.16 1.227 -0.319 -0.34 0.934 
No. of observations 479 90 
Chi-square 205.84 416.99 
Log likelihood -128.507 -76.205 
sigma  0.573
***
 
Notes:
 ***, **
 and 
*
 indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The first model is a probit for land 
rent-out participation, and the second model is a truncated regression for land rent-out amount.   
Two very interesting findings are that farm size negatively impacts land rent-out 
participation and positively impacts land rent-out amount, whereas, land 
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fragmentation is found to have the opposite influence, it affects land rent-out 
participation positively and land rent-out amount negatively. One possible 
explanation is that farmers with large farms may have the intention to become 
specialized farmers, who are less likely to engage in off-farm employment, and 
thus have little impetus to rent-out land. While large farm households, especially 
those with fewer plots, find it easy to rent-out land. The estimated coefficients 
suggest that a household with one additional mu of land, is 23 percent less likely of 
renting out their farmland, but for those households who actually rent-out land, one 
additional mu of land increases land rented out by 0.6 mu. 
Various researchers have pointed out that land fragmentation is causing 
productivity losses (NGUYEN ET AL., 1996; WAN AND CHENG 2001; CHEN ET AL., 
2009). Therefore, in reality, farmers usually voluntary consolidate land within a 
village through exchanging or renting out land. However, fragmented land is 
difficult to rent-out. The coefficients reveal that compared to households with a 
larger average plot size, households with small plots are 16 percent more likely to 
rent-out land, albeit among those actually renting-out land, an increase in average 
plot size would reduce the amount of land rented out by 0.21 mu. 
With regard to the two village-level variables, village average rental price is 
positively related to land rent-out participation and its amount, while village land 
transfer rate is found to have no significant effect on either land rent-out or its 
amount. The coefficients sizes indicate that households in a village with a 100 
Yuan higher land-rental price is predicted to have an increase in the possibility of 
renting-out land by ten percent, and an increase in the amount of land rented-out of  
0.07 mu. 
Finally, the results for the county dummy variables indicate that county-specific 
factors such as the level of economic development and wage rate make households 
in Mengxian and Wenxian rent-out smaller amounts of land than households in 
Huaxian. 
6.6 Summary 
Land-rental markets provide benefits for both the farmers that want to dispose of 
their land to move to non-farm sectors and those who wish to expand their farm 
size. Thus, the development of well-functioning land-rental markets is critically 
important for facilitating the structural transformation of an economy from an 
agricultural-based one to an industrialized one. 
In this chapter, the key factors that influence the decision to transfer land and the 
amount of land transactions, particularly the impact from land tenure arrangements 
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and off-farm labor markets, were analyzed. Considering the demand and supply 
side of land-rental markets, this study investigates separately the behavior of 
renters and those renting-out land in the study area. 
The main finding of the research is that the land-rental market is mainly driven by 
off-farm employment. Households with active participation in off-farm labor 
markets are more likely to rent-out land, and among those who have already rented 
out land, active participation in off-farm employment also increases their land 
rent-out amount. Without off-farm job opportunities, households are unlikely to 
rent-out their land, and the land-rental market does not work if there is no supply. 
This finding confirms the results of previous studies on land rental market 
development in China (TU, HEERINK AND LI, 2006; KIMURA, OTSUKA AND ROZELLE, 
2007).  
Institutional factors such as land tenure arrangements also play a significant role in 
land transactions. More reallocations in the past reduce both the propensity and the 
magnitude of rental market transactions. Households that experience more 
reallocations decrease their rental market participation, since they may feel 
insecure concerning their land use rights. Land-use certificates significantly 
contribute to participation in land-rental markets and the rental amount. Possession 
of land-use certificates reduces the transaction costs on both sides of a land-rental 
market, thus making land transactions easier. In addition, land transfer rights only 
positively impact the land transfer amount.  
A number of other variables are also found to be statistically and significantly 
affecting land-rental participation and its intensity in a different way. Households 
with high land availability may tend to rent more land to extend farm size and 
specialize in agricultural production. Whereas, household heads with higher 
education rent-out more land since it is easier for them to move off the farm. 
Households in a village with a more active land market and less active labor market 
tend to rent more land. While average land-rental rates are positively related to land 
renting-out and its amount.  
In order to promote land-rental market development in China, policies should aim 
to provide more off-farm work opportunities and further strengthen individual land 
rights. Under the current administrative land reallocation system, individual 
land-use rights can be taken away and this appears to be thwarting incentives for 
farmers, including relatively unproductive part-time farmers who cultivate tiny 
plots of land, to rent-out their land. Hence, according to the empirical results, 
granting and protecting individual land rights is one of the major remaining 
institutional reforms that must be implemented in China in order to sustain China‟s 
rapid economic transformation. Specific measures such as issuance of more official 
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means of contracting, e.g. certificates, and reduce village-level land transfer 
regulation, will strongly stimulate the development of land-rental markets. Special 
training programs which aim to provide rural migrants with the necessary 
knowledge to find off-farm job opportunities will also benefit land rent-out activity. 
Finally, policy related to promoting a market based land-rental market should be 
pursued.
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7 OFF-FARM EMPLOYMENT, LAND RENTAL 
MARKET AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY 
Well-functioning factor markets are crucial for the sustainability and growth of 
agriculture and for rural development (DONNELLAN ET AL., 2012). However, 
imperfections in these markets are common in developing countries. For 
economies in transition, most notably China, the problem of factor-market 
imperfections are even more severe (BENJAMIN AND BRANDT, 2002). Empirical 
evidence shows that agricultural factor markets in rural China, particularly land 
and labor, face many institutional obstacles and remain underdeveloped (CARTER 
AND YAO, 2002; BOWLUS AND SICULAR, 2003). Imperfect factor markets may 
constrain households‟ ability to exchange land and labor, and so generate 
inefficient resource allocation, which further causes productivity loss (BENJAMIN 
AND BRANDT, 2002; FENG AND HEERINK, 2008).  
7.1 Introduction 
The impact of land tenure arrangements on the development of off-farm 
employment and land rental markets has been analyzed in previous chapters. This 
chapter will further investigate its effect on agricultural production. Basically, this 
influence is through property rights‟ effect on investment incentives and the way 
land is allocated across households (KHANTACHAVANA ET AL., 2012). Security of 
tenure is likely to improve long-run productivity through increasing the incentives 
to invest in and properly manage land. When farmers feel more secure in their right 
or ability to maintain long-term use over their land, the return on long-term land 
improvements and conservation measures is higher, and they have therefore a 
greater incentive to undertake investments (BRASSELLE, ET AL., 2002). Additionally, 
when productivity differentials exist among households, the development of land 
rental markets can enhance allocative efficiency and agricultural productivity by 
facilitating transfers of land from less productive households to more productive 
ones (CARTER AND YAO, 2002; DEININGER ET AL., 2003; FARUQEE AND CAREY, 
1997; FENG AND HEERINK, 2008; YAO, 2003). However, in present-day China land 
rental arrangements are generally informal, short-term, and between households 
living in the same village. The underdeveloped land rental markets that generate 
high transaction costs may limit the number of rentals, and in general, these 
constraints on rentals will affect productivity. 
The effect of off-farm employment on agricultural production is ambiguous. 
Participation in off-farm activities changes resource endowments of households, 
especially labor and capital used for financing off-farm employment move out of 
farm production (SHI ET AL., 2005). Households may need to restructure their farm 
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production by changing factor use and variable input use. Off-farm employment 
reduces the labor available for agricultural production, especially if hiring 
agricultural labor incurs transaction costs and if hired labor is not as efficient as 
family labor. But off-farm employment also enables households to increase their 
income, to overcome credit and insurance constraints and to increase their 
investment in agricultural production (ROZELLE ET AL., 1999; TAYLOR ET AL., 
2003). In addition, the reduction in food consumption by household members 
working off-farm (e.g. the migrants) may have an impact on agricultural production 
decisions if household production and consumption decisions are non-separable 
(BURGER, 1994; WOUTERSE, 2006). 
Previous studies on the effect of land tenure on agricultural production have 
focused on South Asia (BINSWANGER ET AL., 1995; OTSUKA AND HAYAMI, 1988; 
SHABAN, 1987) and Africa (AHMED ET AL., 2002; BENIN ET AL., 2005; GAVIAN AND 
EHUI, 1999; GAVIAN AND FAFCHAMPS, 1996; PENDER AND FAFCHAMPS, 2006; 
PLACE AND OTSUKA, 1997). The focus of these studies has been on to compare the 
relative efficiency of owner-operated, rented, or sharecropped plots. Many studies 
find an efficiency loss on sharecropped land relative to owner-operated land. 
Land tenure research in China focuses on the land tenure insecurity resulting from 
frequent land reallocations, and the impact of this insecurity on household 
investment and agricultural productivity (KUNG AND LIU, 1997; LI ET AL., 1998; 
YAO, 1998; BENJAMIN AND BRANDT, 2002; JACOBY ET AL., 2002). Most studies 
found that land tenure insecurity had a significant but small effect on investment 
(e.g. green manure, organic manure), but no significant effect on productivity. This 
may be attributed to the fact that long-term investment on land plays a minor role in 
agricultural production compared to other agricultural inputs such as land, labor, 
and chemical fertilizers (YAO, 2003). 
Little research has targeted the effect of land rental market development on 
allocative efficiency and agricultural productivity in rural China. LOHMAR ET AL. 
(2001) found that allocative efficiency and aggregate agricultural production was 
improved because households that rent land have a significantly higher marginal 
product of land than households that do not rent additional land. JIN and DEININGER 
(2009) found that net revenue on rented plots was some 60 percent higher than 
what the landlord would have obtained under self-cultivation. A 
productivity-enhancing role of land markets is also inferred from the fact that in a 
more limited sample from Southern China, productivity on leased plots is 
consistently highest (FENG ET AL. 2010). 
Many empirical studies investigated the effect of off-farm employment on 
agricultural production in rural China. The studies by ROZELLE ET AL. (1999) and 
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TAYLOR ET AL. (2003) applied the “new economics of labor migration” (NELM) 
framework developed by STARK AND BLOOM (1985), through a simultaneous 
equation model, they found a negative lost-labor effect and a positive income effect 
on agricultural production. However, WU AND MENG (1997) did not find this 
lost-labor effect; they only found a positive income effect of off-farm work on 
grain productivity. Some recent research has focused on off-farm employment‟s 
effect on technical efficiency. CHANG AND WEN (2011) estimate Cobb-Douglas 
stochastic production frontiers (SPF) for rice farmers in Taiwan to find that 
technical efficiency of households without off-farm workers is slightly higher than 
that of households with off-farm workers. YUE AND SONADA (2012) had similar 
findings that the average production frontier of households without a wage worker 
was higher in their study region. While FENG (2008) found that participation in 
migration did not have any effect on technical efficiency. 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the effects of land tenure arrangements, 
off-farm employment and land rental market participation on agricultural 
production in rural China. The remainder of the chapter structures as follows. 
Section 7.2 reviews theoretical approaches of measuring agricultural productivity 
and efficiency. Section 7.3 presents a theoretical framework for the analysis. 
Section 7.4 introduces the estimation procedures. Estimation results are presented 
in section 7.5. Moreover, section 7.6 discusses the variation of productivity and 
technical efficiency. An extended discussion about factor markets, productivity 
and rural income is illustrated in section 7.7. Finally, section 7.8 concludes the 
chapter with summarizing the main findings and drawing some policy implications. 
7.2 Theoretical Approaches of Measuring Agricultural Productivity 
7.2.1 Productivity and Efficiency 
Following LOVELL (1993), the productivity of a production unit can be measured 
by the ratio of its output to its input. Thus, agricultural productivity is measured as 
the ratio of agricultural outputs to agricultural inputs. While individual products are 
usually measured by weight, their varying densities which make measuring overall 
agricultural output difficult. Therefore, output is usually measured as the market 
value of final output, excludes intermediate products such as corn feed used in the 
meat industry. This output value may be compared to many different types of 
inputs such as labor and land in terms of yield. These are called partial measures of 
productivity. Agricultural productivity may also be measured by what is termed 
total factor productivity. This method of calculating agricultural productivity 
compares an index of agricultural inputs to an index of outputs. This measure of 
agricultural productivity was established to remedy the shortcomings of the partial 
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measures of productivity; notably that it is often hard to identify the factors that 
cause them to change. Changes in TFP are usually attributed to technological 
improvements (LIPSEY AND CARLAW, 2004). 
However, productivity varies according to differences in production technology, 
production process and differences in the environment in which production occurs. 
The main interest here is in isolating the efficiency component in order to measure 
its contribution to productivity. Producers are efficient if they produce as much as 
possible with the inputs they have actually employed and if they have produced that 
output at minimum cost (GREENE, 1997). The concept of technical efficiency 
entails a comparison between observed and optimal values of output and inputs of a 
production unit (SADOULET AND JANVRY, 1995). This comparison takes the form of 
the ratio of observed to maximum potential output obtainable from the given input, 
or the ratio of the minimum potential to observed input required to produce the 
given output, or some combination of the two. These two give rise to the concepts 
of technical and allocative efficiency. A productive entity is technically inefficient 
when, given its use of inputs, it is not producing the maximum output possible 
(output distance), or given its output, it is using more inputs than is necessary. 
Similarly, a production unit is allocative inefficient when it is not using the 
combination of inputs that would minimize the cost of producing a given level of 
output (SADOULET AND JANVRY, 1995). 
Efficiency and productivity are closely related. Changes in productivity are due to 
differences in production technology, differences in the efficiency of the 
production process, and differences in the environment in which production takes 
place (GROSSKOPF, 1993). Productive efficiency is therefore an important 
determinant of productivity and should be incorporated in productivity analyses. 
The empirical challenge is to measure productive efficiency and to apportion its 
share in the productivity variations (ODHIAMBO AND NYANGITO, 2003). 
Considering the data available, this study analyzed productivity through land 
productivity, labor productivity and technical efficiency. 
7.2.2 Efficiency Measurement 
Based on the seminal work of DEBREU (1951), KOOPMANS (1951) and FARRELL 
(1957), who developed a conceptual model to measure efficiency, which is known 
as frontier analysis. According to BOGETOFT AND OTTO (2011), each productive 
unit can be described by its employed production plan, i.e. the 
input-output-combination. The basic idea of frontier analysis is to derive a 
reference performance, i.e. a best-practice frontier, from a given set of different 
input-output-combinations, to which each observation is compared. The distance to 
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that frontier is then interpreted as the waste of resources or the omission of potential 
outputs and provides a measure of inefficiency or the degree of efficiency, 
respectively (NIESWAND, 2012).  
Additionally, most of the research on efficiency of small farms has been triggered 
by the very influential work of SCHULTZ‟s (1964) “efficient but poor” hypothesis. 
Since then, many studies have been conducted in different countries to analyze the 
technical efficiency level of farmers (AIGNER ET AL., 1977). In microeconomics of 
production, technical efficiency is defined as “the maximum attainable level of 
output for a given level of inputs, given the current range of alternative 
technologies available to the farmer” (ELLIS, 1993). Technical efficiency can be 
analyzed using two approaches. These are the output-oriented and input-oriented 
approaches. The first one has an output-augmenting orientation, whereas the 
second one is targeted toward conservation of inputs. 
As indicated in Figure 7.1, “x” is inputs on the X-axis and “q” is output on the 
Y-axis. There is a frontier line in the center of the diagram. The production frontier 
represents the maximum output attainable from each input level. Hence, it reflects 
the current state of technology in the industry. Farms operate either on that frontier 
if they are technically efficient or beneath the frontier if they are not. Point A 
represents an inefficient point whereas points B and C represent efficient points. A 
farm operating at point A is inefficient because technically it could increase output 
to the level associated with point B without requiring more input. The distance to 
the frontier line measures the inefficiency of farms. 
Generally, measurement of technical efficiency can be done using either parametric 
(econometric) approaches or non-parametric (mathematical programming) 
techniques. Econometric approaches developed by AIGNER AND CHU (1968) are 
among the first to use stochastic frontier methods of estimation. Their model 
acknowledges the influence of random errors and data noise on agricultural 
production. This approach assumes that deviations from the production frontier 
may not be entirely under the control of farmers (AIGNER ET AL., 1977). In doing so, 
the model helps in distinguishing the effects of stochastic noise from the effects of 
other inefficiency factors. It also allows hypothesis testing on the production 
structure and efficiency. However, this approach imposes a distributional 
assumption of the inefficiency term and the frontier technology. On the other hand, 
a non-parametric approach (Data Envelopment Analysis) does not impose such 
restrictions, but assumes the absence of measurement or sampling errors, and 
deviations from the production frontier are under the control of the production unit 
being considered. They are, thus, deterministic. In farming systems where 
production is highly bound to the natural environment, the effect of stochastic noise 
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is clearly observable. Therefore, the current study followed a stochastic frontier 
approach. 
 
Figure 7.1: Production frontiers and technical efficiency 
Source: FENG AND HEERINK (2008) 
7.3 Econometric Models and Estimation Methods 
7.3.1 Specification of the Frontier Production Function 
Stochastic frontier models (SFM) developed simultaneously by AIGNER ET AL. 
(1977) and MEEUSEN ET AL., (1977) are made up of three components: the 
deterministic production function, the idiosyncratic error and the inefficiency error 
component. Since the error term has two components, the stochastic frontier 
models are often referred to as “composed error models”. The general version of 
the stochastic frontier production function can be written in the following way: 
     ( , )exp exp 1,2,..., . 7.1i i i iY f x v u i I    
Where iY  is the single output,   is a vector of technology parameters and i
x  is 
a vector of inputs used. The model specifies two random disturbance terms iv and iu . 
The random disturbance term iv  is intended to capture the effects of the stochastic 
noise. It is assumed to be independently distributed with a mean equal to zero and 
standard deviation of 2v . The disturbance term iu  captures technical inefficiency 
and is assumed to be independent of iv . Its distribution is assumed to be half 
normal, being identically and independently distributed as
2(0, )N  . 
0 x D 
• 
•  B  
•  A 
Frontier 
y 
C 
TE=DA/DB 
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Let 2v  and 
2
u  be the variances of the symmetric (v) and one-sided (u) error terms. 
It then follows that: 
2 2 2 (7.2)v u     
and the ratio of the two standard errors is as used by JONDROW, ET AL. (1982): 
(7.3)v u     
According to BATTESE AND CORRA (1977), the variance ratio parameter  , which 
relates the variability of iu to total variability (
2 ) can be calculated in the 
following manner: 
   2 2 2 2 2/ 1 / + (7.4)u u vor          
So that 0 1  . 
This means that if the value of   is equal to zero, the difference between farm 
outputs is entirely due to statistical noise. On the other hand, a value of one would 
indicate that the difference is attributed to technical inefficiency (BATTESE AND 
CORRA, 1977; COELLI, 1995).  
LOVELL (1993) shows that technical efficiency (TE) can be expressed as a 
reciprocal of Dubreau-Farrel output-oriented technical efficiency. This can be 
written as: 
 exp( ) 1, 2, ..., . 7.5
( , )exp( )
i
i i
i i
y
TE u i n
f x v
   
 
The production model will usually be linear in the logs of the variables, so for 
estimation purposes the model in (7.3) usually becomes: 
 log log ( , ) 1,2,..., . 7.6i i i iy f x v u i I     
Where 
1
logi sf
i
u
e
  and ( , )if x   can assume many functional forms; the two 
most used in empirical works are the Cobb-Douglas and the translog function. 
The relatively large number of inputs that were distinguished in this study greatly 
complicates the application of a translog function. Therefore, the Cobb-Douglas 
production function has been chosen for the analysis of the data. 
Estimation of technical efficiency was first accomplished by Aigner, Lovell and 
Schmidt (1977), Battese and Corra (1977) and Meeusen et al., (1977). These 
studies provide estimates of the average technical efficiency over all the 
observations. The data used was cross-sectional in nature. To estimate the 
equations, a number of assumptions were necessary. First, it was assumed that 
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0iv   and then an estimate of a deterministic production frontier was made. The 
maximum likelihood method (MLE) can then be used as an estimation procedure in 
this case.  
The stochastic frontier model can be estimated using a one or two-stage approach. 
In the two-stage procedure, the frontier production function is estimated first and 
the values for technical inefficiency are derived subsequently, ignoring a set of 
variables (z) that affect technical inefficiency. In the second stage, these derived 
inefficiency levels are regressed to a vector of household and other socioeconomic 
variables (z) to see how efficiency levels vary with these variables (FENG 2008; 
ALEMU, 2010). However, it is suggested to use caution with this approach, because 
it violates the distributional assumptions of the error terms. In other words, the 
two-stage procedure lacks consistency in assumptions about the distribution of the 
inefficiencies. In step one, it is assumed that inefficiencies are independently and 
identically distributed in order to estimate their values. In step two, estimated 
inefficiencies are assumed to be a function of a number of household-specific 
factors, violating the assumption in step one (COELLI ET AL., 1998; WANG AND 
SCHMIDT, 2002). A single stage maximum likelihood model (BATTESE AND COELLI, 
1995) is suggested as a way to solve this problem, in which the relationship 
between technical inefficiency and the variables is imposed directly in estimating 
the frontier production function and the household inefficiency levels 
(KUMBHAKAR ET AL., 1991; WANG AND SCHMIDT, 2002). In this study, the 
one-stage approach is used because of its advantages. The maximum likelihood 
estimates were computed using the statistical package STATA 10.1. 
Agricultural production depends, in general, on land area, labor, seed, fertilizers, 
herbicides and pesticides, mechanical power, and irrigation. The descriptive 
statistics of the variables used in the stochastic frontier production function 
estimation, subdivided by participation in land rental markets are presented in 
Table 7.1. Among the 382 households used for the productivity and technical 
efficiency analysis, 151 households rented land from others. 
Households in the survey area grow mainly grain crops, winter wheat and summer 
maize together in one year. The yields vary between varieties. For our study the 
gross value has been aggregated and measured in monetary units. The average 
value was 6868 Yuan per household, and the mean value for households that rented 
land was higher than households without land rental participation. Results from the 
ANOVA test further confirmed that the variation is substantial. Additionally, the 
average land area per household used for grain production was about 8.4 mu and 
the average labor input was around 59 days (Table 7.1). Seed, fertilizers, herbicides 
and pesticides, mechanical power and irrigation used for production were 
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measured in monetary units. From the results of ANOVA test, there is a statistically 
significant difference in all of the input variables among the two groups. Basically, 
all inputs in the Cobb-Douglas production function were expected to have a 
positive effect on grain production, except for herbicides and pesticides. Their 
effects on land productivity depend on whether they are applied for the prevention 
or control of weeds or pests. 
Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the SFM estimation 
 HH rent land HH not rent   F Total 
 Mean S.D Mean S.D  Mean S.D 
Gross value of 
output (Yuan) 
8657.9 5573.0 5691.3 4426.0 33.7
***
  6867.9 5218.5 
Labor (man-days) 67.6 28.6 54.2 24.3 22.3
***
  59.2 26.6 
Area planted (mu) 10.6 6.8 7.0 4.9 34.8
***
  8.4 6.0 
Seed (Yuan) 323.1 238.9 202.2 160.6 33.2
***
  246.7 198.8 
Pesticide (Yuan) 294.6 295.1 205.0 163.9 36.2
***
  239.8 229.5 
Fertilizer (Yuan) 1489.9 991.6 991.3 617.4 14.6
***
  1182.7 821.7 
Mechanical power 
(Yuan) 
325.5 209.1 230.2 165.1 22.9
***
  265.7 188.9 
Irrigation (Yuan) 372.4 275.4 240.7 187.3 29.0
***
  290.1 233.4 
No. of observations 147 235  382  
Source: Field survey (2009) 
7.3.2 Specification of the Productivity and TE Determinant Function 
In crop production, productivity and technical efficiency is likely to be affected by 
a wide range of factors that are associated with farm management practices 
(FORSUND ET AL., 1980), including indicators of land-tenure security, farm 
characteristics, household characteristics, household market participation, e.g. 
participation in land rental markets, off-farm employment and agricultural products 
markets and other village-specific factors. 
Description of the variables used in productivity and technical efficiency 
determinant estimation are specified as following. Tenure security is represented 
by the number of previous reallocations and household expectations of land 
reallocation in the next few years. Households that have experienced more land 
reallocations in the past or expect land reallocation in the near future are less secure 
than household that have experience less, or expect to. Therefore, reallocation 
times and expectation of reallocation are expected to be negatively correlated with 
productivity and technical efficiency. The share of households with certificates in a 
village and land transfer rights possessed by a household are used to indicate 
household land transferability. Issuance of land-use certificates to every household 
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in the village would reduce transaction costs of land rental. If land can be easily 
transferred between farmers, productivity will increase. Thus, land transferability 
is expected to be positively related to productivity and efficiency. 
Land characteristics are represented by farm size, plot number and rating of soil 
quality. An inverse relationship between productivity and farm size is a common 
empirical finding in developing country agriculture (BENJAMIN, 1995). CHAYANOV 
(1926) first documented that small farms produce more output per cropped area in 
the Russian agriculture. Later, the same evidence was found by SEN (1962), 
BARDHAN (1973), and ROSENZWEIGAND BINSWANGER (1993) in other developing 
countries. For China‟s agriculture, by reviewing the relationships between farm 
size, productivity, and factor markets, BRANDT (1985) had similar findings in 
pre-war (1930s) northeastern China. Later, BENJAMIN AND BRANDT (2002), CHEN, 
HUFFMAN AND ROZELLE (2005) also found this inverse relationship in Chinese 
agriculture. Hence, a farm size variable is used here to test whether small farms are 
more efficient in the study area.  
The number of plots in a household is an indicator of land fragmentation, which 
can have either negative or positive effects on productivity and technical efficiency 
(TAN, 2005). On the one hand, a larger number of plots needs more labor 
(NGUYENET AL., 1996) and may be more difficult to manage. On the other hand, it 
enables households to optimize their labor allocation over different crop species 
and seasons, especially if there is no market for agricultural labor (FENOALTEA, 
1976). Grain production is influenced by the quality of the soil. In this study, 
farmers‟ rating of their land‟s soil quality is used as a soil quality indicator. It is 
expected that grain production is positively correlated with soil quality.  
Household characteristics include average adult age, average adult education level 
and number of agricultural assets. Average age of household adults is used as a 
proxy for the family‟s farming experience. The effect of age on productivity and 
technical efficiency is ambiguous, depending on whether older farmers are more 
experienced or more likely to stick to farming traditions and less likely to adopt 
new technologies. Average education of adults represents the management skills of 
a family. Productivity and technical efficiency are expected to increase with 
education, as education increases the household‟s ability to utilize existing 
technologies and make better farm management decisions (BATTESE AND COELLI, 
1995). In the research area, mechanical power such as mechanical seeders, 
mechanical traction, and combines are very commonly used. Households either 
possess or hire these machines for their agricultural production. Thus, the number 
of agricultural assets in a household is expected to have a positive impact on 
productivity and technical efficiency. 
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Household markets participation covers off-farm labor markets participation, land 
rental markets participation, and agricultural products markets participation. A 
dummy variable whether a household participates in off-farm employment 
represents household off-farm labor markets participation. Off-farm employment 
affects productivity and efficiency in three ways. The first one is through the 
lost-labor effect. Off-farm employment can be expected to reduce productivity and 
efficiency, especially if hiring agricultural labor incurs transaction costs and hired 
labor is not as efficient as family labor. The second one is through the income effect. 
Off-farm employment is expected to increase household incomes, and thereby 
facilitate the use of material inputs and improve technical efficiency (ROZELLE ET 
AL., 1999; TAYLOR ET AL., 2003). The third one is through the 
reduced-consumption effect. Household members working off-farm (e.g., off-farm 
employment by migrated members) means less food consumption and therefore 
reduces agricultural production if household production and consumption 
decisions are non-separable (BURGER, 1994; WOUTERSE, 2006). Therefore, the 
effect of off-farm employment on technical efficiency is ambiguous.  
Household land rental market participation is measured by the possibilities of 
household renting decisions that is predicted with a probit model (see Appendix 2). 
In principle, all explanatory variables in the determinant function should be 
exogenous. However, household participation in land renting as well as off-farm 
employment may be endogenous as they depend on tenure security, land 
characteristics, household characteristics, market rent, wages and other prices. As 
mentioned earlier, data on household participation in off-farm employment were 
collected for the year 2008, whereas data on household participation in land renting 
and agricultural production were collected for the year 2009. Household 
participation in off-farm employment is therefore treated as exogenous. Decisions 
on land renting were made in the year 2009 and may therefore be considered 
endogenous.  
Inclusion of endogenous variables in the estimation may result in biased estimates. 
Instrumental variables are used to address this endogeneity problem. First, a probit 
model was used to estimate land renting at the farm household level, and to predict 
the probability of household participation in land renting. The predicted probability 
was then used as an instrument for the actual participation in the land rental market 
in determinant estimation of land and labor productivity, as well as technical 
efficiency. As mentioned previously, households renting land are expected to 
achieve a higher productivity and technical efficiency because developed land 
rental markets enable the transfer of land from less efficient to more efficient 
households. 
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For household participation in agricultural products markets, this study uses the 
ratio of sold output to total output as a proxy. Following SCHULTZ‟s (1964) 
„poor-but-efficient‟ hypothesis, small farmers in traditional agricultural settings are 
reasonably efficient in allocating their resources by responding positively to price 
incentives. As part of the market economy, farmers are profit maximization 
motivated production units. Efficiency and profit maximization are two sides of the 
same coin; at the level of individual production unit we cannot have one without the 
other (KEBEDE, 2001). Therefore, the ratio of sold output to total produced output is 
used here to measure the influence of participation in products markets on 
agricultural productivity and technical efficiency. 
To capture the variation in other factors that systematically differ between the 
counties, two dummy variables for the Mengzhou and Wenxian counties are 
included. It is assumed that the production frontier may shift by county. 
7.4 The Determinants of Land and Labor Productivity 
The results of the determinant function for land and labor productivity are 
presented in Table 7.2. As expected, reallocations have a significant and negative 
impact on land productivity, indicating that tenure security does influence 
productivity. Share of certificates is positively related to both land and labor 
productivity, and significantly so. Share of certificates represent land 
transferability, therefore the results suggest that land transferability significantly 
affects productivity. This finding confirms the results of earlier research by 
LOHMAR ET AL. (2001) and FENG (2008), i.e., that land transfer markets facilitate 
the transfer of land from less to more productive households. However, the other 
two variables for land tenure arrangements, namely expectation of reallocation and 
land transfer rights were found to have no significant impact on land productivity. 
For all of these four institutional variables, only the coefficient of land transfer 
rights is significantly much different from zero in the labor productivity 
determinants function, suggesting that households in a village with little 
intervention in farmer land transactions are predicted to have higher labor 
productivity. 
Regarding land characteristics, farm size was found to have no significant impact 
on land productivity, but a highly significantly effect on labor productivity. The 
positive sign indicates an increasing return to scale; the bigger the farm, the more 
easily the formation of appropriate scale, and the higher the labor productivity of 
farmers. Moreover, plot number negatively affects land productivity, which 
indicates that land fragmentation leads to higher probability of land productivity 
reduction. As expected, soil quality rating positively affects land productivity. 
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However, these two variables have no significant impact on labor productivity. 
Table 7.2: OLS estimates of determinants for land and labor productivity 
Explanatory Variables Land productivity Labor productivity 
Coef. t S. E. Coef. t Robust 
S.E. 
Land tenure variables       
Land reallocations -13.91
**
 -2.37 5.877 -25.50 -0.78 32.62 
Expe. of reallocation 15.43 0.86 17.91 -10.72 -0.10 104.21 
Share of certificates 3.035
*
 2.04 1.487 -17.55 -1.49 11.75 
Land transfer rights -14.34 -0.86 16.64 153.9
*
 1.76 87.44 
Household variables       
Farm size (mu) 1.993 0.40 5.044 217.2
***
 3.44 63.12 
Plot number  -9.859
*
 -1.74 5.608 80.15 1.45 55.45 
Soil quality rating 96.78
***
 7.75 12.50 51.53 0.69 74.40 
Average adult age  3.431
**
 2.28 1.507 -6.124 -0.59 10.40 
Average adult 
education (yrs) 
18.89
***
 3.59 5.260 -0.809 -0.03 29.04 
Agricultural assets 8.834
*
 1.89 4.678 63.60
**
 2.58 24.66 
Market parti. variables       
Off-farm labor 
market (1=yes) 
40.56 1.10 36.91 -514.9
**
 -1.86 277.3 
Land rental market
1
 45.43
*
 2.06 43.54 969.9
***
 3.28 295.4 
Agriculture products 
market 
31.61
*
 0.70 45.09 872.6
***
 4.02 217.2 
County dummy (cf. 
Huaxian) 
      
Mengzhou 29.60 0.82 36.19 -1142.5
***
 -3.15 362.5 
Wenxian -121.7
***
 -3.25 37.42 -1403.4
***
 -3.94 356.0 
constant 1214.2
***
 10.46 116.05 1986.3
**
 2.33 853.0 
Number of 
observations 
382 382 
R squared 0.403 0.604 
Adj-R-squared 0.379  
F( 15, 366) 16.49 30.35 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
Notes: 
1
Household renting in decisions are predicted probabilities by estimating a probit model in Appendix 2. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Tests for homoskedasticity and 
multicollinearity for variables used in productivity analysis are in Appendix 3. 
For household characteristics, average adult age and average adult level of 
education were both found to positively, significantly, affect land productivity. The 
positive effect of age suggests that older farmers are more experienced. In addition, 
more education means more management skill and greater ease learning and 
accepting new technology. Surprisingly, these two variables have an insignificant 
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impact on labor productivity. One explanation for this might be that younger and 
more educated farmers more easily engage in migration or local off-farm work, 
they may only pursue part-time farming, thus the effect of average age and 
education have no significant impact on labor productivity. Household agricultural 
assets have a significantly positive impact on both land productivity and labor 
productivity. Households with more agricultural assets are expected to face fewer 
obstacles in agricultural production, besides, agricultural assets, especially 
mechanical assets, show a substitutive effect with labor input. 
Concerning off-farm employment, the OLS results show that it significantly effects 
labor productivity. The negative sign indicates that households who participate in 
off-farm employment have low labor productivity compared to households who do 
not. Households that rent land achieve higher land and labor productivity, because 
a well-developed land rental market enables the transfer of land from less 
productive households to more productive ones. Furthermore, the participation in 
product sales markets significantly increases both land and labor productivity. 
When involved in a sales market, as a production unit, households are also 
motivated by profit maximization, which results in optimizing resource allocation 
and improving productivity. Finally, the two county dummy variables indicate that 
households in Mengzhou have lower land productivity than households in Huaxian, 
and households in Mengzhou and Wenxian have low labor productivity than 
households in Huaxian. 
7.5 Results for SFP and the Determinants on Technical Efficiency 
7.5.1 Results for Stochastic Frontier Production Function 
The results of the stochastic frontier production function are presented in the upper 
part of Table 7.3. The inefficiency component of the disturbance term (u) is 
significantly different from zero, which indicates that there is statistically 
significant inefficiency in the data. Besides, the value of gamma ( ) indicates that 
47.2 percent of the variation in output is due to technical inefficiency. This means 
that technical inefficiency is likely to have an important effect in explaining output 
among farmers in the sample. 
As expected, output responded significantly and positively to land, fertilizers, and 
mechanical power. The elasticity of output with respect to land, fertilizers and 
mechanical power are 0.894, 0.030 and 0.052 respectively, indicating the 
importance of land as a scarce resource for agriculture production in China. Output 
responses to herbicides and pesticides are negative and statistically significant. The 
over-use of herbicides and pesticides is a common phenomenon in China, which 
  OFF-FARM EMPLOYMENT, LAND RENTAL MARKET AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY  129 
causes the diminishing return to production effect and environmental problems as 
well. The sum of the elasticity is 1.001. A test for constant returns to scale is 
support for agriculture production in study area. 
The average technical efficiency score for the sample was 0.85. This indicates that 
on the average 85 percent of the potential output is obtained by using the current 
mixture of production inputs. It also reveals the challenge and potential for 
improving agricultural production in Northwest Henan Province. The technical 
efficiency estimates ranged from 0.60 to 0.99. Of all the households in the sample, 
around 43 percent had technical efficiency scores below 0.85. This suggests that 
substantial gains in production can still be obtained by improving farm 
management practices under the existing technologies. 
7.5.2 Determinants of Technical Efficiency 
The results for the determinants of technical efficiency are presented in the lower 
part of Table 7.3. As proposed, land reallocation is found to be positively related to 
inefficiency, thus negatively related to technical efficiency. Because of tenure 
insecurity, farmers tend to invest less, especially for long term input such as 
organic fertilizers, which results in the decrease of soil quality and other related 
environmental problems and further leads to efficiency loss in production. Whereas, 
expectations of land reallocation was found to positively affect technical efficiency. 
A possible explanation is that when farmers assume that there will be a land 
reallocation in the near future, they tend to use more variable inputs, such as 
chemical fertilizer, herbicides and pesticides to maximize short-term agricultural 
profits on the current land. Therefore, in a short period, those households seem to 
achieve a higher technical efficiency. As with the impact on land and labor 
productivity, shares of certificates, land transfer rights have no significant impact 
on technical efficiency. 
Among the three land characteristics, only soil quality rating was found to have a 
positive impact on technical efficiency at the one percent significance level. 
Average adult age and average adult education level showed positive correlation to 
technical efficiency, indicating that more experienced and educated farmers are 
more efficient. As expected, agricultural assets have a positive effect on technical 
efficiency. With agricultural assets, especially those modern machines which are 
effective tools to improve technical efficiency, the use of mechanical power in 
production essentially makes farming less labor intensive and hence reduces the 
cost of production substantially. 
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Table 7.3: MLE estimate of the SFPF and inefficiency determinants 
Dependent variable: Ln Aggregate output of Grains 
(Yuan) 
   
Explanatory Variables: Production function part Coef. z Std. Err 
Ln labor input (man-days) 0.025 1.29 0.019 
Ln area planted (mu) 0.894
***
 29.16 0.031 
Ln seed (Yuan) 0.015 1.45 0.010 
Ln herbicides and pesticides (Yuan) -0.031
*
 -1.88 0.017 
Ln fertilizer (Yuan) 0.030
*
 1.71 0.018 
Ln machinery used (Yuan) 0.052
***
 3.43 0.015 
Ln irrigation (Yuan) 0.016 1.45 0.011 
Constant  6.459
***
 49.21 0.131 
Inefficiency determinants     
Land tenure variables    
Land reallocations 0.008
*
 1.94 0.004 
Expectation of reallocation -0.026
*
 -1.88 0.014 
Share of certificates -0.003
*
 -1.99 0.001 
Land transfer rights 0.005 0.39 0.014 
Household variables    
Farm size (mu) -0.006 -0.95 0.007 
Number of plots 0.003 0.56 0.005 
Soil quality rating -0.081
***
 -6.99 0.011 
Average adult age (yrs) -0.003
**
 -2.11 0.001 
Average adult education (yrs) -0.016
***
 -3.55 0.004 
Agricultural assets -0.006
*
 -1.75 0.003 
Market participation variables    
Off-farm labor market (1=yes) -0.038 -1.21 0.031 
Land rental market -0.064
*
 -1.78 0.038 
Agriculture products market -0.042 -1.28 0.033 
  County dummy (cf. Huaxian )    
Mengzhou  0.023 0.65 0.036 
Wenxian  0.111
**
 3.11 0.036 
Constant 0.517
***
 5.17 0.100 
lnsigma2 -4.503
***
   
Number of observations   382 
Gamma    0.472 
Wald chi2(7)   4020.31 
Loglikelihood   342.90 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Regarding household land rental market participation behavior, it was found to be 
positively related to technical efficiency, indicating that households that rented 
land achieved higher technical efficiency than households that did not rent land. 
This finding confirms that land resources could be transferred to higher efficiency 
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farmers through land rental markets (LOHMAR ET AL., 2001; FENG, 2008). Other 
market participation, off-farm labor markets and agricultural products markets 
were found to have no effect on technical efficiency. 
7.6 Variation of Productivity and Technical Efficiency 
Technical efficiency scores obtained from the stochastic frontier production 
function and calculated productivity scores are summarized in Table7.4. When we 
look at the situation across regions, both the productivity and efficiency scores for 
Huaxian are higher, the results showing that households in Huaxian are the most 
productive among all the three counties. Second are households in Mengzhou 
County, while farmers in Wenxian are the least productive. From a Kruskal-Wallis 
test
8
 (table 7.4), it is observed that the mean difference in productivity and 
technical efficiency scores among households of the three counties is statistically 
different to zero, which means that there is productivity and technical efficiency 
variation among the regions.  
Table 7.4: Kruskal-Wallis test of productivity and efficiency variation in counties 
County Land productivity Labor productivity TE 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Mengzhou (N=149) 1679.25 196.64 1583.20 921.27 0.88 0.06 
Wenxian (N=119) 1486.17 199.78 1175.70 732.39 0.79 0.07 
Huaxian (N=114) 1644.82 180.93 3432.40 1800.62 0.92 0.07 
H statistic 60.5 165.9 114.0 
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
By looking at the situation according to land rental market participation, 
households that rent land have higher productivity and efficiency scores. In 
particular, labor productivity for households who rent-in land is 1.5 times greater 
than that of households without land rental participation. The Man-Whitney test 
shows this variation to be statistically significant. This finding once again confirms 
the results of earlier research by DEININGER AND JIN (2005) i.e. that land rental 
markets have a positive impact on land transfer to more agriculturally able famers, 
also, technical efficiency can be improved at the same time (FENG, 2008). 
 
 
                                                             
8 Data did not meet the prerequisition of normality distribution and homogeneity of variance for applying ANOVA or T tests, 
therefore the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test and Man-Whitney test are suitable. The detailed test of normality and variance 
homogeneity can be found in appendix 4. 
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Table 7.5: Man-Whitney test of productivity and efficiency variation in land rental market 
participation 
County Land productivity Labor productivity  TE 
 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Land rent HH (N=147) 1640.73 181.44 2526.56 1646.08 0.88 0.07 
No rent HH (N=235) 1588.86 224.16 1683.81 1365.1 0.84 0.09 
Z statistic -2.367  -6.547  -3.952  
Sig. 0.018  0.000  0.000  
Total (N=382) 1608.83 210.03 2008.11 1533.4 0.86 0.08 
7.7 Factor Markets, Productivity and Rural Income 
The Chinese authorities have identified promoting agricultural productivity, raising 
farmers‟ incomes and narrowing the rural-urban income gap as top priorities for the 
near future (FENG, 2008). Raising productivity involves the production of greater 
outputs and higher earnings using lower quantities of inputs and through 
value-addition and innovation to cater to customer needs. Improvement of 
productivity would therefore bring down unit costs of agricultural products, while 
raising incomes of about 6.5 billion people living in rural areas. Reducing the 
rural-urban income gap is likely to depend on increases in the productivity of land 
and labor, and therefore on the development of rural land and off-farm labor 
markets (NYBERG AND ROZELLE, 1999). 
The development of rural land rental markets can improve agricultural 
productivity and equity by facilitating transfers of land to more productive 
farmers and facilitating participation in the non-farm economy by less productive 
farmers (TU, HEERINK AND LI 2006). Whereas the development of off-farm labor 
markets could facilitate the smooth movement of labor out of the agricultural 
sector into higher-paying non-agricultural jobs and provide land rental supply to 
farmers who want to stay in the agricultural sector (DEININGER ET AL, 2012). 
The analysis from the previous sections reveals that household land rental activity 
positively affects productivity and technical efficiency. This confirms that land 
rental markets facilitate the transfer of land to more productive farmers. Higher 
productivity will lead to higher income. However, this is just the short-run effect 
of land rental markets. From the long-run perspective, even if land productivity 
decreases, as long as household farm size increases, by renting land from other 
farmers, farm income could still continue to grow. Therefore, in the long-run, 
there is a need for structural change in agriculture and an increase in farm size.  
Moreover, this simultaneous process of structural adjustment and farm size 
increase depends very much on the labor market situation outside agriculture. 
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Because of the restrictions in total land availability, individual farm growth by the 
means of additional land can only be achieved when other farms reduce or give 
up their farming activities (BAUER AND MICKAN, 1997). Within the overall process 
of economic development, an increasing proportion of the people has to be 
employed in the industry or service sectors for the average farm size to be able to 
increase, in order to earn parity income from agriculture (BAUER AND KESTING, 
1993). Thus, for the policy aim of increasing rural household incomes and 
reducing the rural-urban income gap, the development of both land rental and 
off-farm labor markets are vital. 
7.8 Summary 
Land rental market development and off-farm employment have important 
implications for agricultural production. This chapter investigated the productivity 
and technical efficiency in agricultural production and examined the effect of land 
tenure arrangements, land rental market participation and off-farm employment on 
productivity and efficiency for 382 sample households in the study area.  
The empirical results allow drawing several main conclusions. The technical 
efficiency estimates ranged from 0.59 to 0.98 in agricultural production in 
Northeast Henan Province, with a mean value of 0.86, suggesting that there is a 14 
percent scope for increasing crop production under the existing technological 
conditions. Results from summarization of the mean productivity and technical 
efficiency scores by counties show that Huaxian earns the highest scores in both 
productivity and efficiency while Wenxian earns the lowest scores and Mengzhou 
ranks in between, indicating a regional difference in agricultural production.  
Results from determinants of productivity and technical efficiency show that 
secured land-use rights are positively related to land productivity and technical 
efficiency. This finding has strong policy implication that increasing tenure 
security, by prohibiting land reallocation and readjustment, facilitating formal land 
registration, and creating an efficient system of land administration in rural areas 
will increase agricultural production. 
The findings also show that participation in off-farm employment does not have an 
effect on land productivity and technical efficiency. A possible explanation of this 
finding is that agricultural production in the research area is characterized by small 
farm size and a large labor surplus and that the remittances sent home by migrants 
are mainly used for non-agricultural purposes, such as building houses and 
marriage. While off-farm employment is negatively related to labor productivity 
due to the substitution effect of labor allocation between farm and off-farm work. 
There is significant income difference between farm work and off-farm work in 
  OFF-FARM EMPLOYMENT, LAND RENTAL MARKET AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY  134 
China (LI, 2003), rational peasants (POPKIN, 1979; SCHULTZ 1964) would without 
doubt choose work in the off-farm sector to maximize their profit. Although 
off-farm employment decreases agricultural labor productivity, policies aimed at 
improving access to off-farm employment opportunities may improve household 
incomes and release more land rental supply in rural China. 
Participation in land rental markets positively affects productivity and technical 
efficiency. Compared to households with no land rental market participation, 
households that rent land are more productive and technically more efficient. 
Therefore, the development of land rental markets allows land to be transferred to 
those who are more capable of earning a higher return from agricultural production; 
which suggest that policies to stimulate the development of land rental markets 
would contribute significantly to agricultural production in rural China. Hence, in 
order to facilitate the realization of this transfer, measures to reduce the transaction 
costs of exchanging land would be appropriate. 
Participation in agricultural products markets increases both land and labor 
productivity. Rural households normally diversify into a range of farm, non-farm 
and off-farm activities (ELLIS, 2000) and consequently are integrated into the 
market through participation in multiple input markets as well as multiple output 
markets. Overall, increased market orientation moves rural households from 
subsistence production to profit and (cash) income-oriented decision making units, 
which can result in increased production.
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8 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter summarizes the main findings of the study, highlights the policy 
implications and provides recommendations for future research. The discussion is 
presented in three sections. The first section deals with a summary of issues related 
to the research problem and approaches followed. The second section discusses 
major results of the study and implications for policy. Finally, the third section 
indicates limitations of the study and recommends areas of future research. 
8.1 Summary of the Study 
8.1.1 Problem Statement and Methodological Approach  
As a result of over three decades of economic reform, China has made rapid 
progress in increasing agricultural productivity and farmer incomes and alleviating 
rural poverty. However, agricultural productivity and rural industrial growth have 
slowed down in recent years, and the income disparity between rural and urban 
households has widened rapidly. The development of land and labor markets, 
which facilitate the smooth movement of labor out of the agricultural sector into 
higher-paying, non-agricultural pursuits and market-based land transfers from less 
to more productive farmers who can expand the scale of their operations, may 
contribute both to increasing agricultural productivity and rural household incomes 
and to reducing the income inequality between rural and urban areas. 
Nevertheless, rural labor and land rental markets still face many institutional 
obstacles and remain largely underdeveloped (FENG, 2008). The current Hukou and 
land tenure systems are the most crucial. Better appreciation of how these 
institutional factors affect the direction and pace of rural structural change and 
productivity will be critical to understanding the underlying dynamics and helping 
design policies that can avoid the rising rural-urban inequality without having to 
resort to very costly and potentially distorting transfer payments (JIN, ET AL., 2012). 
However, even though China is at a critical point in terms of policy design, 
empirical studies in this area are lacking. 
To help close this gap, this study uses data collected from 479 randomly selected 
farm households in Henan province to explore the impact of land tenure 
arrangements on off-farm labor markets and land rental markets development and 
the combined effects of land institutions and factor markets development on 
agricultural production.  
Based on the notion of tenure security and transferability as the main ways through 
which land tenure affects behavior, this study uses four variables to measure land 
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tenure arrangements. Two variables have been chosen to represent tenure security: 
the number of reallocations that have taken place in a village since the HRS was 
established and household expectations of land reallocation in the next few years. 
The share of households with certificates in a village and land transfer rights 
possessed by a household are used to indicate household land transferability. 
The determinants of off-farm employment participation, off-farm employment 
labor allocation as well as their work duration were analyzed using probit, poisson 
and tobit models. Factors affecting land rental market participation and its 
transaction amount were analyzed using Cragg‟s double-hurdle model with the 
assumption that the decision to participate in land rental markets may precede the 
decision on its transaction amount. Simple Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regressions were used to investigate the impact of land tenure, off-farm 
employment and land rental participation on land and labor productivity. Finally, a 
one-step Stochastic Frontier Production model was employed for examining the 
determinants of technical efficiency. 
8.1.2 Empirical Findings  
In an effort to attain the major objectives of this study, important findings were 
obtained from the different employed analytical tools.  
The analysis of the determinants of off-farm labor market development indicates 
that tenure insecurity reduces incentives for exiting agriculture (mainly by 
migration), but have no influence on local off-farm employment, while certificates 
seem to increase participation in non-agricultural labor markets through their 
impact on both migration and local off-farm employment. Farm size significantly 
reduces off-farm employment, whereas fragmentation increases migration, but 
reduces local off-farm work. The quality of irrigation and drainage facilities, 
derived via farmer ratings, has a strong effect on both migration and local off-farm 
work. The finding of previous research that larger households and households with 
fewer dependents tend toward migration is further confirmed in this study. Farmer 
age reduces off-farm labor market participation and education promotes off-farm 
employment, especially migration, which is also consisting with earlier research 
findings. However, income deprivation is significantly and negatively related to 
off-farm labor supply, which is opposite to relative deprivation theory. One 
possible explanation is that the calculation of income in this study includes 
remittances, which makes households who do not have migrants are relatively 
deprived in the village. 
The analysis on factors affecting household land rent decisions indicated that both 
land rent and its transaction amount are positively affected by share of certificates, 
  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 137 
farm size, and village land transfer rates; and negatively by migration days and 
tenure insecurity. There are also variables significantly affecting one decision and 
not the other. For instance, local off-farm work days and household labor 
endowment negatively and positively affect land rent participation, respectively, 
but have no significant influence on its rental amount. Similar analysis on the 
supply side of land rental markets indicates that both households land rent-out and 
its amount are positively affected by migration days, share of certificates and 
village average rent prices and negatively by land reallocation. Two very 
interesting findings are that farm size discourages land rent-out participation, but 
encourages the land rent-out amount, whereas land fragmentation works in the 
opposite way, it affects land rent-out participation positively and land rent-out 
amount negatively. 
In the analysis of determinants of land and labor productivity, it is verified that both 
land and labor productivity are positively affected by the share of certificates, a 
land rent-in dummy variable, agricultural assets and ratio of sold agricultural 
products. The positive influence of share of certificates and land rents indicates that 
land transfer markets could facilitate the transfer of land from less productive 
households to more productive ones. Additionally, land reallocation and land 
fragmentation negatively affect land productivity, while soil quality rating, average 
adult age and education positively affect land productivity. In contrast, farm size 
and off-farm employment positively and negatively affect labor productivity, 
respectively. 
Results from a one-step stochastic frontier model showed that output responded 
significantly and positively to land area, fertilizers, and mechanical power. While 
output responses to herbicides and pesticides were negative and statistically 
significant, indicating the problem of herbicides and pesticides overuse. The 
analysis also revealed that technical efficiency is positively related to the 
expectation of land reallocation, soil quality rating, average adult age and education 
and a land rent-in dummy, while negatively related to land reallocations. 
Furthermore, summarizing land and labor productivity and technical efficiency 
indicated that productivity and technical efficiency varies by region and land 
rent-in participation. 
8.2 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
China has witnessed a massive movement of labor away from the farm and an 
increasing incidence of land rental activities over the past decades. Institutional 
mechanisms, however, still impose substantial restrictions on the development of 
land rental markets and off-farm employment. The empirical analyses indicate that 
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land tenure security and land transferability incentive household‟s off-farm labor 
market and land rental market participation, while migration could facilitate land 
rental market development by releasing more land rental supply, and finally, the 
development of land rental markets improves the efficiency of land allocation, 
agricultural productivity, as well as technical efficiency. By summarizing the 
policy recommendations in previous chapters, a number of policy options can be 
formulated as follows.  
Further reform of land tenure and Hukou systems. 
These two systems have, for a long time, served as China‟s strategy to support and 
stimulate industrial growth. However, they have also limited the development of 
land and labor markets and thereby constrained increases in agricultural land and 
labor productivity. 
The current land tenure system, characterized by tenure insecurity and restrictions 
on land transfer rights, prevents rural households from marketing their land (and 
labor) resources as land remains the most important asset for farm households in 
terms of providing basic consumption needs (BURGESS, 2001), generating part of 
their income, and serving as a social safety net (DONG, 1996). Specific measures 
for emphasizing land tenure reforms are as follows. First, prohibit administrative 
land reallocation and promote a market-based land transfer system so that land 
resources can be allocated efficiently. Second, the government needs to set-up land 
offices in rural China and issue long-term land use rights certificates to farmers. 
Third, local government should reduce village level land transfer regulation 
through limiting the direct intervention of the village committee in household land 
transfers. 
The empirical results suggest that engagement in off-farm work, especially 
migration will promote the development of land rental markets. However, the 
difficulty of achieving urban Hukou status impedes most farmers from becoming 
permanent migrants, so they are reluctant to give up their farmland in their home 
villages, which further dampens land rental supply. Therefore, it is also necessary 
to further reform the Hukou system. Specifically, local city governments need to 
define reasonable entry criteria for gaining urban Hukou for migrants (for example, 
the migrants have worked in the city for 2-3 years and earned a monthly income 
above a certain level). At the same time, the city governments can establish a 
welfare package for migrants who are granted urban Hukou. This package would 
include basic social security, public housing and children‟s educational 
arrangements. Then, if a migrant reaches the entry criteria as defined above, and is 
willing to give up his or her rural lands on a voluntary basis, the migrant can be 
granted an urban Hukou, and automatically be eligible for the welfare package. 
  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 139 
The above reforms and their specific measures are very important prerequisites for 
developing land rental markets and stimulating off-farm employment, thereby 
increasing agricultural productivity and rural household incomes. 
Build local institutions that facilitate land transfer and off-farm employment 
The second set of policy options is to build local institutions that facilitate land 
transfers and off-farm employment. Land rental market participation and off-farm 
employment often involve high uncertainty and risk. Land rental transactions tend 
to be informal, short term, and involve little or no payment. Institutions that 
provide credit and/or help build information networks may therefore be 
instrumental in reducing the uncertainty and risk involved in land rental market 
participation and off-farm employment. These local institutions could provide 
information for households willing to participate in land rental transactions, and 
ensure long-term transactions that consolidate land and stipulate appropriate rents 
and written land rental contracts. 
Local institutions could also provide information for households interested in 
working off-farm, offer specialized training, and intervene in the negotiation with 
urban employers to ensure a fair salary, insurance, appropriate working conditions 
and written work contracts. They could provide interested households with relevant 
information and other help, such as credit to cover the initial costs of starting their 
own business or investing in farming or other industries. 
3. Promoting rural industry  
As is the case in many other less-developed areas in China, migration is still a 
dominant choice of households in the research area. Results from the descriptive 
analysis show that over 60% of households have migrant members. Given that 
population levels in Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou and other mega-cities in China 
are approaching their limits, future off-farm income-earning opportunities for 
rural households should, wherever possible, be created within their own region or 
even more locally. In other words, local off-farm employment should be 
stimulated. The development of rural industry plays an important role in creating 
job opportunities and increasing incomes. The development of local-based 
secondary and tertiary sectors and the growth of small towns and cities are crucial 
for absorbing future surplus rural labor. Rural areas should make use of their 
comparative advantages, as geographical concentration of specialized farms could 
lead to agricultural product processing enterprises in their region. Rural areas that 
are near cities and have attractive scenery can development rural tourism. 
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4. Investments in infrastructure constructions and social service 
Most rural areas in China are characterized by poor infrastructure, underdeveloped 
social services, and a fragile natural environment (OECD, 2005b). The conditions 
not only limit the potential for improving agricultural production, but also threaten 
farmer livelihoods. The empirical results reveal that developing infrastructure in 
irrigation and drainage will not only facilitate agriculture development, but also 
help release more labor from the agricultural sector. Moreover, educated farmers 
find it easy to engage in off-farm employment, even those who left in agriculture as 
productive farmers. Therefore, public investment in terms of improving rural 
infrastructure and social services in rural areas and providing free education and 
training may assist households to obtain access to off-farm employment and 
stimulate local land transfers. In this way, these interventions provide an important 
contribution to reducing income gaps and improving farmer livelihoods. 
8.3 Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Research 
The study used data from 479 farm households in three counties in Henan province. 
They were selected in such a way that the findings are assumed to be applicable to a 
much larger area of Henan province, and probably much of the North China Plain 
with winter wheat and summer maize-based production systems. However, the 
empirical results evidently do not allow up-scaling of the conclusions to China as a 
whole. Further research in other regions of China is needed to assess the extent to 
which the findings have more general validity. 
It is evident that this study uses cross-sectional household-level data. As a result, 
the linkages of variables across time are not investigated. This study examines the 
impact of land tenure arrangements on rural off-farm and land rental market 
development, and the consequences of that market participation on agricultural 
productivity and technical efficiency. Another important way that land property 
rights can impact agricultural production is through long-term investment in land, 
was not able to be investigated due to the crop rotation system, farmers‟ preferable 
use of chemical fertilizers and data limitation. 
Finally, there are two areas for follow-up research. First, future research might 
use panel data and develop a systems approach to fully investigate the impacts of 
land tenure arrangements on agricultural production through long-term investment 
and land transferability. Second, land and labor are undeniably linked and it is 
generally believed that household land rental and off-farm employment decisions 
are often made jointly. Some of the recent land reform pilots also involved the 
loosening of residency requirements and thus allow study of the interaction 
between the two markets.
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG (GERMAN SUMMARY) 
1. Hintergrund und Arbeitsziel 
Nach drei Jahrzehnten der ökonomischen Reformanstrengungen in China ist die 
landwirtschaftliche Produktivität und das Einkommen der Landwirte gestiegen, 
wodurch die Armut in ländlichen Regionen gemildert wurde. Gleichsam 
verlangsamte sich der landwirtschaftliche Produktivitätsanstieg in den letzten 
Jahren genauso wie der Industrialierungsprozess im ländlichen Raum. Die Kluft 
zwischen ländlichen und urbanen Einkommen wuchs stetig. Die Entwicklung der 
regionalen Arbeitsmärkte erleichterte den Übergang von Arbeitskräften heraus aus 
dem landwirtschaftlichen Sektor, hinein in besser bezahlte 
außerlandwirtschaftliche Beschäftigung. Kleinere Grundbesitzer treten ihr Land 
auf Basis marktwirtschaftlicher Regeln an produktivere Großgrundbesitzer ab. 
Diese können ihre Produktionen erweitern, während die anderen in neuen 
Wirtschaftszweigen anwandern. Beide Entwicklungen leisten ihren Beitrag zur 
Reduzierung der Einkommensungleichheit zwischen ländlichen und urbanen 
Gebieten. 
Nichtsdestotrotz stehen sowohl dem regionalen Arbeitsmarkt als auch dem 
Landpachtmarkt bürokratische Hindernisse entgegen, die die Dynamik des 
landwirtschaftlichen Strukturwandel abbremsen. Das aktuelle Hukou
9
- und 
Landbesitzregister spielt dabei eine entscheidende Rolle. Um die Eigendynamik 
dieser Prozesse zu begreifen, ist eine bessere Einschätzung dieser Faktoren in 
Bezug auf Geschwindigkeit der ländlichen Strukturveränderungen und 
Produktivitätssteigerungen von großer Bedeutung. Darauf basierend, lassen sich 
Strategien entwickeln, wie die Schere zwischen ländlichen und städtischen 
Regionen verringert werden kann, ohne kostspielige Finanzausgleichszahlungen in 
Kauf nehmen zu müssen. Obgleich sich China diesbezüglich an einem kritischen 
Punkt befindet, gibt es kaum empirische Erhebungen in diesem Bereich. 
Um diese wissenschaftliche Lücke zu schließen benutzt die vorliegende Studie 
Daten von 479 zufällig ausgewählten Haushalten in der Provinz Henan, um den 
Einfluss von Grundbesitzvereinbarungen auf Einnahmen außerhalb des 
Landwirtschaftsbetriebs (außerlandwirtschaftliche Beschäftigung) und die 
Strukturveränderungen in der Landwirtschaft zu untersuchen. Unter Bezugnahme 
auf die kombinierten Effekte regionaler Institutionen und die Entwicklung der 
Faktorenmärkte werden Veränderungen der landwirtschaflichen Produktion 
untersucht. 
                                                             
9Hukuo ist eine staatliche Wohnsitzkontrolle die entscheidet zwischen urbanen und ländliche Zugehörigkeit. 
 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 142 
2. Datenerhebung und methodische Auswertung 
Die empirische Studie basiert auf Daten einer Einkommenserhebung zufällig 
ausgewählter Haushalte in Henan, einer der landwirtschaftlich bedeutsamsten 
Provinzen in Zentral-China. Erhoben wurden die Daten im Jahr 2009. Methodisch 
umfasst die Erhebung vier-augige Interviews zu Fragen zu Pachtverträgern, zur 
landwirtschaftlichen Produktion, zur einkommensrelevanten Arbeitsverteilung 
(einschliesslich Migration in die Stadt und ländliche auserlandwirtschaftliche 
Beschäftigung) sowie zu demographischen und ökonomischen Charakteristika der 
Haushalte. Die meisten Befragten waren Haushaltsvorstände. Waren diese nicht 
verfügbar, wurde der Ehegatte/die Ehegattin befragt. 
Die Befragung umfasste drei Distrikte: Mengzhou, Wenxian und Huaxian – alle 
in der Henan-Provinz. Unter Berücksichtigung des ökonomischen 
Entwicklungsniveaus wurden drei Gemeinden in Mengzhou und Huaxian sowie 
zwei Gemeinden in Wenxian ausgewählt. Zudem wurden zwei bis drei Dörfer je 
nach topographischer Lage in jeder Gemeinde untersucht. In jedem Ort wurden 
30 Haushalte nach dem Zufallsprinzip befragt. Insgesamt umfasst die empirische  
Erhebung acht Gemeinden, 17 Dörfer und 479 Haushalte. 
Abhängig von der Grundbesitzsicherheit und deren Übertragbarkeit als Parameter 
des Verhaltens bei Pachtvertragsabtretungen benutzt die Studie vier Variablen, 
um den Prozess sich verändernder Grundbesitzvereinbarungen zu untersuchen. 
Zwei der Variablen repräsentieren das Maß der Besitzsicherheit: die Anzahl an 
umgesetzten Neuverteilungen pro Dorf, seit dem die HRS dort eingeführt wurde, 
sowie von den Haushalten erwartete Landumverteilungen in den nächsten Jahren. 
Die Anzahl von Haushalten mit entsprechenden Zertifikaten in einem Dorf und 
die freiheitliche Abtretung von Landnutzungsrechten indizieren die 
marktwirtschaftliche Funktionalität bei der Übertragbarkeit von Landbesitz. 
Die Determinanten von außerlandwirtschaftlicher Teilnahme am Arbeitsmarkt, 
von nicht-wirtschaftlicher Beschäftigungsneuzuteilung, sowie von der 
Arbeitsdauer wurden mit dem Probitmodell, der Poissonverteilung und dem 
Tobitmodell analysiert. Dem hingegen wurden Faktoren, die die Teilnahme am 
Landpachtmarkt und die Anzahl stattfindender Transaktionen erklären, mit 
Craggs Double-Hurdle-Modell untersucht. Angenommen wurde dabei, dass die 
Entscheidung, im Pachtmarkt aktiv zu werden, der Entscheidung voran steht, wie 
intensiv sich die Menge an Transaktionen gestaltet. Mithilfe der 
Ordinary-Least-Square-Regression (OLS) wurde der Einfluss auf den 
Grundsbesitz, die außerlandwirtschafliche Beschäftgigung und die Teilnahme an 
Pachtvertragsveränderungen und Arbeitsproduktivität untersucht. In einem letzten 
Schritt wurde eine „Stochastic Frontier Analysis“ (SFA) herangezogen, um den 
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Bestimmungsgröße von technischer Effizienz zu überprüfen. 
3. Empirische Ergebnisse 
Die Resultate der Untersuchungen belegen, dass es im Untersuchungsgebiete 
einen aktiven Arbeitsmarkt außerhalb der Landwirtschaft gibt. 93 Prozent der 
befragten Haushalte gaben an, dass sie im Jahr 2008 Arbeitsbeschäftigungen 
außerhalb des Agrarbereichs nachgegangen sind. Zudem hat sich der 
Pachtvertragsmarkt robust weiter entwickelt. Die Untersuchung brachte zum 
Vorschein, dass 49 Prozent der Haushalte im 2009 auf dem Grundbesitzmarkt 
aktiv wurden - obgleich die Haushalte noch immer viele Hindernisse überwinden 
müssen, um daran zu partizipieren. 
Die analysierten Determinanten zur Entwicklung des außerlandwirtschaftlichen 
Arbeitsektors zeigen, dass die rechtliche Besitzsicherung die Anreize reduzieren, 
die einen Ausstieg aus der Landwirtschaft ermöglichen sollen, während 
Zertifikate die Anreize steigern, da sie gleichermaßen auf Migration und 
regionale Arbeitsplatzwechsel einwirken. Die Größe der Bauernhöfe verringert 
die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass ein Bauer eine außerlandwirtschaftliche Arbeit sucht, 
wohingegen die Flächenaufspaltung die Migrationsbewegungen bewirken, 
gleichsam aber lokale außerlandwirtschaftliche Beschäftigung vermindern. Die 
Qualität des Be- und Entwässerungsanlagen beeinflussen die Anreize 
gleichermaßen, wenn es um Migration und Branchenwechsel geht. Die 
Ergebnisse früherer Untersuchungen konnten innerhalb dieser Studie belegt 
werden, wonach größere Haushalte und Haushalte in geringen 
Abhängigkeitsverhältnissen eher zur Migration bereit sind. Höheres Alter 
beeinflusst die Teilnahme an außerlandwirtschaftliche Beschäftigung negativ, 
während höhere Bildungsabschlüsse begünstigend wirken. Das gilt vor allen 
Dingen für Migrationsbewegungen - ein Befund, der sich ebenfalls mit früheren 
empirischen Erhebungen deckt.  
Die Analyse jener Faktoren, die eine Entscheidung zur Verpachtung von 
Ländereien in den individuellen Haushalten bedingen, brachte zu Tage, dass 
Pachtverträge und der Pachtpreis in etwa gleichem Maße durch 
Zertifizierungsscheine, die Größe der Bauernhöfe und die Ausstattung der Arbeit 
beeinflusst werden. Außerdem verpachten Haushalte in Dörfern, in denen ein 
aktiver Landpachtmarkt floriert, ihr Land mit einer größeren Wahrscheinlichkeit. 
Demhingegen übt die Teilnahme an einer außerlandwirtschaftlichen 
Beschäftigung einen gegenteiligen Einfluss aus. Ähnliche Untersuchungen der 
Angebotsseite auf dem Landpachtmarkt haben gezeigt, dass Pachtverträge, 
Pachtpreishöhe und Migration die Entscheidung zur Landverpachtung positiv 
beeinflussen. Pachtverträge führen dazu, dass Haushalte ihr Land bereitwilliger 
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abgeben. Landaufteilungen und die Anzahl der Arbeitskräfte üben einen 
gegensätzlichen Einfluss aus. 
Die Analyse der verschiedenen Parameter von Land- und Arbeitsproduktivität hat 
ergeben, dass beide positiv durch Landzertifizierungsscheine und Partizipation an 
agrarkulturellen Erzeugnissen beeinflusst werden. Dies zeigt, dass die 
Landpachtmärkte den Verkauf von Ländereien von weniger produktiven 
Betrieben hin zu produktiveren erleichtern können. Weitere Variablen, die einen 
positiven Effekt ausüben, sind landwirtschaftlicher Besitz und die Teilhabe am 
Gütermarkt.  Zudem wurde deutlich, dass Landumverteilungen und die 
Fragmentierung von Grundbesitz die Produktivität lähmen, während die 
Bodenqualität, das Durchschnittsalter der Erwachsenen und der Bildungsgrad die 
Produktivität steigern. 
Die Ergebnisse des SFA zeigten, dass Outputs deutlich positiv auf 
Landbeschaffenheit, Düngemittel und mechanische Leistungskraft reagierten. 
Durch die übermäßige Verwendung von Herbiziden und Pestiziden kristallisierte 
sich ein deutlich negativer Einfluss auf die Outputs heraus. Die Analyse 
offenbarte des Weiteren, dass Neuverteilung des Landes die technische Effizienz 
negativ beeinflußt, während Bodenqualität, das Durchschnittsalter der 
Erwachsenen, der Bildungsgrad und verpachtete Ländereien effizienzsteigernd 
wirken. 
Die oben aufgezählten empirischen Ergebnisse lassen verschiedene 
Schlussfolgerungen zu. Erstens, schaffen Landbesitzsicherheit und 
Landbesitzübertragbarkeit Anreize zur Partizipation der Haushalte an einer 
außerlandwirtschaftlichen Beschäftigung und am Landpachtmarkt. Zweitens, 
kann Migration die Entwicklung der Landpachtmärkte durch eine Zunahme des 
Pachtangebots erleichtern. Und drittens, verbessert die Entwicklung von 
Landpachtmärkten die Effizienz von Landaufteilungen, der landwirtschaftlichen 
Produktivität und der technischen Effizienz. 
4. Schlussfolgerungen für die Politik 
Basierend auf den empirischen Ergebnissen schließt diese Studie mit einer Reihe 
von politischen Vorschlägen zur weiteren Verbesserung der Entwicklung von 
Pachtmärkten und außerlandwirtschaftlicher Beschäftigung, sowie zur Förderung 
des Wachstums der landwirtschaftlichen Produktivität und der ländlichen 
Haushaltseinkommen. 
a. Weitere Reformen der Bodenordnung und des Hukuo-Systems 
Das aktuelle Bodenordnungssystem ist gekennzeichnet von unsicheren 
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Besitzverhältnissen und Restriktionen im Landtransferrecht. Es verhindert, dass 
ländliche Haushalte ihr Land- und ihre Arbeitskraftressourcen auf dem Markt 
anbieten, weil Boden noch immer das wichtigste Kapital für sie ist, wenn es um 
die Sicherstellung der persönlichen Grundversorgung geht (BURGESS, 2001). Das 
Land generiert große Teile ihres Einkommens und funktioniert als soziales 
Sicherheitsnetz (DONG, 1996). Spezifische Maßnahmen für Bodenreformen 
könnten wie folgt aussehen: Erstens, sollte die Regierung die administrative 
Landumverteilung verbieten ein marktorientierten Landaustauschsystem fördern. 
Dadurch könnte die Ressourcen des Landes effizienter genutzt werden. Zweitens, 
muss die Regierung regionale Ämter ins Leben rufen und die Herausgabe 
langjähriger, zertifizierter Bodennutzrechte für Landwirte in den Mittelpunkt 
stellen. Drittens, sollten lokale Regierungen auf Dorfebene die Regulierung der 
Märkte zurückfahren, indem Ortsvorstände keinen direkten Einfluss mehr auf 
Landverkäufe nehmen dürfen. 
Das Hukou-System schränkt die Arbeitnehmermobilität und die Bodenressourcen 
ein, weil es im städtischen Raum schwer eine Hukou-Lizenz zu bekommen ist. 
Der Großteil der Landwirte migriert daher nicht auf Dauer. Sie weigern sich die 
landwirtschaftlichen Flächen in ihrer Heimat aufzugeben, was wiederum das 
Landpachtangebot mindert. Bei weiteren Reformen des Hukou-Systems müssen 
die lokalen Stadtverwaltungen dafür Sorge tragen, dass die Aufnahmekriterien für 
Migranten realistisch definiert werden. (z.B. für den Fall, dass ein Migrant in 
einer Stadt seit zwei oder drei Jahren mit einem bestimmten monatlichen 
Mindesteinkommen gearbeitet hat). Dies schafft Rechtssicherheit. Gleichzeitig 
könnten Stadtverwaltungen Sozialleistungen für Migranten einführen, die in der 
jeweiligen Stadt einen Arbeitsplatz angenommen haben. Die Leistungen könnten 
Sozialversicherungen, Sozialwohnungen und Bildungsangebote für die Kinder 
beinhalten. Erfüllen Migranten die Aufnahmekriterien, wie sie oben skizziert 
wurden, und sind freiwillig dazu bereit ihre Heimat und ihren Grundbesitz 
aufzugeben, treten die Sozialleistungen automatisch in Kraft. 
b. Aufbau Institutionen, die die Grundstücktransfers und die 
außerlandwirtschaftliche Beschäftigung erleichtern 
Die Partizipation an Pachtmärkten und die Aufnahme von Beschäftigung 
außerhalb der Landwirtschaft sind häufig von hoher Unsicherheit und Risiko 
geprägt. Verpachtungen sind informell, kurzbefristet und beinhalten eine geringe 
oder ganz ausbleibende Bezahlung. Institutionen, die Kredite bereitstellen und 
Informationsnetzwerke aufbauen, können dabei helfen, das Risiko zu schmälern. 
Sie sollten Informationen für die Haushalte bereitstellen, die bereit sind, an 
Pachttransaktionen teilzunehmen, und langfristige Rechtssicherheit zu angemessen 
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Mieten und schriftlich vorliegenden Verträgen sicherzustellen. Die Institutionen 
könnten auch Informationen für interessierte Haushalte bereitstellen, die 
außerlandwirtschaftlich Arbeit wollen, ihnen eine spezialisierte Ausbildung 
anbieten und in Verhandlungen mit städtischen Arbeitgebern eingreifen, um ein 
faires Gehalt, Versicherungen, angemessene Arbeitsbedingungen und schriftliche 
Arbeitsverträge zu gewährleisten. Sie könnten interessierten Haushalten 
Informationen und andere Hilfe zukommen lassen – etwa Kredite zur Gründung 
eigener Geschäfte oder zur Investition in landwirtschaftliche und andere 
Industrien. 
c. Förderung ländlicher Industrie 
In der Untersuchungsregion ist, wie in vielen anderen wenig entwickelten 
Regionen Chinas, Migration immer noch gängige Praxis. Die Ergebnisse der 
deskriptiven Analyse zeigen, dass es in über 60 Prozent der Haushalte Migranten 
gibt. Vor dem Hintergrund, dass sich die Bevölkerungsdichte in chinesischen 
Millionenstädten wie Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou und anderen ihren Grenzen 
nähert, sollten wenn möglich regionale oder lokale, außerlandwirtschaftliche 
Einkommensmöglichkeiten geschaffen werden. Mit anderen Worten, lokale, nicht 
landwirtschaftliche Arbeitsstellen sollten gefördert werden. Die Entwicklung 
ländlicher Industrie spielt eine wichtige Rolle für die Schaffung von regionalen 
Arbeitsstellen und für die Einkommenserhöhung ländlicher Haushalte. Die 
Entwicklung regional und lokalbasierter sekundärer und tertiärer Sektoren sowie 
das Wachstum kleiner Dörfer und Städte sind entscheidend, um Überschüsse an 
ländlicher Arbeitskraft aufzufangen. Ländliche Regionen sollten ihre 
Wettbewerbsvorteile nutzen um mögliche Entwicklungsschritte zu forcieren. Dies 
könnte zur räumlichen Konzentration spezialisierter landwirtschaftlicher Betriebe 
und zur Entwicklung gemeinsamer Verarbeitungs- und 
Vermarktungsunternehmen führen. Ländliche Regionen in Stadtnähe könnten sich 
zu Naherholungsbieten entwickeln. 
d. Investitionen in Infrastruktur und soziale Dienste 
Die meisten ländlichen Gebiete in China sind charakterisiert von einer mangelnden 
Infrastruktur, unterentwickelten Sozialsystemen und schwachen 
Umweltbedingungen (OECD; 2005b). Die Bedingungen schränken nicht nur das 
Potenzial zur Verbesserung der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion ein, sondern 
bedrohen zudem auch die Lebensgrundlage der Bauern. Durch die empirischen 
Analysen wurde herausgefunden, dass Infrastrukturentwicklungen bei Be- und 
Entwässerung nicht nur die Entwicklung der Landwirtschaft fördern können, 
sondern auch den Übergang von landwirtschaftlichen in nicht-landwirtschaftliche 
Beschäftigung foroieren. Darüber hinaus können gut ausgebildete Landwirte leicht 
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in neue Arbeitssektoren integriert werden. Gleichzeitig können die in der 
Landwirtschaft verbleibenden produktiver arbeiten. Demzufolge tragen öffentliche 
Investitionen zur Verbesserung der ländlichen Infrastruktur und der sozialen 
Dienste bei, eröffnen den Zugang zur kostenlosen Bildung und Ausbildung. Dies 
unterstützt den Übergang landwirtschaftlicher Haushalte in 
außerlandwirtschaftliche Beschäftigung und regt zur Abtretung von Grundbesitz 
an. Durch diese Maßnahmen wird ein wichtiger Beitrag geleistet, um 
Einkommenslücken zwischen Regionen und Städten zu reduzieren und die 
Lebensgrundlage der Landwirte zu verbessern. 
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Appendix 1: Comparison of Tobit and Cragg‟s double-hurdle model for household 
land rental decision and the transaction amount  
Table A1.1: Comparison of Tobit and Double-hurdle model for household land rent 
decision 
Variables Tobit Probit for 
participation 
Truncated reg. 
for rent amount 
Coef. t S. E. Coef. S. E. Coef. S. E. 
Migration days -0.005
***
 -4.50 0.001 -0.002
***
 0.0003 -0.002
**
 0.001 
Local off farm 
days 
-0.002 -1.50 0.001 -0.001
***
 0.0005 -0.001 0.001 
Reallocations -0.528
**
 -2.83 0.186 -0.186
***
 0.065 -0.770
***
 0.171 
Expectation of 
reallocation 
dummy 
-0.186 -0.51 0.366 -0.009 0.134 -0.532 0.352 
Share of 
certificates 
0.114
***
 4.10 0.027 0.046
***
 0.011 0.105
***
 0.027 
Land transfer 
rights 
-0.672
**
 -2.26 0.297 -0.535
***
 0.121 1.070
***
 0.340 
Labor  0.712
***
 3.14 0.227 0.329
***
 0.089 0.148 0.205 
Farm size 1.842
***
 6.40 0.288 0.273
*
 0.158 1.434
***
 0.246 
Fragmentation  -0.277
**
 -2.10 0.132 -0.048 0.051 0.061 0.122 
Sex dummy 0.382 0.59 0.643 0.058 0.249 0.174 0.624 
Age (yrs) -0.041
*
 -1.84 0.022 -0.006 0.008 -0.054
***
 0.019 
Education (yrs) -0.186
*
 -1.91 0.097 -0.012 0.037 -0.144 0.088 
Cadre dummy 0.195 0.25 0.787 0.008 0.286 0.399 0.697 
Village land 
transfer rate 
0.109
***
 5.56 0.196 0.038
***
 0.007 0.064
***
 0.177 
Village off-farm 
employment rate 
-0.078
*
 -1.91 0.041 -0.014 0.017 -0.192
***
 0.038 
Mengxian 1.654
**
 2.02 0.818 0.332 0.375 3.001
***
 0.687 
Wenxian 1.945
**
 2.20 0.885 0.186 0.406 3.346
***
 0.745 
Constant -4.838
**
 -2.04 2.376 -1.828
*
 0.941 0.983 2.130 
No. of 
observations 
479   479  152  
Chi-square 246.55   209.75  108.52  
Log likelihood -501.839   -194.425  -273.250  
sigma 3.171
***
     2.432
***
  
2 test Double-Hurdle versus Tobit, λ = 68.32 > 2 (17) = 33.41  
(double-hurdle is preferable) 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table A1.2: Comparison of Tobit and Double-hurdle model for household land rent out 
decision 
Variables Tobit Probit for rent 
out participation 
Truncated reg. 
for rent out 
amount 
Coef. t S. E. Coef. S. E. Coef. S. E. 
Migration days 0.007
***
 6.71 0.001 0.003
***
 0.0005 0.0007
*
 0.0004 
Local off farm 
days 
0.006
***
 4.63 0.001 0.003
***
 0.0005 0.0002 0.0004 
Reallocations -0.835
***
 -3.67 0.227 -0.281
**
 0.094 -0.245
*
 0.111 
Expectation of 
reallocation 
dummy 
0.530 1.61 0.329 0.215 0.165 0.044 0.090 
Share of 
certificates 
0.218
***
 6.74 0.032 0.091
***
 0.014 0.030
*
 0.012 
Land transfer 
rights 
-0.042 -0.16 0.259 -0.180 0.113 0.229
**
 0.083 
Labor  -0.966
***
 -3.59 0.269 -0.396
***
 0.117 -0.028 0.082 
Farm size -0.306 -1.87 0.163 -0.231
**
 0.078 0.600
***
 0.063 
Fragmentation 0.262 1.52 0.172 0.162
*
 0.081 -0.213
***
 0.059 
Sex dummy 0.093 0.14 0.663 0.065 0.284 -0.097 0.207 
Age (yrs) 0.047 1.83 0.025 0.017 0.011 0.0003 0.009 
Education (yrs) 0.194 1.95 0.100 0.079
*
 0.044 0.064
*
 0.031 
Cadre dummy -0.575 -0.68 0.850 -0.231 0.399 0.152 0.264 
Village land 
transfer rate 
-0.0246 -1.34 0.018 -0.008 0.008 -0.00152 0.007 
Village average 
rent 
0.002 1.88 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0004 
Mengxian 0.283 0.30 0.947 0.220 0.426 -0.744
*
 0.164 
Wenxian 0.346 0.34 1.004 0.316 0.446 -0.984
**
 0.329 
Constant -13.17
***
 -4.55 2.895 -5.099
***
  -0.319 0.329 
No. of 
observations 
479   479  90  
Chi-square 220.36   205.84  416.99  
Log likelihood -297.864   -128.507  -76.205  
sigma 2.684
***
 11.64    0.573
***
  
      -0.556
***
  
2 test Double-Hurdle versus Tobit, λ = 186.304 > 2 (17) = 33.41 
 (double-hurdle is preferable) 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix 2: Results of the determinants of land rent probit model 
Table A2.1: Determinants of land rent in probit model  
 Coef. z S.E. 
Reallocation times -0.277
***
 -4.64 0.060 
Expectation of reallocation -0.216 -1.46 0.148 
Share of certificates 0.079
***
 6.89 0.011 
Land transfer rights -0.471
***
 -4.06 0.116 
Farm size (mu) 0.014 0.35 0.040 
Number of plots 0.024 0.37 0.064 
Soil quality rating 0.231
**
 2.17 0.106 
Average adults‟ age (years) -0.0098 -0.70 0.013 
Average adults‟ education  (years) -0.078* -1.71 0.046 
Participate in off-farm labor market (1=yes) -0.002 -0.01 0.336 
Agricultural assets 0.099
**
 2.53 0.039 
Ration of sold agriculture products 0.560 1.54 0.365 
Mengxian -0.101 -0.32 0.315 
Wenxian -0.148 -0.42 0.351 
Constant -1.115 -1.17 0.954 
No. of observations 382   
Chi-square 139.23   
Log likelihood -184.94   
Pseudo R2 0.28   
Note:
 ***, **
 and 
*
 indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Appendix 3: Test for homoskedasticity and multicollinearity for variables used in 
productivity analysis  
Table A3.1: Cameron & Trivedi’s decomposition of IM-test for variables used in land 
productivity analysis 
Source Chi2 df p 
Heteroskedasticity 132.03 130 0.434 
Skewness 14.61 15 0.480 
Kurtosis 3.23 1 0.072 
Total 149.86 146 0.396 
Note: White‟s test for H0: homoskedasticity; against H1: unrestricted heteroskedasticity. p value 
has to be less than the given significance level to reject the null hypothesis, therefore there is no 
severe homoskedasticity problem. 
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Table A3.2: Cameron & Trivedi’s decomposition of IM-test for variables used in labor 
productivity analysis 
source Chi2 df p 
Heteroskedasticity 239.24 130 0.000 
Skewness 38.36 15 0.008 
Kurtosis 3.21 1 0.073 
Total 280.81 146 0.000 
Note: White‟s test for H0: homoskedasticity; against H1: unrestricted heteroskedasticity. p value 
has to be less than the given significance level or Chi2 = 239.24 >
2 (15) = 32.80 to reject the null 
hypothesis, therefore there is homoskedasticity problem. 
Table A3.3: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for variables used in productivity analysis 
variables VIF 1/VIF 
Mengxian 4.60 0.218 
Wenxian 4.25 0.236 
Land transfer rights 3.31 0.302 
Share of certificates 2.52 0.397 
Farm size (mu) 2.31 0.433 
Ration of sold agriculture 
products 
1.53 0.653 
Average adults‟ age 
(years) 
1.34 0.748 
Average adults‟ 
education  (years) 
1.31 0.765 
Number of plots 1.30 0.770 
Participate in land rental 
market 
1.21 0.829 
Soil quality rating 1.20 0.833 
Reallocation times 1.15 0.873 
Participate in off-farm 
labor market (1=yes) 
1.12 0.893 
Expectation of 
reallocation 
1.10 0.908 
Agricultural assets 1.08 0.922 
Mean VIF 1.95  
Note: Using the available rules of thumb (i.e. average VIF Has to be less than 2; individual VIF 
has to be less than 10), there is no severe multicollinearity problem. 
 
 
 
 
  APPENDICES  169 
Appendix 4: Test for Normality and Homogeneity for land productivity, labor 
productivity and technical efficiency by county and land rental participation 
Table A4.1: Komogorov-Smirnov Test of Normality for productivity and TE by county 
and land rental participation 
County Land productivity Labor productivity TE 
Statistic Sig. Statistic Sig. Statistic Sig. 
Mengzhou (N=149) 0.909 0.380 1.786 0.003 1.126 0.159 
Wenxian (N=119) 0.486 0.972 1.669 0.008 0.489 0.970 
Huaxian (N=114) 0.776 0.583 1.260 0.084 1.631 0.010 
Land rent HH 
(N=147) 
1.034 0.235 1.764 0.004 1.363 0.049 
No rent HH (N=235) 0.601 0.863 3.043 0.000 1.164 0.133 
Note: Significance of data means the distribution is significantly different from a normal 
distribution, i.e. it is non-normal. 
Table A4.2: Test of Homogeneity of Variance for productivity and TE by county and land 
rental participation 
County Land productivity Labor productivity TE 
Statistic Sig. Statistic Sig. Statistic Sig. 
Mengzhou (N=149) 2.840 0.094 3.755 0.055 6.304 0.013 
Wenxian (N=119) 1.835 0.178 9.586 0.002 6.977 0.009 
Huaxian (N=114) 2.722 0.102 0.289 0.592 2.879 0.093 
Land rent HH 
(N=147) 
0.111 0.895 6.438 0.002 0.172 0.842 
No rent HH (N=235) 0.101 0.904 44.7 0.000 0.744 0.476 
Note: Significance of data means the variances in different groups are significantly different, data 
are not homogenous 
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